【作者】 李峻；

【导师】 张应强；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 高等教育学， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 我国处于一个利益分化的社会转型时期，各群体的利益矛盾十分突出。而公共政策过程就是不断整合利益的过程。我国的高考政策是影响千家万户的一项公共教育政策。近年来，社会各界对高考政策公平性争议的实质是利益之争。由于以往对高考政策分析的技术路径的限制，使得如何合理界定高考政策中各个主体之间的深层关系成为一个刚刚破题而又尚未形成一致性结论的重要课题。利益相关者理论是一种对公共政策中的利益进行分析而且颇有成效的分析方法。借用该理论的思想与方法，我们发现高考政策的变迁中存在中央政府、地方政府、高校以及考生等核心利益相关者，他们之间存在着不同的利益诉求以及争取自身利益的行为选择。通过截取招生计划政策、反“高考移民”政策以及保送生政策变迁中利益相关者博弈的过程进行分析后发现，中央政府、地方政府、高校以及考生之间为了各自利益最大化存在着非合作博弈行为。类似的非合作博弈会导致个体理性与个体理性、个体理性与集体理性之间的冲突，造成利益总量的“漏损”。而只有通过合理的制度安排，促使各利益相关者进行“无限重复博弈”，各方才有望达成合作，减少冲突。我国高考政策变迁历程是各个利益相关者利益格局不断调整的过程。这个利益调整的过程是通过利益相关者之间“利益冲突——调整——阶段性均衡——冲突——阶段性均衡”的循环博弈模式实现的，利益非均衡与利益均衡状态交替出现。利益相关者对潜在利益的追求以及制度环境中某些外生性变量诱致了政策的变迁，形成了诱致性制度变迁路径；而一定的非正式制度向正式制度转变形成了政府主导的强制性制度变迁路径，并且在变迁过程中存在“路径依赖”和“政策学习”的现象。未来的高考政策变革应该致力于建立中央政府、地方政府、高校以及考生之间的利益均衡机制，促使各个利益相关者在利益均衡点上寻找“合作之路”。因此，高考政策的公平性建构必须在遵循合法性、合理性与现实性的基础上，通过科学界定各个利益主体的权利、建立利益主体的政策参与和利益协商机制以及扩大利益供给等途径实现。更多还原

【Abstract】 Our country has stepped into the period of transformation, and the conflict among interest groups is serious. The process of public policy is the process of interest integration. As a public policy, China’s National Matriculation Tests Policies (NMTP) influent every family. In recent years, the nature of discussion on National Matriculation Tests Policies in society is interest diversity.Because technical paths limit analyzing procedure, how to define the relationship between the central government,local government, colleges and students becomes a new but important question remaining to be solved.The stakeholder theory can be used to analyze the interset of public policy,and it would a feasible resolvent. In the view of the stakeholder theory,we find that there are some core stakehoders in China’s National Matriculation Tests Policies (NMTP) ,such as central government,local government, colleges and students. The core stakehoders have their own interset and they pursue different interests in the policy change of China’s National Matriculation Tests Policies. By offering and analyzing the the game instances in the change of Planning Policy, Anti-immigrants Policy and Recommended Students Policy, we can find that the core stakeholders play non-cooperation game for their own max-interset. Suchlike game will always arouse the contradictions between individual and individual ration, individual and collective ration.Only through reasonable institutional arrangement can these stakeholders’ play infinite repeated game, come to an agreement and then the contradictions be solved.The change of China’s National Matriculation Tests Policies is the intersest adjustment process of every core stakehoders. The intersest adjustment process of every core stakehoders’ interests realizes in a circulating way: from "confliction" to "adjustment" to"periodic balance"to"confliction"to "periodic balance" and so on. The state of interests equilibrium and non- equilibrium emerges alternately. The claim to potential interest of stakehoders and some exogenous variables of institutional environment induced the institution change, and led to the path of induced institution change;some informal institution transferred to formal institution and formed force-derivative institutional evolution leding by government. We also find there are path dependence and policy learning in the change of China’s National Matriculation Tests Policies.The reform of China’s National Matriculation Tests Policies should bulid up a set of profit-balanced mechanism among central government,local government, colleges and students,make all the stakehoders research a cooperative path at their profit-balanced point.Therefore,faire China’s National Matriculation Tests Policies should be built on legitimacy, rationality and actuality, be definited all the stakehoders’ rights.In addition, we should construct a set of mechanism for policy participation and profit negotiation,and increase supply.更多还原