【作者】 黄满池；

【导师】 彭建刚；

【作者基本信息】 湖南大学 ， 金融学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 公司并购是资本市场资源配置优化的重要形式,也是资本市场发展的重要推动力量。市场经济先行国家的经济发展史,从一定意义上来说就是一部公司并购史。然而,由于历史原因,我国资本市场存在着股权分置现象,上市公司股东被割裂成非流通股东与流通股东,表现出“同股不同权、同股不同价、同股不同利”的中国特色。股权分置使公司治理缺乏共同的利益基础,成为完善股票市场基础制度的一个重大障碍。在此情况下,我国上市公司的并购与成熟资本市场有很大不同,存在许多缺陷,致使并购活动的正面效应难以体现。股权分置改革是推进上市公司并购的重要催化剂,中国并购市场在股权分置问题解决后将进入一个崭新的充满机遇的“新并购时代”。基于此,系统而又深入地研究股权分置及其改革时期的上市公司并购问题具有重要的理论价值与现实意义。首先,本文梳理了国内外学者对股权分置改革问题及对上市公司并购理论和实证的研究成果,指出当前研究中存在的缺陷与问题,为后面各章的论述奠定了理论基础。其次,应用博弈论建立了一个对上市公司并购掏空与支持理论的全新解释框架,该框架中分别对关联并购和非关联并购建立了博弈模型,研究并购方大股东的策略选择以及不同股权制度安排对策略选择的影响。就非关联并购而言,股权分置状态下被并购公司的质量越好,并购方越倾向于采取掏空策略,在通货膨胀较高、市场风险加大的时候,大股东的行为就会更加“短视”。而在全流通条件下,同股不同价问题的解决会使大股东的掏空行为得到抑制。就关联并购而言,股权分置状态下,大股东倾向于实施掏空策略,而小股东则往往选择用脚投票策略。而在全流通条件下,大股东实施支持策略的动机增强,小股东也会改用用手投票策略。再次,论文分别对股权分置状态下和全流通条件下上市公司并购行为进行了实证研究。在股权分置状态下,通过对股票市场近十年的走势分析以及对2002-2003年间180起并购事件的实证检验,得到股权分置下掏空行为的逆向选择问题和长期均衡特征:股市长期低迷,在低迷的股市中绝大部分上市公司更倾向于掏空行为。而且我国资本市场长期以来实行的股权分置制度进一步加剧了这种逆向选择和长期均衡的态势。在全流通条件下,通过对2005-2006年间已经完成股改的全流通上市公司(财务数据截止到2008年4月30日)并购绩效进行实证检验,分析了沪深两市中股改并购公司绩效反应模式,并购公司是否为绩优公司时对并购公司绩效的影响,以及关联并购对并购公司的绩效影响。实证显示股权分置改革后我国上市公司并购的动因已经发生了改变,并购动机出现出多元化趋势,以产业整合为目的的战略性并购将不断增加。最后,提出完善我国股权分置改革与提高上市公司并购效率的可操作性对策。针对大小非,本文提出对大小非施以严格的减持和披露程序,以及建立“大小非稳定社会责任基金”的思路,针对新股发行制度,本文认为改革的关键是利益分配,一方面要逐步实现发行定价市场化,另一方面,可以采取“市值配售”与“一人X手”相结合的发行制度。政府要减少行政干预,其手段应该从直接帮助的“有形之手”逐步转向市场导向与环境建设的“无形之手”。监管部门要完善并购法律法规体系,增强市场信息透明度,加强监督管理制度建设。中介机构要积极在并购中发挥应有的作用。上市公司则要完善内部治理结构,明确并购的目的与反并购的挑战。更多还原

【Abstract】 The company M&A is an important form of resource allocation and optimization of the capital market, and also important driving strength of its development. The economic development history of the countries leading in market economy development, in some sense, is the history of company M&A. However, a phenomenon of Split Share Structure exists in the capital market of our country due to historic reasons. The shareholders of listed company are divided into non-tradable shareholder and tradable shareholder, showing the Chinese characteristics of“the same shares with different rights, the same shares with different price and the same shares with different interests”. Split Share Structure makes corporate governance lack of common benefit basis and becomes a significant obstacle of perfect stock market basis system. In this condition, the listed company M&A of our country is very different from mature capital market, existing a lot of defect and making the positive effect of M&A activity can not embody easily. Split Share Structure reform is the important catalyst to push forward the listed company M&A, and the M&A market in China will enter a“new era of M&A”with full of new opportunities. So, it is of great practical sigjificance and theoretical value to study the listed company M&A from the period of Split Share Structure and its reform thgroughly and systematically.First, the paper combs through the theoretical and empirical research resulvs of Split Share Structure ref?rm and tle listed company M&A, points out the defect and problem existing in current study, and lays the theoretical foundation for discussing the following chapters.Second, the paper sets up a brand-new explanation framework of a listed company M&A Tunneling and Propping theory by applying Game Theory. In this framework, the game model is set up in terms of connected M&A and inconnected M&A, studying tactics choice of the M&A big shareholder and impact of the different system arrangement on tactics choice. As far as inconnected M&A is concerned, the M&A company’s quality is better in the situation of the split share structure, the strong shareholder is inclined to adopt tunneling tactics, especially when market risk is bigger and inflation rate is high, the big stockholder’s behavior becomes more short-sighted. While in the full circulation situation, the solution of the same shares with different price problem makes strong shareholder’s tunneling behavior being restrained. In terms of connected M&A, the strong shareholder is inclined to adopt tunneling tactics in the situation of the split share structure, but the small shareholder will adopt the tactics of voting by feet. The motivation supporting tactics of the strong shareholder is strengthening , the small shareholder also may switch over to use voting by hand in the full circulation situation.Once again, the paper has carried out empirical researches on the listed company M&A behavior in the situation of the split share structure and the full circulation. In the situation of the split share structure, basing on examining our stock market trend of the last decade, as well as 180 mergers and acquisitions in china stock market from 2002 to 2003, this chapter investigates the Adverse Selection and its long-run equilibrium characters: long-run stock market is sluggish, and the more flagging the stock market is, the more the vast majority of listed companies is inclined to act tunneling. At the same time, it points out that the Split Share Structure in china stock market had aggravated further the Adverse Selection and long-run equilibrium situation. In the situation of the full circulation, The paper does an empirical study on the sample of mergers and acquisitions conducted in listed companies (the deadline of financial data is 2008-4-30)with full circulation after their Split Share Structure reform from 2005 to 2006, and analyzes the company performance reaction pattern by Split Share Structure Reform, M&A company which is a good company affects company performance or not, and connected M&A’s effect on the connected company. The study indicates the listed company M&A behavior motivation changes, and M&A behavior motivation appears a diversified trend, strategy M&A with aim to industry integration will increase more and more.At last, the paper puts up the practical countermeasure about perfecting Split Share Structure Reform and improving listed company M&A efficiency. To shareholders with over 5% non tradable share and with less than 5% non tradable share, stock reduction and information disclosure procedure should be strict, and the stable social responsibility fund of shareholders with over 5% non tradable share and with less than 5% non tradable share should be set up. To the new share issue system, the key of reform is benefit assignment. One side, price issuing step by step becomes market-oriented, adopting“sale with market value“with“one people X hand“issuing system on the other hand. The government should reduce administrative intervention, from“visible hand”of tangibility helping directly to“invisible hand”of the market orientation and the environmental improvement step by step. The regulatory sector should perfect law and regulation system, strengthen market information transparency, and tighten supervision and managing system. The intermediary institutions should play an active role in the M&A market. The listed company should perfect inside corporate governance, and make clear of the M&A purpose and the challenge of defending M&A.更多还原