【作者】 佘桂荣；

【导师】 张强；

【作者基本信息】 湖南大学 ， 金融学， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 金融是现代经济的核心,金融监管是金融发展与金融安全的基石。要实现经济的可持续发展,金融体系的稳健运行至关重要。而要达到这一目的,不仅需要市场机制拥有发达的自我调节和自我稳定功能,而且需要政府进行灵活有效和及时适度的干预。这一点已经被1929年大萧条以来的经济发展实践所证明,当前次贷危机所引发的金融海啸更是最新的印证。因此,改革银行监管的一个根本性问题依然是如何找到市场约束与官方监管的最优结合点并实现两者动态均衡。本文研究的出发点是以银行监管中的市场约束为视角,探讨银行监管的反思与调整这一当前全球最为炙手可热的话题;研究重心通过对银行监管市场约束的重新认识,推动市场约束与官方监管功能耦合的理性思考;研究的落脚点在于实施监管再造,积极探索在银行安全网重构中强化市场约束效应,并将之付诸于我国银行监管改革实践之中。全文结构按照逻辑路径层层展开:什么是银行监管中的市场约束?影响市场约束有效性的因素有哪些?如何在监管再造中实现市场约束与官方监管的功能耦合?如何基于我国国情引入市场约束完善银行监管?通过回答上述问题尝试建立系统、科学的市场约束理论研究框架及可行实施策略。通过追溯银行监管中的市场约束理论渊源及发展沿革,厘清市场约束与官方监管的区别与联系,借鉴包括《巴塞尔新资本协议》在内的国内外最新研究文献,系统建立市场约束实施机理的四维分析框架——实施主体、实施程序、实施途径及实施基础,四个维度相辅相成,共同构成了市场约束激励结构。上述框架的建立回答了“市场约束是什么”的问题。以模型演绎及实证研究相结合的方法分析市场约束有效性及其影响因素。基于社会利润最大化的市场约束最优模型意在分析如何有效发挥市场约束以实现银行监管的宏观目标;基于实施基础的市场约束模型重在分析市场约束有效发挥的微观影响因素;基于银行最优经营的市场约束模型则验证了市场约束可以在某种程度上发挥官方监管资本约束的职能。上述模型分析揭示了实施适度市场约束的重要性以及完善市场约束实施基础的必要性。基于实施程序的实证检验中,市场监控存在的证据非常确凿,市场影响研究较少但大体支持有效性结论,最新研究趋势是将实施程序与实施基础相结合,提高有效性检验的可信度。本文利用因子分析法构建我国银行业经营安全系数评价模型,并在改进Demirgug-Kunt和Huizirtga(2004)经典模型的基础上,考察引入实施基础变量时我国14家银行2000-2007年间的市场约束效应,研究结论为强化我国市场约束提供经验证据。市场约束与官方监管对立统一的辩证关系使两者的结合成为可能,美国次贷危机的监管诱因使两者的结合变得更为迫切,新规制经济学以及激励相容监管理念为两者的结合找到理论支撑。通过实施监管再造,引入市场约束重构银行安全网,实现市场约束与官方监管的最优结合就成为理性选择。通过将理论分析、模型推演与经验研究相结合,在剖析现有银行安全网的旧弊端与新问题基础上,分析银行安全网与市场约束的结合机理,并对具体制度设计提出建议。包括从实施边界、决策体系、执行模式以及支撑机制四个层面完善广义的审慎监管新框架;从立法支持、甄别机制、救助策略以及制度安排等方面优化最后贷款人机制设计;通过实施有限的存款保障机制、制定风险保险费率以及优化保险组织形式等措施建立可信的显性存款保险制度。全文最后分析了我国当前强化市场约束促进银行监管再造的必要性,提出从优化金融市场基础设施、加强金融运行透明度、完善银行公司治理等方面夯实市场约束实施基础,提出完善我国现有银行安全网中审慎监管及最后贷款人的机制设计,废除隐性担保建立显性存款保险制度等一系列建设性对策。对策将市场约束真正贯穿银行监管“预防性管理-紧急救助-市场退出”全过程,最终将实现我国银行监管帕累托改进。本文主要研究意义在于丰富银行监管中的市场约束理论分析框架并从监管层面对于此次金融海啸进行反思,为调整与改革全球金融监管提供参考借鉴,并为实施国家金融战略提供决策支持。更多还原

【Abstract】 Finance is the core of the modern economy, financial supervision is the foundation of the financial development and security. Need to realize the sustainable economic development, the financial system operating stably are all-important. To aim at the destination, not only require market mechanism owning function of self-adjustment and self-stabilization, but require governmental effective and moderate intervention. This point has already been proven by the economic growth since Great Depression in 1929, currently, financial tsunami caused by subprime mortgage crisis is the latest exemplification. So, how to find the optimum combining site and realize dynamic equilibrium between government supervision and market discipline is still the fundamental issue of the banking regulation.The thesis start with the current global hot issue: rethinking and adjustment about banking supervision from the view of market discipline mechanism of banking supervision. This paper focus on give reconsideration to market discipline in banking supervision and promote rational thought about coupling relation between the market discipline and official supervision. The purpose of this study is to reconstruct regulation system, establish modern banking regulation system compatible with incentive and market leading, then apply to practice of Chinese banking regulation reform. The thesis answer four questions according to logic:“what is market discipline of banking supervision?”“Is market discipline effective?“Which is influencing factor?”“How to tamp market discipline micro mechanism in supervision rebuilding and strength its effect in design of banking safety net?”and“how to introduce market discipline to perfect building supervision based on national conditions”, attempt to set up a systemic and scientific frame of market discipline theory and present some feasible measures.The thesis establish four dimensional framework of market discipline mechanism: subject of implementation, implementation procedure, implementation approach, and implementation foundation by tracing the origin of market discipline theory and its development course, introducing the latest research literatures at home and abroad including New Basel Capital Accord. Four dimensions need each other, form market discipline structure compatible with incentive. The establishment of frame answers the question: what is the market discipline. To achieve banking supervision’s macro target with market discipline function; the market discipline model based on implement foundation focus on microcosmic factors influencing the efficiency of market discipline function; the market discipline model based on banking optimum operation confirm the market discipline can play the function of official capital constrain to some extent. Model analyses show the essentiality of moderate market discipline and necessity of perfecting micro mechanism of implementing market discipline. We find tangible proof to testify market supervision exist in faith through empirical test based on implementation procedure. There is little study on market influence but major part support the efficiency conclusion. The trend of the latest study is to present reliability of efficiency test by combining implementation procedure and foundation, this paper uses the factor analysis to construct safety factor evaluation model of Chinese banking operation, observe the effect of market discipline of 14 banks from 2000-2007 by introducing implementation basis variable based on the correction of classical model of Demirgug-Kunt and Huizirtga(2004). The research conclusions provide evidence of intensification of market discipline.It is possible to combine market discipline with official supervision because of their relationship of the unity of opposites. Supervision reflection on subprime mortgage crisis make the combination become more fervently. New institution economics and supervision notion of incentive compatibility provide theoretical evidence for this combination. So, it is the rational option to rebuild supervision system, construct modern banking supervision system of market leading and incentive compatibility and realize the optimum combination between market discipline and official supervision. Implement rebuilding of the supervision mechanism has to need both reforms. Reconstruct banking safety net of official supervision. We combine theoretical analysis, model deduction and empirical study, analyze mechanism of combination between banking safety net and market discipline, then present suggestions about institutional design based on the analysis of old disadvantage and new problem of current banking safety net. The suggestion Include establishing the new framework based on generalized and prudent regulatory principles from four levels of implementation frontier, decision system, execution mode and support mechanism; arranging system of equivocal Final International Creditor under moderate transparency from aspects of legislation support, discrimination mechanism, assistance strategy and perfect institution; setting up credible explicit deposit insurance system by implementing limited deposit insurance system, deciding risk premium rate and optimizing insurance organization form.The thesis finally analyses the necessity of strengthening market discipline to improve banking regulation’s rebuilding, put forward micro mechanism of implementation foundation of market discipline from aspects of perfecting Infrastructure of financial market, strengthening transparency of financial operations and perfecting banking corporate governance, present constructive measures about perfecting prudent supervision of Chinese existing banking safety net and design of lender of last resorts, abolishing implicit guarantee, establishing explicit deposit insurance system and market exit mechanism. The measure apply market discipline system to whole process of banking regulation“precautionary management—emergency assistance—market exit”, finally realize combined function of official regulation and market discipline and achieve Pareto improvement.The purpose of the thesis is to perfect analytical frame of banking supervision market discipline and reflect on the financial crisis from the perspective of supervision, provide references for adjusting and reforming global financial regulation, offer decision support to carrying out state financial strategy.更多还原