【作者】 郭文新；

【导师】 曾勇；

【作者基本信息】 电子科技大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 以有限合伙制度组成的专业投资者，通过向富裕的个人或机构融资，以权益资本投资于高科技初创企业，这种投资模式被称为风险投资。风险投资合约是风险投资家与创业者之间投资的依据，是责权利配置的凭证，是指导合约双方今后行动的纲领性文件。相对于实证分析而言，专门针对风险投资合约的理论研究显得较为滞后和薄弱，现有的理论结果尚未准确地抓住风险投资的独特性质并深入阐述这些性质与相应的合约结构的有机联系。本文重点研究风险投资合约中的现金流权利配置，即风险投资的资本结构。本文首先对风险投资合约的实证与理论文献进行了综述，总结了风险投资合约的规律性特征和合约治理机制，并指出风险投资的资本结构和控制权配置是理论研究的方向。在此基础上，运用相关合约理论，本文尝试解释有限合伙协议和风险投资合约的合约结构和合约条款。本文重新考察了单边道德风险问题下的资本结构模型。不预先设定债券等合约形式，而是用一阶方法从原始的假设和最优化问题出发，内在地推导出最优的资本结构是基础性的理论工作。之前的经济学家认为合约理论的标准分析工具——一阶条件方法无法推导最优的资本结构，本文应用一阶条件方法得到了最优的财务合约，并拓展分析了投资者风险规避的情形。该研究不仅完善了小企业融资问题的经济解释，也为进一步研究风险投资的资本结构打下了基础。先前的理论研究尝试从双边道德风险的角度考察风险投资的融资过程，但这些研究均未导出风险投资的资本结构是可转换优先股的结论。本文结合相关实证研究提出了三个重要假设，一是双方的努力都会随机性的提高企业的利润，二是双方的努力是互补的，三是从极大似然原理看，创业者在企业的发展中发挥了关键性的作用。构造了风险企业双边道德风险下的融资模型，运用一阶条件方法导出了风险投资的最优资本结构是，风险投资家持有可转换优先股，创业者依业绩获得普通股。在不完全合约的背景下，考虑创业者和风险投资家分别提供合约的两种定约情形，设计了诱导合约双方最优努力的可转换债券。债务给予创业者特定的威胁，使得其有动力提供足够的努力；而风险投资家可将债券转换为股权，也使得其意愿提供企业价值增值的努力，从而揭示了可转债的最优激励效能。研究揭示了风险投资家如何根据观察到的信息管理看涨期权和清算权，债务对应于VC拥有的清算权，而转换权则对应于VC持有企业的看涨期权。以研究报告作为本文的应用研究部分，该报告应用风险投资理论和合约理论，研究了某公司战略风险投资管理和高科技项目的运作情况。该报告在实践中发挥了重要作用，也具有一定的学术意义，可作为研究我国国有企业从事高科技产业投资和管理活动的一组案例。更多还原

【Abstract】 Venture capital consists of financing high-tech start-up ventures through equity orequity-like instruments by limited partnerships of professional investors who raise fundsfrom wealthy and/or institutional investors. The venture financing contracts betweenventure capitalists (VC) and is entrepreneurs the basis of VC’s investment. They arealso the arrangement voucher of responsibilities, rights benefit as well as the planswhich guides the two parties for future action. Comparing with the empirical analysis,the theoretical studies of these financing contracts is relatively lag and weak.Consequently, the present theoretical outcomes have not yet accurately grasped theinherent properties of venture capital and failed to expound on the relationship betweenthese properties and the structure characteristics of the corresponding venture capitalcontracts. This paper mainly studies the cash flow right allocation of venture capitalcontracts, namely, the capital structure.First, this paper reviews the empirical and theoretical literatures of venture capitaland sums up the disciplines and governance mechanisms of their financing contracts,which points out that the capital structure and the control right is the important concernfor theoretical researching. And then, the paper tentatively explains the terms andstructure of limited partnership agreement and venture financing contract based on therelevant contract theory.Secondly, the paper re-examine the capital structure models of the unilateral moralhazard. The treatment of a financing problem to which not assigning debt contract as asolution in advance, but endogenously derives that the optimal capital structure solutionusing first-order condition (FOC) approach from the original assumptions andoptimization, is a fundamental work. Previous economists believe that the standardanalysis tool of contract theory - the FOC approach can not derive the optimal capitalstructure. In this paper, we find the optimal solution to the financing problem usingFOC approach, and expand the analysis to the situation when of the investor is riskaverse. Our study not only completes the economic explanation of the financingproblem of small enterprises, but also lays the foundation for further study of capital structure of ventures backed by venture capital.Previous attempts to study the capital structure of ventures backed by venture capitalare at the setting of double moral hazard, but these studies do not get the conclusion thatventure’s capital structure is convertible preferred stock hold by VC. Based on theempirical study, this paper proposes three important assumptions: (ⅰ) the efforts of VCand entrepreneur can also increase stochastically the profit of venture; (ⅱ) efforts arecomplement; (ⅲ) in view of principle of maximum likelihood, entrepreneur play keyrole in the development of venture. So this paper constructs a double moral hazardmodel and derives endogenously the capital structure of venture backed by venturecapital. We find that the optimal capital structure is a convertible preferred stocks givingto VC, and giving common stocks to entrepreneur only when profit exceeding aparticular level.In the background of incomplete contract, this paper considers two contractingsettings of which one is entrepreneur provide contract to VC and another is the reverse,and designs the convertible debt to induce the efforts of two parties. Debt is a financialinstrument which can gives a specific threaten and provide sufficient motivation to theentrepreneurs. The opportunity of which VC can convert debt to equity, gives the VCincentive to provide effort adding value to the venture. The outcome reveals VC how tomanage the call option which is the conversion right, and how to manage the liquidationright.A report is as the application research part of this paper, which is a research ofstrategic venture capital management and operation of high-tech projects of a publiccompany. The report played an important role in practice, but also has some academicsignificance, as a group of cases of China’s state-owned enterprises engaged ininvestment and management of high-tech industry investment.更多还原