【作者】 唐运舒；

【导师】 杨善林；

【作者基本信息】 合肥工业大学 ， 企业管理及其信息化， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 股权分置改革解决了我国资本市场上内生性、基础性缺陷,使各类股东的利益标准趋于一致,但没有从根本上解决我国上市公司中“一股独大”的问题,股改后大股东的侵害行为依然存在。股改后,上市公司大股东会以持有的股票可流通为契机,依据筹码和信息上的绝对优势操纵股价,谋求自身利益最大化,侵害中小股东的权益。本文采用规范分析和实证分析相结合的方法对上市公司启动股权分置改革到其实现全流通这一特殊时期大股东的侵害行为进行研究,并根据大股东在全流通进程中表现出的侵害特征和趋势提出了保护中小投资者利益的政策建议。本文主要研究内容及其研究结论如下:1.在对全流通进程中大股东侵害行为机理剖析的基础上,借鉴Ohlson模型构建了考虑资产转移与公司股票价格定量关系的大股东的最大化利益效用模型。通过模型推论得出:在非流通股解禁过程大股东为了其利益最大化,在股改承诺期买入公司股票前,会采用“掏空”上市公司的行为,降低购入股票的成本;股价低于其真实价值越多,大股东买入公司股票就越多;股改承诺期结束后,大股东在卖出公司股份前,会向上市公司注入资产,“支持”上市公司;大股东持股比例越大、在股改承诺期买入的股份越多,预期股改后公司的股价偏离公司真实的价值系数越大,以及公司的预期权益报酬率越高,大股东“支持”上市的动机越强。2.对大股东履行股改承诺的情况进行了实证分析。研究发现:绝大多数上市公司大股东都能履行股改时的承诺。不过也有少数的大股东置股改承诺于不顾,公然违背股改承诺,其中在向上市公司注入优质资产类承诺中违规情况最多。3.实证分析了上市公司定向增发过程中大股东的违规行为。研究发现:(1)有公司大股东及其关联方认购股份的定向增发价格要显著低于针对机构投资者定向增发的价格,公司定向增发中存在公司大股东利用融资决定权寻租及向特定对象低于公允价格发行股票进行利益输送问题。(2)在上市公司定向增发过程中存在着明显的内幕交易行为,大股东从公司定向增发中获得了超额收益。(3)实证结果不支持定向增发过程中大股东向其持股公司注入了优质资产的假设。4.实证分析了全流通进程中限售股的解禁、减持及对市场的影响,得出如下研究结论:(1)限售股的解禁给市场带来了实质性的压力,部分投资者在限售股解禁之前已开始抛售股票;限售股获得解禁后,公司股票的抛售压力明显强于市场平均。(2)公司托宾Q值的高低和市场的涨跌状况是影响公司限售股解禁市场效应的主要因素,公司托宾Q值越高,公司限售股解禁的累积超常收益率越低;限售股解禁时,当市场处于下跌状态时,累积超常收益率越低,相反,累积超常收益率越高。此外,公司的规模也是影响限售股解禁市场效应的一个重要的因素。(3)通过测算发现:2008年10月底前,市场的减持压力主要来自于“小非”的减持。但未来若干年市场的减持压力将主要来自于“大非”的减持,此外,未来各年“大小非”的减持压力将主要集中2009年。5.针对大股东在全流通进程中表现出的侵害特征和相关环境的变化,文章从完善公司治理结构、健全投资者法律保护体系以及创新监管方式三方面提出了保护中小投资者利益的政策建议。本文的研究贡献主要在于:(1)通过建构大股东最大化效用的定量模型,对非流通解禁这一特殊时期大股东的侵害行为特征进行了推论,并从履行股改承诺、定向增发以及“大小非”减持的角度对相关推论进行了验证,提供了非流通股解禁过程中大股东侵害行为的经验证据。(2)在实证分析的基础上,从不同角度提出了规范大股东行为的政策建议,为相关监管部门提供政策参考。更多还原

【Abstract】 Nontradable share reform could not in a reasonable way resolve the problem of domination of a single shareholder existed in listed companies in China although it did address to an inherent and fundamental issue in China capital market with a suitable result of interest accordance of stakeholders. Large shareholders’ expropriation of minority shareholders’ interests still de facto prevails in practice after the ending of this reform. To maximize their own interests, large shareholders have an incentive to expropriate minority shareholders’ interests by their absolute privilege of share amount held and information acquired since from then on they possess the mass would-be tradable shares.The purpose of this research is to examine the expropriation misbehaviours of large shareholders throughout the periods specifically from the startup of nontradable share reform to the time when nontradable shares are full circulated by a methodology of combination of both normative analysis and positive analysis, suggestions on the policies of protection of minority investors’ interests are presented following a detailed analysis of the characteristics and tendency of large shareholders’ expropriation during the above mentioned periods.The main research work and brief conclusions about this paper are as follows:1.Based on anlyasis of the mechanism of expropriation misbehaviours of large shareholders during the full circulation process, borrowing Ohlson model, we construct a large shareholders’utility model that includes the consideration of quantitative relation between transferring of firm’s assets and its share price. The deduction of our model is as follows: first, in the course of full-circulation of A-Shares, large shareholders are likely to take tunneling measures to lower their average cost of shares purchased before the promised nontradable time of shares in order to maximize their own interests. The lower is share price than its value, the more is share amounts purchased by large shareholder; secondly, large shareholders tend to inject assets to controlled listed companies to manipulate share prices before they sell shares which is tradable after the promised nontrading time passed, and large shareholders have stronger motivation to manipulate share prices not only while they maintain higher stockholding level or have purchased more shares during the promised nontrading time but also while they anticipate a greater deviation of share prices from its evaluation as well as a higher ROE ratio of the firm is expected.2.This paper conducts empirical tests on fulfillment of promises made by large shareholders during nontradable share reform. The examination shows that almost all of large shareholders of listed companies inclined to keep their promises, however, few cases do exist in which large shareholders just ignore what they have promised and would not burden their obligations such as the prevailing promises of high quality assets injection.3.This paper examines the expropriation misbehaviours of large shareholdersmis during private placement. The findings include:(1)share prices of private placement facing to large shareholders and large shareholders’ related parties are significantly different from those facing to institutional investors, this implies that large shareholders expropriate minority investors’ interests through deliberate manipulations of financial decision; ( 2 ) empirical evidence indicate that large shareholders are likely to self-serving through insider trading in the processes of private placement ;(3)results of empirical test show that it hard to believe that large shareholders did inject high quality assets to controlled companies as they promised in the process of private placement from a perspective of changes in financial position before and after the injections. 4.We have examined the status of reducing shareholding of large and small part of non-tradable shares in process of full circulation of A-shares and its impacts on capital market.The examination suggests:(1)some investors incline to sell down shares they held before lockup period of restricted shares come to an end, therefore, the unlockup of restricted shares bring a material pressure on capital market, and the sell out pressure of shares of a company of which shareholders just earn the unlockup permission is significantly higher than average level; (2)Tobin-Q of a company and security market situation are the two primary elements which influence market effect of unlockup of restricted shares, the higher the Tobin-Q of a company, the lower the cumulated abnormal return rate of this unlockup, furthermore, during the unlockup process, the cumulated abnormal return rate is lower in a recession of capital market, and vice versa. Besides the above mentioned two primary elements which influence market effect of unlockup of restricted shares, size of companies can be counted as the third one; (3)our detailed estimation and calculation shed light on the following facts: the pressure of shareholding reducing arise mostly from that of small part of non-tradable shares before October 2008, and from then on the similar pressure would stem from that of large part of non-tradable shares. Moreover, the pressure of shareholding reducing of large and small part of non-tradable shares would mainly concentrate in the year of 2009.5. Finally, suggestions on the protection of minority investors’interests are presented in the dimensions of perfection of the structure of corporate governance, soundness of legal system of investor protection and construction of creative supervision models, which focus on the dealing of expropriation misbehaviour of large shareholders and of the fast changing economic condition.This paper makes contributions to the literature in the following two dimensions.(1) Following detailed deductions about the characteristics of large shareholders’ expropriation through constructing large shareholders’maximum utility model, this paper conducts empirical testing about deductions mentioned above from the aspects of fulfillment of promises during nontradable share reform, private placement.and reducing shareholding of large and small part of non-tradable shares, and provides empirical evidences of large shareholders’expropriation misbehaviours during the full circulation process; (2)Based on the empirical testing, this paper proposes some suggestions from various dimensions for the supervisory bodies concerned on restricting expropriation misbehaviours of large shareholders.更多还原