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基于企业冗余资源的技术创新激励机制研究

Study on Incentive Mechanisms of Technological Innovation Based on Slack Resources

【作者】 钟和平

【导师】 张旭梅; 方润生;

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 , 企业管理, 2009, 博士

【摘要】 冗余资源不仅能够缓冲企业资源短缺、保持组织的和谐、减缓环境的冲突,而且是企业创新和组织变化的重要催化剂。冗余资源促进了企业的创新和发展。目前,国内外的相关研究已经越来越多地关注企业的冗余资源与技术创新之间的关系,但如何激励企业员工的基于冗余资源的创新行为,尚缺乏研究。基于此,本文基于资源冗余观、创新观、激励理论,深入研究了企业员工的基于冗余资源的技术创新的激励问题,具体来讲,全文在介绍研究背景、目的、意义、内容及国内外相关研究文献综述的基础上,从四个侧面研究了基于企业冗余资源的技术创新的激励机理和激励机制:首先,研究了基于企业冗余资源的技术创新行为的相关理论。从冗余在企业里的存在形态和资源的可识别性角度,将冗余资源划分为:物质冗余、人力资源冗余、财务冗余,进而提出了物质冗余与技术创新之间的倒置“U”型关系模型,人力资源冗余与技术创新之间的倒置“N”型关系,财务冗余与技术创新之间的“N”型关系;从资源供给的角度将企业的技术创新划分为基于企业新增资源的技术创新和基于企业冗余资源的技术创新,提出了基于企业冗余资源的技术创新的概念,并分析了基于企业冗余资源的技术创新行为特征和产出优势。然后,研究了完全靠员工自己搜寻企业冗余资源进行技术创新的激励问题,提出了不同冗余程度下的员工的基于企业冗余资源的技术创新的最优激励合约。当企业冗余不足时,企业应弱化对员工的基于企业冗余资源的技术创新活动的激励;当企业冗余适度时,企业不应满足现状,应适度激励员工的“技术创新”行动和“获取冗余”行动;当企业冗余过多时,同时加大对“技术创新”行动和“获取冗余”行动的激励,能更有效地促进员工的基于企业冗余资源的技术创新,因此,企业可以通过激励来调节企业冗余资源与技术创新的关系;同时,通过对模型的进一步分析,还提出了效率风险的概念,从理论上解释了企业普遍存在的一种现象:做出重大贡献者往往并不能分享相应的份额。再后,研究提出了在企业提供新增资源条件下的员工利用企业冗余进行技术创新的最优激励合约。当员工的“技术创新”行动与“获取冗余”行动间的成本函数相互独立时,各行动的最优激励合同相互独立,且“技术创新”行动的最优激励因子与资源配置无关;当两行动的成本函数互补时,若企业新增资源的边际收益小于边际成本,则应重度强化对员工的“技术创新”行动与“获取冗余”行动的激励,若企业新增资源的边际收益大于边际成本,则应轻度强化对员工的“技术创新”行动与“获取冗余”行动的激励;当两行动的成本函数相互替代时,若企业新增资源的边际收益小于边际成本,则应对员工的“技术创新”行动进行重度弱化激励、对员工的“获取冗余”行动进行轻度弱化激励,若企业新增资源的边际收益大于边际成本,则应对员工的“技术创新”行动进行轻度弱化激励、对员工的“获取冗余”行动进行重度弱化激励。最后,在分析研发人员、营销人员、生产人员等不同创新主体的基于企业冗余资源的技术创新行为的基础上,提出了这些不同主体的基于企业冗余资源的技术创新的最优激励合约,并结合企业典型案例进行了进一步阐释和检验。对于研发人员,若其“冗余创新”活动难以观测,宜通过加强对研发人员的“正式创新”活动的激励来促进研发人员的“冗余创新”绩效的提高。对于营销人员,一方面,可以按最优激励合约直接奖励营销人员的“冗余创新”成果,以促进其“冗余创新”绩效的提高;另一方面,可以通过加强对营销人员的“营销任务”的激励,间接促进其“冗余创新”绩效的提高。对于生产人员,一方面,可以按最优激励合约直接奖励其“冗余创新”成果,另一方面,对于“生产任务”饱满的生产人员,宜通过弱化对其“生产任务”的激励来诱使他们多做一些“冗余创新”工作;对于“生产任务”不饱满的生产人员,宜通过强化对其“生产任务”的激励来促使他们多做一些“冗余创新”工作。

【Abstract】 Slack resources not only can cushion the shortage of a firm’s resources, maintain the organizations harmony, mitigate the conflicts from environment but also are an important catalyst of innovation and organizational changes. Slack resources promote the innovation and development of a firm. Nowadays, the domestic and international studies about them have paid more and more attention to the relationships between slack resources and technological innovation, but no studies to date have examined how to promote employees’innovative behaviors based on slack resources. Accordingly, on the basis of the resource slack concepts, innovation concepts, incentive theory, this dissertation studies the incentive issues for technological innovation based on slack resources. Concretely, on the basis of introducing the background, purpose, meaning, content of this study and reviewing relevant research literatures, this dissertation explores the incentive mechanisms for technological innovation based on slack resources by four sections.Firstly, this dissertation explores the concepts of the innovative behaviors based on slack resources. From the viewpoint of the existing forms and available discretion of slack resources in enterprises, this dissertation divides the slack resources into physical slack, human resource slack, and financial slack, and brings forward the inverted U-shaped relationship model between physical slack and technological innovation, the inverted N-shaped relationship model between human resource slack and technological innovation, the N-shaped relationship model between financial slack and technological innovation. From the resource-supply angle, this dissertation divides technological innovation into two innovation model which based on newly-added resources and slack resources, and puts forward the concept of technological innovation based on slack resources. Furthermore, the dissertation analyses the characteristics and output advantages of technological innovation based on slack resources.Secondly, this dissertation explores the incentive issues of technological innovation entirely based on individual’s searching for firm’s slack resources; and brings forward the best incentive contracts of technological innovation based on slack resources under the condition of different levels of slack resources. When the levels of slack resources of a firm are low, the firm should weaken the incentive for the technological innovation based on slack resources; when the levels of slack resources of a firm are moderate, the firm should moderately inspire“innovating”and“getting slack resources”; when the levels of slack resources of a firm are high, the firm should strengthened the incentive for the“innovating”and“getting slack resources”. Thus, the firm can modulate the relationship between slack resources and technological innovation by incentive. In addition, this dissertation introduces the concept of efficiency risk, which explains theoretically one kind of phenomenon generally existing in firms that one to make the significant contribution to the firm is not certain to be able to share his corresponding shares.Thirdly, this paper explores and brings forward the best incentive contracts for employee to use slack resources to do technological innovation which is under the conditions of the firm’s newly-added resources. When the cost function of“innovating”and“getting slack”is independent, the best incentive contracts of every action is independent and the best incentive factor for“innovating”has nothing to do with the allocation of resources; When the cost function of the two actions is complementary, the firm should heavily strengthened the incentive for the“innovating”and“getting slack”of the employee if the firm’s marginal income is less than marginal cost of the newly-added resources invested, and lightly strengthened the incentive for the“innovating”and“getting slack”of the employee if the firm’s marginal income is more than marginal cost of the newly-added resources invested; When the cost function of the two actions is substitute, the firm should heavily weakened the incentive for the“innovating”and lightly weakened the incentive for the“getting slack”if the firm’s marginal income is less than marginal cost of the newly-added resources invested, and the firm should lightly weakened the incentive for the“innovating”and heavily weakened the incentive for the“getting slack”if the firm’s marginal income is more than marginal cost of the newly-added resources invested.Finally, this dissertation brings forward the best incentive contracts for R&D, marketing, production personnel’s technological innovation based on slack resources on the basis of analyzing their innovative behaviors based on slack resources, and further explains these contracts combining typical cases. For R&D personnel, the firm should strengthened the incentive for the“formal innovating”action to promote the performance of“slack innovating”if the outcome of R&D personnel“slack innovating”is not measurable. For marketing personnel, on the one hand, the firm can directly award his“slack innovating”achievements according to the best incentive contracts, on the other hand, the firm should strengthened the incentive for the“marketing duty”to promote indirectly the performance of“slack innovating”. For production personnel, on the one hand, the firm can directly award his“slack innovating”achievements according to the best incentive contracts, on the other hand, when the production personnel’s“production tasks”are full, the firm should weaken the incentive for“production tasks”to induce them to do more“slack innovating”works, and strengthen the incentive for“production tasks”to induce them to do more“slack innovating”works when the production personnel’s“production tasks”are not full.

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 重庆大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2009年 12期
  • 【分类号】F273.1;F224
  • 【被引频次】7
  • 【下载频次】986
  • 攻读期成果
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