【作者】 肖剑；

【导师】 但斌；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 加入WTO后,我国企业已快速进入全球经济时代,面临着国际、国内的巨大竞争压力,而电子商务模式的广泛应用给企业提供一种新的合作途径,使得e-供应链管理成为学术界和企业界重要的研究和实践领域。在e-供应链中,制造商和零售商分属于不同的独立实体,存在着渠道冲突和平台冲突,导致供应链系统的性能降低和成员的利益受损。鉴于此,本文分析e-供应链中制造商和零售商产生渠道冲突和平台冲突的根源,研究了双方的合作策略。首先,由于e-供应链中电子渠道独立于零售商时,会存在“渠道冲突”,因此考虑制造商在电子渠道领域和零售商进行合作,把电子渠道的订单全部交由零售商来完成,收益共享,建立了基于Stackelberg博弈的理论模型。分析发现电子渠道的需求不受零售商是否合作的影响,对一个简化情形,得到了制造商和零售商选择在电子渠道合作的解析条件。通过算例仿真,探讨了电子渠道独立于零售商时的批发价格和制造商的电子渠道收益分享比例对合作的影响,发现某些情形下制造商电子渠道和零售商合作为最优策略。其次,在前面研究的基础上,在需求不确定情形下,用主从博弈和贝叶斯方法对e-供应链中电子渠道和零售商的渠道分销合作进行研究,发现制造商调高其需求规模预测值将导致电子渠道和零售渠道的价格升高,电子渠道的需求减少,而制造商给予零售商的单位补贴与电子渠道和零售渠道的价格正相关,与电子渠道的需求负相关,但不影响零售渠道的需求。再次,在e-供应链中,为缓解渠道冲突,提高服务效率,制造商选择将电子渠道的服务交由零售商完成。在对称信息的框架下,建立了双渠道供应链中制造商电子渠道与零售商服务合作的Stackelberg和Bertrand模型。发现制造商虽然选择将电子渠道服务交给零售商完成,仍需注意降低其电子渠道的边际服务成本,同时要选择和具有较低边际服务成本的零售商合作,才能保持双渠道的竞争优势。当零售商具有边际服务成本优势时,制造商和零售商才能从服务水平的提高中获利。与Bertrand竞争相比,在Stackelberg竞争下e-供应链的渠道价格较低。制造商总是偏好作价格的领导者,而零售商在市场批发价格较低时,会选择独立定价,而在市场批发价格较高时,愿意作制造商定价的跟随者。而后,在e-供应链中,电子渠道和零售渠道商品的可替代性导致渠道冲突。考虑零售商在传统渠道中附带销售电子渠道商品的互补品,建立了渠道产品合作的双渠道供应链Bertrand博弈模型。发现若消费者对零售商处互补品的价格敏感,则供应链中互补品的价格下降,制造商产品的渠道价格增加,同时电子渠道的需求和收益均上升,对零售渠道中制造商产品的销售和收益增加有利。利用上述模型,通过算例得出,如果零售商选择合适的互补品在零售渠道进行销售,将能促进双方收益的增加,渠道产品合作策略是可行的。最后,对单个制造商多个同质零售商的e-供应链系统,市场需求为价格弹性不确定需求,假设零售商之间进行Cournot博弈,并和制造商进行Stackelberg博弈,建立了偏向制造商的的e-供应链模型。发现在偏向制造商的e-供应链中,制造商和零售商的竞争优势增强;零售商的数目增加,对制造商有利而对零售商不利;电子平台的佣金率增加时,制造商的收益减少;零售商能接受的佣金率随其数目的增加而变小;最后通过算例对所得到的结论进行了验证。更多还原

【Abstract】 After the WTO accession, China’s enterprises have been quickly enter the time of the global economy, faced with international and domestic competitive pressure. E-supply chain management, especially the cooperation of manufacturers and retailers in e-supply chain has been an important management problem . In e-supply chain, manufacturers and retailers belonging to different independent entities, there is channel conflict and platform conflicts, which lead to the reduction of supply chain performance and damage of members’interests. In view of this, by study the channel conflict and platform conflict in e-supply chain between manufacturers and retailers, cooperation strategies of both sides are proposed.Firstly, in the e-supply chain, if the manufacturers’electronic channels are independent from the retailers, there will be "channel conflict". The cooperation between electronic channels and retailers was studied, which retailers finished all electronic channels’orders, and manufacturers and retailers shared electronic channels’revenue. By a Stackelberg game theoretical model , it shows that retailers’cooperation choice has no effect on electronic channels’demand. With a simplified case, it gets the analytical conditions that manufacturers and retailers choose cooperation in the electronic channels. When the electronic channels are independent from retailers, by numerical examples, the effects of the wholesale prices and manufacturers’sharing proportion on cooperation are discussed, in some cases, manufacturers’electronic channels and retailers choose cooperation is the optimal strategy.Secondly, in e-supply chain, under uncertain demand, to study this phenomenon by Stackelberg game and Bayesian methods, the result shows manufacturers, which keep optimistic of future demand, lead to the price of electronic channels and retail channels increased, and the demand of electronic channels reduced. Retailers’units subsidies given by manufacturers are positively associated with the price of electronic channels and retail channels, and negative relation to the demand of electronic channels, but has no effect on the demand of retail channel.Thirdly, in e-supply chain, in order to avoid channel conflict and improve service efficiency, manufacturers outsource electronic channels’services to retailers. In the symmetric-information framework, the service-cooperation Stackelberg and Bertrand model of electronic channels and retailers in dual-channel supply chain are proposed. We found that although manufacturers outsource electronic channels’services to retailers, they still need to reduce the marginal services cost of electronic channels, and choose retailers parter with a lower marginal services cost to maintain the competitive advantage of dual channel. When retailers have the advantage of the marginal services cost, manufacturers and retailers can make a profit by improving the service level.The prices of both channel’s under Stackelberg competition is lower than those of Bertrand competition. Manufacturers always prefer the leadership of pricing.Fourthly, in e-supply chain, the commodities’replaceability of ectronic and retail channels lead to channel conflict. Consider the retailers sell the complementary goods of electronic-channels commodities in the traditional retail channels,a Bertrand game model of channel-product cooperation about dual-channel supply chain is proposed. We find that if consumers is more price-sensitive to the complementary goods of manufacturers’products, it’s price decrease,and the channels price of manufacturers’products increase, at the same time, the demand and profit of electronic channels increase respectively, and the demand and profit of manufacturers’products in retail channels increases. By numerical examples, if the retailer can choose a suitable complementary goods, it will realize double-win, so the channel-product cooperation strategy is feasible.Finaly, for single-manufacturer-multi-homogeneous-buyer supply chain system, based on market demand with price elasticity of uncertain demand, buyers follow Cournot game, and manufacturers follow Stackelberg game with buyers, a manufacturer-oriented electronic supply chain model is proposed. We found that manufacturers and buyers enhance their competitive advantage in vendor preferred e-supply chain, with the increase of buyers’number, manufacturers get benefit and buyers are disadvantaged. With the increase of commission rates of third-party information platform, manufacturers’revenue reduced. With the increase of its’number , buyers’acceptable commission rate is smaller, finally the availability of the conclusions in this paper are illustrated with practical examples.更多还原