【作者】 何寿奎；

【导师】 傅鸿源；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 PPP (Public-private partnerships)模式是介于外包和私有化之间并结合了两者特点的一种公共产品提供方式。PPP模式下公共部门和私人企业共同参与公共项目的建设和运营,共同分担风险,发挥各自的优势以便更好地为社会提供公共服务。由于人们对PPP模式合作机理的认识不够深入,加之PPP模式实施周期长,可以模仿的实例较少,在一定程度上限制了PPP模式的推广和应用。本文在讨论PPP模式的经济特性和公共项目公私合作形成机制的基础上,研究PPP项目的产权结构与效率的关系,PPP项目的风险分摊机理,以及PPP项目的组织演化机理;建立了PPP模式的项目治理结构,以及处于困境PPP项目的管理决策方法;提出了PPP项目风险分担方式与风险管理方法,以及PPP项目政府监管政策与制度保障。最后以水务项目和公路项目公私合作为例进行PPP项目合作机理的例证分析。PPP模式与一般合同承包相比较具有其经济特性:联合投入,社会福利的帕累托次优性,社会成本节约大于社会福利损失,政府职能的双重性及PPP项目产权的明晰性等。通过分析PPP模式的经济特性,需要重新界定公共部门在PPP项目中的作用,科学设计PPP项目的治理机制,提升公共服务的供给水平。研究PPP模式合作机理的主要理论依据包括:公共项目区分理论,有效竞争理论,可竞争市场理论,激励性规制理论和PPP模式选择的资金价值理论。推行PPP模式必须设计科学的合作机制。为实现公共项目的投资效益,应建立收益公平分配机制和利益补偿机制,公私合作的双赢机制,以及公私合作功能与利益协调机制。考虑公共项目及准公共品的公益性,应该兼顾效率与公平,建立科学的激励机制与市场监督机制。为了控制道德风险,应该建立公私合作道德风险自律机制,提高道德风险成本,提高投资者的退出成本。关于PPP项目产权结构的研究表明:当私人公司控股时,社会成本节约水平取决于利润分配比例的高低;当国家控股时,社会福利损失较小,但私人公司努力程度低于理想水平。政府应根据公私合作带来社会成本的节约与社会福利损失的大小来选择合理的产权结构,对排它成本高的公共项目主要由政府供给。论文建立了PPP模式下项目治理的一般框架,即建立产权明晰,剩余索取权与控制权基本对应,政府监督、合同约束和社会监督相结合的项目治理结构。根据能力原则和损失原则,论文讨论了PPP项目典型风险的识别与风险分担方式,对可转移风险建立了风险分担机制,运用模糊综合评价法计算公私双方风险分摊系数及基于风险的利益分配方法。为有效控制PPP项目的风险,应该建立公私合作双方风险协同管理平台。由于公共基础设施PPP模式的实施时间长,合作中难免出现困境,本论文分析了PPP模式组织演变的一般过程。提出公私双方相互作用的利益均衡及稳定性,由双方的相互贡献系数及独立投资效用增长率共同决定,当一方对另一方贡献为正,则双方积极合作。研究表明,政府对处于困境PPP项目进行挽救的依据是破产的社会成本大于挽救补贴的社会成本。政府应根据项目的不同性质建立监管与规制方法,确立科学的监管途径。为了有效进行价格监管,本论文建立了公共项目PPP模式下价格形成机制的框架。论文应用Baron-Myserson理论,基于服务质量和成本建立了社会福利最大并满足私人企业参与约束和相容约束的激励机制设计模型,以诱导私人公司显示成本与质量的真实信息,并以成本与服务质量来制定管制价格。为了顺利推行PPP模式,提出应该建立的相关制度保障体系。文章以水务项目和公路项目公私合作为例进行PPP项目管理组织、定价机制、风险分担与项目回购的例证分析。更多还原

【Abstract】 Public-private partnerships are a way of public product provision, which is between service outsourcing and privatization and combines the characteristics of the two management styles. Under ppp mode, the public sector and private enterprises participate in public construction projects and operations, share the risks, and exert their own advantages to provide better provision of public services together. The understandings about cooperation mechanism of the PPP mode that people have are not deep enough, in addition to long-term implementation of PPP model and fewer examples that can be imitated, so to some extent, this way has limited the promotion and application of the PPP model. At the basis of PPP model’s economic characteristics and the formation mechanism of public-private partnerships in public projects, this paper will research on the relationship of the structure of property rights and social efficiency of PPP project, risk-sharing mechanism, and mechanism of microstructure evolution; set up management structure of PPP and the policy decision on saving the projects in a difficult situation; advance the risk-sharing and management method of PPP projects, government regulatory policy and institution security system. Finally, a water project and highway project about public-private partnerships are taken as an example to carry out PPP projects empirical analysis of the mechanism.Compared with the general contracts, PPP model has its economic characteristics, including united inputs, social welfare’s Pareto sub-optimal,social cost savings which are greater than the loss of social welfare, the twofold duty of the government and PPP project’s property rights is distinct etc. By analyzing the economic characteristics of PPP, it is necessary to redefine the role of the public sector in public-private partnerships, manage PPP projects targeted and enhance the level of the supply of public services.Main theoretical basis of cooperation mechanism on PPP model includes the distinction theory of public projects, the theory of effective competition, the theory about the competitive market , the theory of incentive regulation and the theory of funding value of PPP model’s selection.It is required to design a scientific co-operation mechanism to implement PPP model. For the realization of project’s investment returns, it is necessary to set up the mechanism of the income’s equitable distribution and benefits compensation, the win-win cooperate mechanism,the mechanism of the function of public-private partnership and benefit’s coordinate. Considering the public welfare of public projects and quasi-public goods, it should take into account efficiency and equity,set up a prompting mechanism and a science market monitoring mechanism to the project company. In order to control the risk of moral hazard, it also should set up the self-regulatory mechanism on moral hazard of public-private partnerships, enhance the costs of moral hazard and exiting to the investor.The research on PPP project’s structure of property rights has shown that: when it is hold by a private company, the level of cost savings depends on the level of the ratio of profit distribution. When it is hold by the government, the welfare loss is smaller, however, the effort of private companies is lower than the optimal level. Based on cost savings brought about by public-private partnerships and the size of social welfare’s loss, government should select the structure of property rights reasonably ,and the high cost is mainly provided by the government. This paper has set up the general framework of the project governance under the PPP model, and has set up the project management structure, which makes property rights identified clearly, makes residual claim and controls over basic corresponding, and has a combination of government supervision, social supervision and contract constraints.In accordance with the principle of capacity and the principle of losses, this paper has discussed the PPP projects’identification of typical risk and approaches of risk-sharing, set up a risk-sharing mechanism for the risk which could be transferred, calculated the risk-sharing coefficient of both public and private and the distribution methods of interests based on the risk with the use of Fuzzy Comprehensive Evaluation Method. In order to control the risks of PPP projects effectively, a public-private collaborative risk management platform should be set up.Because of the long time of public infrastructure of PPP models’implementation, it is inevitable that there are difficulties in co-operation; this paper has analyzed the general process of the PPP model’s evolution. The interests of balance and stability interacted between public and private are determined by the contribution coefficient of each other and the effectiveness growth rate of independent investment together, when one side’s contribution is positive to the other side, then the two sides are very cooperative. The studies have shown that the foundation that government saves the projects in a difficult situation is that administrative costs of bankruptcy are greater then administrative costs of saving-subsidies.The government should set up supervision and regulation methods according the different nature of the project, determine the scientifical supervision way. In order to supervise price effectively, the thesis sets up the pricing mechanism. Using the Baron-Myserson theory, a prompting mechanism model which realizes the maximum of social welfare and satisfies to private enterprise participating in restriction and consistent restriction is built, induces private enterprise to show the true information of cost and quality,and constitute controlled price by cost and quality. The thesis raised that the implementation of PPP models is required to set up security system related institution. This paper has carried out empirical analysis about PPP’s management organizations, pricing mechanisms , risk-sharing and buy-back of project with the example of a water supply project and highway about public-private partnerships.更多还原