【作者】 袁春生；

【导师】 夏新平； 袁建国；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 企业管理， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 世界范围内财务舞弊案的持续发生,使得财务舞弊的治理问题在21世纪重新面临着严峻挑战。本文针对我国上市公司财务舞弊的监督机制失效成因进行理论与经验研究。文章首次聚焦于监督职能这一视角,阐述监督职能是公司治理的本质之一,然后比较分析公司治理层面的监督职能与企业内部会计控制制度在防范财务舞弊上的效果,指出我国上市公司财务舞弊的主要成因是公司治理层面的监督机制失效。文章进一步将监督机制分为直接监督和间接监督两类机制,以此分类建立研究假设并进行实证检验。这一分析框架为未来我国财务舞弊的治理进行更为全面而系统的深入考察提供了可资参考的研究思路。直接监督机制与财务舞弊关系的经验研究支持内部制衡机制失效是舞弊的直接成因,从而为我国上市公司治理的改革方向提供了经验证据:(1)股东大会在防止公司财务舞弊方面的作用有限,股东参与公司治理受股权结构的制约;股权集中没有为防范财务舞弊提供激励,其作用依赖于实际控制人性质;公司实际控制人性质为财务舞弊的重要影响因素;(2)独立董事防范财务舞弊的效果不明显,总经理兼任董事长会提高公司舞弊概率,在董事会决策权分配中,董事长权力居于主导地位,其它董事成员作用式微;董事会会议次数与财务舞弊的关系不显著为正,审计委员会监督效果不佳;(3)监事会规模、监事会会议频率及其成员持股比例都与财务舞弊不相关,监督会监督没有为抑制公司财务舞弊行为起到预期效果;(4)独立审计监督在一定程度上发挥了作用,证券管理部门的监管对公司财务舞弊有重大威慑力,二者之间存在着相互替代关系;(5)董事会规模与财务舞弊直接负相关,其边际监督能力随着董事会规模扩大而先增强后减弱;企业绩效与财务舞弊负相关,董事会成员间的知识互补效应导致董事会规模通过企业绩效而与财务舞弊负相关。本文还首次从间接监督视角,关注经理人市场竞争与控制权市场竞争这二个基本市场竞争制度和国家法律制度环境对财务舞弊的影响。研究结果表明:(1)经理人市场竞争能够抑制上市公司财务舞弊行为,而经理人报酬激励与声誉机制的作用受制于经理人市场竞争状况;(2)在控制权市场竞争中,只有第二大股东才能对第一大股东起制衡作用,其它股东在公司治理中无足轻重;(3)经理人市场竞争与报酬激励、控制权市场竞争存在着互为替代关系,在不发达劳动力市场中,需支付更高报酬才能抑制代理人自利行为;(4)投资者法律保护与上市公司舞弊负相关,同时投资者法律保护程度的改善也能够有效降低公司财务舞弊概率,此结论的政策意义是,在我国,完善法律制度是加强投资者保护从而抑制公司财务舞弊行为的一项重要制度安排。这些经验证据有助于理解舞弊的经济制度与法律制度成因。更多还原

【Abstract】 At the beginning of the 21st century, so many worldwide financial frauds in prominent companies happened one after another, which makes it a serious challenge: how can we cure listed companies’financial frauds. The main purpose of this paper is to provide theoretic and empirical study on the causes for the non-effectiveness of monitoring mechanism for listed companies’financial frauds in China. Focusing on corporate monitoring mechanism, this paper illustrates that monitoring is one essential function of corporate governance. By comparatively analyzing the effects of corporate governance on deterence of financial frauds with that of internal accounting control system, it is pointed out that the main reason of financial frauds in Chinese listed companies is non-effective monitoring mechanism at the aspect of corporate governance. And then this paper develops research hypotheses and provides empirical evidences about the effects of direct and indirect monitoring mechanisms on financial frauds in public companies. This analysis framework can provide referencable paradigm for future deep research on determinations of financial frauds.The results of empirical tests on the relationship between direct supervisal mechanisms and financial fraud, which can provide reference solutions for China’s listed company governance reform, are consistent with the hypothesis that the poor effectiveness of internal governance mechanism is the direct cause of corporate financial frauds. (1)The function of shareholder meeting on preventing frauds is limited and the role of shareholders is dependent on ownership structure. What’s more, how ownership concentration works on preventing financial frauds depends on the type of actual controllers, which is an important determination of financial frauds. Therein, ownership concentration turns out not to be effective to prevent financial frauds. (2) The monitoring from independent directors has no effects on frauds, as well as board of directors meeting and auditing committee. The likelihood of financial frauds is higher in the corporate with the chairman of board of directors also is CEO. So it maintains that the chairman of board of directors possesses a leading position and the power of other directors is very limited. (3) The size of supervisory board, the frequency of supervisory board meeting, and the ownership percentage of members in the supervisory board are not related to the likelihood of financial frauds. These results support the fact that the monitoring from the supervisory board is inefficient on deterring corporate fraudulent behavior. (4) The supervision from independent auditors or securities supervision bureaus is negatively related to the probability of financial frauds significantly. Further more, securities supervision bureaus and independent auditing are governance mechanisms which can be substitutes for each other. (5) The direct relationship between board size and financial frauds is negative. What’s more, with enlarging board size, its marginal monitoring effects can be enhanced in the beginning and then become smaller; corporate performance is negatively related to frauds, and the indirect links between board size and the likelihood of financial frauds is negative, which means the larger BOD size is, the higher corporate performance is, the lower the likelihood of corporate financial frauds is.Moreover, this paper firstly studies the effects of managerial labour market competition, control rights market, and investor legal protection on the likelihood of financial frauds. The main findings are as follows: (1) Depended on managerial labour market competition, which is an important determination of financial frauds, management compensation and reputation have no significant effects on financial frauds; (2)As for control rights market, it is not other shareholders but only the second largest shareholder can discipline the largest shareholder’s behavior efficiently; (3) Managerial labour market competition is a substituted mechanism of management compensation and control rights market, which means, top managers must be paid higher in order to induce managers to behave in ways consistent with shareholders’goals in undeveloped labour market;(4) The relationship between legal protection for investors and financial frauds is negative, and the improvement on investors’ legal protection has a negative influence on the likelihood of frauds. The political illustration of these results is that the improvement of legal system is an important institutional arrangement used to strengthen investors’protection and prevent listed companies from financial frauds. The evidences above are helpful to comprehend how the economic and legal institutions bring about financial frauds in China.更多还原