【作者】 陈子林；

【导师】 张子刚；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 订单履行被认为是电子商务中的薄弱环节,由于Internet的快节奏和消费者对于快速服务要求的不断增加,消费者已经不愿意等待数周或者数月来获得网上订购的商品。Internet零售商在不断的和节奏、时间作斗争,为了能够获得更多消费者的青睐,他们不断的寻找更好的供应链渠道模式来履行订单,其中一个越来越流行的渠道便是drop-shipping。论文从不同的角度对drop-shipping渠道进行了创新性和基础性的研究,主要包括drop-shipping渠道的选择、drop-shipping渠道内部各成员的决策以及drop-shipping渠道和其他渠道之间的竞争问题,具体如下:(1)在一对一供应链环境下研究了供应商和零售商的drop-shipping渠道选择策略,分别给出了供应商和零售商在传统渠道和drop-shipping渠道下的最优决策,并通过渠道间的对比给出了供应商和零售商采用drop-shipping渠道的条件,同时指出尽管采用drop-shipping渠道后,需求不确定的风险由零售商处转移到了供应商处,但是这并不一定就导致供应商的利润下降以及零售商的利润上升。针对采用drop-shipping渠道对供应链整体利润的影响,提出了风险分担策略,通过该策略可以在某些情况下实现系统利润的帕累托改进。(2)在多个供应商竞争的情况下,建立了供应商之间的渠道博弈模型,针对每种可能出现的渠道结构,给出了供应商的最优决策,并通过对所有情况的对比,给出了供应商渠道博弈的纳什均衡。研究结果证实了drop-shipping渠道作为竞争武器的价值,当drop-shipping渠道的有效性因子大于1且市场中的供应商并未全部提供drop-shipping渠道时,提供drop-shipping渠道的供应商可以获得更多的利润,多阶段渠道博弈的均衡结果是供应商均提供drop-shipping渠道。(3)在零售商基于产品零售价和供应商库存竞争的情况下,研究了drop-shipping渠道下的供应链协调问题:指出以往的批发价契约、回购契约、利润分享契约等均不能使供应链获得协调;给出了使drop-shipping供应链达到协调的线性批发价契约和库存成本分担契约的组合策略;在库存成本分担契约下,供应商承担一部分零售商的缺货成本,同时零售商承担一部分供应商的产品滞销成本。(4)建立了drop-shipping渠道下供应商和零售商之间基于合作促销的Stackelberg博弈模型,分别给出了供应商和零售商之间单阶段和多阶段Stackelberg博弈下的最优促销策略,并对两种博弈过程进行了对比,发现多阶段Stackelberg博弈均衡总是优于单阶段Stackelberg博弈均衡,且当零售商给予供应商的drop-shipping风险补偿水平较高时,供应商通过承担一部分零售商的促销费用,可以获得更多的利润,而当零售商给与供应商的drop-shipping风险补偿水平较低时,供应商不需要承担零售商的促销费用。(5)在渠道之间存在免费搭乘现象的情况下,建立了drop-shipping渠道和网络直销渠道之间的竞争模型,指出供应商提供网络直销渠道后,并不一定就导致零售商利润的下降,这依赖于drop-shipping渠道免费搭乘网络直销渠道的效果,当效果高于一定水平时,零售商的利润增加。对于供应商来讲,提供网络直销渠道总是可以获得更多的利润。(6)使用非常一般化的ARIMA时间序列对drop-shipping渠道下的需求进行建模,对未来需求进行了预测,并在此基础上量化了Order-up-to和基于MRP的库存管理方法下的牛鞭效应,最后通过模拟仿真的方法对两种库存管理方法下的牛鞭效应和库存绩效进行了对比,发现基于MRP的库存管理方法在提供了与Order-up-to库存管理方法大体相当的库存绩效的同时产生了较小的牛鞭效应。更多还原

【Abstract】 Order fulfillment is regarded as one of the weakest links in e-commerce. Due to the fast pace of the Internet and the growing expectations for timely service, consumers are no longer willing to wait several weeks or months to have their orders fulfilled. Internet retailers are struggling with this pace, dealing with timely deliveries and in-stock issues. As Internet retailers strive to meet these growing expectations, they are increasingly exploring alternative strategies for fulfilling customer orders. One approach to order fulfillment that is becoming more and more common in today’s Internet retailing is drop-shipping channel.This dissertation studies drop-shipping channel fundamentally with some innovative perspectives, including drop-shipping channel choice, decision-making of channel members and competition between drop-shipping channel and other channels. Details are as follows:(1) Under one-to-one supply chain environment, the supplier’s and retailer’s drop-shipping channel choices are studied. The optimal decisions of supplier and retailer in traditional channel and drop-shipping channel are given respectively. By comparing these two channels, we find that transferring demand-uncertainty risk from retailer to supplier does not necessarily lead to higher expected payoff for retailer or a lower one for supplier. Sometimes, even if supply chain total expected payoff is smaller in drop-shipping channel than in the traditional channel, it is still possible for them to achieve Pareto improving payoffs by adopting drop-shipping channel, provided that risk sharing is allowed.(2) When suppliers compete with each other, we develop a channel game model. In each model setting, we characterize optimal decisions when each firm has a fixed channel structure (traditional channel or traditional and drop-shipping channel). Based on that, we derive the equilibrium channel structure. Our findings provide systematic answers to questions regarding the value of drop-shipping as a competitive weapon. When drop-shipping effectiveness factor is bigger than 1 and some suppliers don’t provide drop-shipping channel, the ones who provide drop-shipping channel will get higher payoff while the others get lower payoff. In equilibrium, all suppliers provide drop-shipping channel. (3) When retailers compete with each other based on retail price and supplier’s capacity, the coordination problems in drop-shipping channel are studied. We find that wholesale price contract, buy back contract, profit sharing contract can’t coordinate supply chain any more. The combination of linear wholesale price contract and inventory cost sharing contract are provided to coordinate drop-shipping supply chain. Under inventory cost sharing contract, the supplier share a part of retailer’s understock cost, while the retailer share a part of supplier’s overstock cost.(4) When supplier and retailer cooperate in promotion, the Stackelberg game model is developed and the single-stage and multi-stage Stackelberg equilibriums are obtained. We find that multi-stage game has better coordination efficiency than single-stage through comparing the results of single-stage and multi-stage. When drop-shipping markup is big, the supplier should share a part of retailer’s promotion fees; when drop-shipping markup is small, it is not necessary for supplier to share the retailer’s promotion fees any more.(5) When free riding exists between channels, the competition between Internet direct channel and drop-shipping channel is studied. We find that providing Internet direct channel does not necessarily lead to lower expected payoff for Internet retailer, it depends on the effect of drop-shipping channel free ride on Internet direct channel. When the effect is good, the retailer can achieve higher payoff. Of course, the supplier always achieves higher payoff by providing Internet direct channel.(6) The generalized ARIMA demand model is developed under drop-shipping channel. Based on this model, future demand is forecasted and bullwhip effect is quantified under order-up-to inventory management approach and MRP based inventory management approach. Simulation modeling is used to compare these two inventory management approaches. The results show that MRP based approach gives smaller bullwhip effect than the traditional order-up-to approach, while providing comparable inventory performance.更多还原