【作者】 任广浩；

【导师】 张继良；

【作者基本信息】 河北师范大学 ， 马克思主义理论与思想政治教育， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 在人类几千年的历史长河中,中央与地方关系始终是一个国家制度的核心问题。它关系到国家统一、民族团结、经济发展和社会稳定。中央与地方关系具体的制度体现是中央国家机构与地方国家机构之间的权力关系,即国家权力的纵向配置问题。国家权力仅仅进行横向配置还不够,还必须进行纵向配置。国家权力纵向配置,是指中央与地方或国家整体与组成部分之间的权力格局,即国家根据国家权力与其管辖地域、人口、历史传统、公共事务的性质和总量等各种复杂的变量关系加以考量后,自上而下或自下而上设立不同层级的政府,权力在不同层级的政府之间进行分配。简单地说,就是中央与地方的权力分配。国家权力纵向配置涉及一国权力配置的原则、制度、方式等一系列国家生活中的重大问题,其重要性决不亚于国家权力的横向配置。从世界各国国家权力纵向配置的发展趋势来看,越来越多的国家抛弃了中央集权与地方分权绝对主义的思路,而以一种相对的思维方式来看待中央与地方权力关系问题。各国中央与地方关系发展的一个共同趋势就是中央集权和地方分权的相对“均衡”。改革开放以来,我国中央与地方的纵向权力关系进行了一系列重大调整,取得了明显的成效,促进了国民经济和社会发展。但是,目前中央与地方纵向权力关系中还存在着许多突出的矛盾和问题,仍然没能彻底摆脱“放权——收权”的循环怪圈。在当代中国的语境下,由于中央与地方关系在整个国家政治生活中的重要性,以及国家权力纵向配置所呈现的不规范性、非制度化,迫切需要通过制度设计找到中央与地方间集权、分权的合理均衡点,实现二者之间的动态平衡,从而在此基础上建构一个民主、高效、充满活力的国家权力纵向配置体系。本文以当代中国“超大国家”的基本国情为出发点,把立法、行政、司法三大国家权力系统之间的横向分权与中央和地方之间的纵向分权有机结合起来,从国家权力横向、纵向和纵横交错的“双重分权”、“立体分权”的权力“网络结构”入手,通过分析中国当代特别是改革开放30年来国家权力纵向配置的发展、演变及其制度困境,探索国家权力纵向配置未来改革的走向和制度化的方案设计。国家权力的配置有五个向度。第一,国家权力在人民与国家机关之间的配置,这就是政治学、宪法学上常说的国体问题,也就是解决国家权力所有权的归属问题。第二,国家权力在少数人和多数人之间的配置,这个配置在近现代国家是通过代议制来完成的。第三,国家权力的横向配置,是指国家权力按照功能在国家机构之间的分配,即同一层次国家机关之间权力的配置格局,也就是政权组织形式,国家权力在功能上通常划分为立法、行政、司法三个部分,并分别由三个不同的机构来行使。第四,国家权力的纵向配置,即中央与地方或国家整体与组成部分之间的权力格局。第五,国家权力在国家和社会之间的配置,国家权力来自于社会,其最终的发展方向是不断回归社会。中央集权理论、地方分权与地方自治理论、中央与地方均权主义理论,是国家权力纵向配置的几种基本理论形态。马克思、恩格斯、列宁的集权分权观和有关国家结构的理论,对当代中国国家权力的纵向配置有着重要的理论指导意义。中国共产党的三代领导人包括毛泽东、邓小平、江泽民和新一届中央领导集体,都对中央地方关系问题给予了极高的关注,并提出了许多对当代中国国家权力纵向配置具有现实指导意义的思想和理论。国家权力的纵向配置与国家结构紧密相连,单一制趋向集权,联邦制趋向分权。但单一制并不意味着绝对集权,联邦制也并非绝对分权。按照国家结构形式的不同,国家权力的纵向配置分为单一制下的配置模式和联邦制下的配置模式两大类。其中单一制配置模式在实践中包括集权型单一制模式、自治型单一制两种形态;联邦制配置模式包括分权型联邦制和集权型联邦制两种形态。20世纪80年代以来,西方各国兴起声势浩大的政府行政改革浪潮,这场改革中的一个主题就是重塑中央和地方关系。在国家权力——国家结构的双重互动变迁中,西方各国的国家结构与集权、分权亦呈现出集权化和分权化并存及共同发展的趋势。当代中国是混合了单一制和联邦制因素而形成的一种独特的国家结构形式。这种权力纵向配置在实践中体现为三种具体模式:即中央与普通行政区的权力配置模式、中央与民族区域自治地方政府的权力配置模式和中央与特别行政区的权力配置模式。当代中国国家权力纵向配置的历史沿革经历了纵向权力结构的宏观构建阶段和改革开放后国家权力纵向配置的发展两个大的阶段。当代中国国家权力纵向配置面临着多方面的制度困境,主要包括中央集权但权威不足;地方权力不断扩大却无权力归属感;中央与地方事务分工不明导致的政府越位、缺位同时存在;缺乏地方利益的表达与平衡机制;权力配置的非均衡性和分殊化;权力配置方式的非制度化;纵向权力监督机制不健全等几个方面。在国家权力纵向配置中,无论是绝对的中央集权还是绝对的地方分权,都是权力配置的极端表现,都存在着明显的弊端。今后的中国不可能实行完全的地方分权,也不可能实行绝对的中央集权体制,而是致力于建构中央有限集权与地方适度分权的动态平衡机制。中央与地方立法权力的配置问题是国家权力纵向配置中的核心组成部分,它决定着整个国家权力配置的状态和中央地方关系的基本格局。一个国家立法权力纵向配置得当,会使国家权力有序、有效、健康的运行;配置不当,则可能产生重大危害。轻则导致立法体系内部混乱,如立法侵权和越权、立法重复、地方保护主义、贸易壁垒等现象,影响国内市场统一及国家法制统一,重则可能导致中央与地方发生权限争议,导致政治冲突、地方暴乱或国家政权不同程度的变动等。因此,世界各国都十分重视立法权限尤其是中央与地方立法权限的配置问题,并试图通过改良各种影响权限配置的因素,采取合理的配置模式、方法和原则,以保障国家权力的有效运行,促进社会政治稳定、经济发展和民族团结,维护国家统一。国家行政权力不可能完全集中在中央政府,必须在中央与地方之间进行科学划分,这就涉及到行政区划和政府的层级问题。行政区划和政府层级构成了一个国家中央与地方行政权力的空间分布与运行机制,是一国行政体制的基础性问题和行政管理的重要组成部分。我国五级行政权力体制存在着严重的弊端。从我国政府层级沿革和国外政区设置的情况看,划小省区、增加省数、增设直辖城市、建立合理的行政区域管理幅度、减少中间层级、撤销乡镇,是革除现行政府层级设置弊端的根本出路。在多层级政府体制下,为实现国家治理目标,各级政府被赋予了不同的职能,而不同职能政府的事权也相应要进行分解,根据政府的职能来确定事权。事权的实现要靠财权保障,而财权的划分又应以事权的划分为基础。合理划分中央与地方的事权、财权,使财权与事权相匹配,这是处理中央与地方关系的关键。从法理上讲,在我国单一制的宪政体制之下,司法权是一种国家权力,而不具有地方自治的性质,地方并不能像具有立法权和行政权那样享有司法权。司法权力地方化的弊病影响了我国法制统一、独立审判这两项重要宪法原则的实现,也使社会主义法治原则受到威胁。要把司法权力地方化的问题放在中央与地方关系的大背景下去思考。“优化司法职权配置”是下一步司法体制改革的重要内容。司法权的地方化,实质上是司法体制本身的弊端所致,要解决司法地方保护主义问题,必须诉诸体制上的改革。要改革法院设置体系、实行司法辖区和行政区划的分离,改革目前法院的经费管理体制和法官选任机制。更多还原

【Abstract】 The relationship between central and local governments is always a key problem of state system in the long history of human beings. It is related to the unification of a country, integration of its nation, development of domestic economic and stability of society. The concrete embodiment of the relation between central and local governments is the power relation between national central institution and local state organs. And it is also an issue in vertical allocation of state power. Since the horizontal allocation of state power is not comprehensive, which makes it is necessary to allocate power vertically. The vertical allocation of state power is a up-and-down power structure between central and local governments, or between a provincial government and its subordinate institutions. A republic can establish different administratively leveled governments either from above or from below, so as to allocate power among them. The vertical allocation of state power takes into account the allocation principle, political system and allocation manner. No wonder the importance of it is no less than the horizontal allocation’s.As the trend of the vertical power allocation all over the world shows, more and more countries have abandoned the idea of either thoroughgoing centralization or decentralization. A more common pracice is that a nation should analyse the relation between its central and local governments and then keep equilibrium between centralization and decentralization. Since the reform and opening-up, a series of important adjustments have been made to the vertical power relation in China, which have achieved clear effects, promoting the development of economy and society nationally. But it worth noting that there still are many protrudent contradictions and problems. In fact, China has not stepped out of the strange loop of“delegating power and then taking power back”. In contemporary China, in view of the important relation between central and local governments in the national political life, and the non-standard and non-institutionalization of vertical allocation, it is very urgent to find a reasonable equilibrium point between centralization and decentralization, then on its basis to construct a democratic, efficient, and vigorous vertical allocation system of state power.This paper uses the situation of modern China as the jumping-off point. Meanwhile, it organically combines the horizontal decentralization of power within the system of the separation of the executive, legislative and judicial powers with vertical decentralization of power between the central government and local units. Furthermore, starting with the network structure of the dual and three-dimensional decentralization of power, and anlysing with the development, evolvement and difficulties of the vertical distrubition of state power in the mordern China, especially during the thirty years’reform and openning-up, the article searches for the future reformatonal direnction of the vertical distrubition of state power and its systematized project design.The allocation of state power is five-dimensional. Firstly, the allocation of state power between people and state organs is an issue of state system in politics and constitutional jurisprudence which establishes the ownership of proprietary. Secondly, the allocation of state power lies between minority and majority in the form of representative system in modern countries. Thirdly, the horizontal allocation of state power means allocating power among state organs in line with different functions. It is a form of government with three branches, namely, legislative, executive and judicial organs. Fourthly, the vertical allocation of state power is the power pattern between the central and local governtments or between a provincial government and its subordinate institutions. The horizontal allocation of state power is not comprehensive, which makes it necessary to allocate power vertically. Fifthly, it is the allocation between state and society. As the state power comes from society, it should return to society in turn.The theory of centralization, decentralization, local autonomy and averaging weight between the central and local governments is the basic theoretical formation in vertical allocation of state power. The view of centralization and decentralization, and the theory of state structure of Marx, Engels, and Lenin have important theoretical guiding significance to the vertical allocation of state power in contemporary China. The three generations of communist leaders in China, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and the new central collective leadership have paid more attention to the relation between the central and local governments, presenteding thoughts and theories significant for the vertical allocation of state power in contemporary China.There always are close linkages between the vertical allocation of state power and the state structure. The vertical allocation of state power has two forms, that is, unitary system and federalism. Unitary system tends to centralize power and federalism tends to decentralization. But the unitary system does not equal to absolute centralization while federalism does not equal to absolute decentralization either. Among them, the allocation model of unitary system contains power centralization and autonomous model in practice. Meanwhile, the allocation model of federalism contains decentralization and power centralized model. A choice of them should be made according to the different national structure of a specific country. Extensive administrative reforms have taken place in western countries since 1980s. The theme of reforms is rebuilding the relation between central and local governments. In the process of interaction between state power and structure, there is a tendency to centralize and decentralize power, which exists and goes together. A special model of state structure has been formed in contemporary China which combines features of unitary system and federalism. To be specific, there are three models, that is, the power allocation model between the central government and general administrative regions, the power allocation model between the central government and regional autonomy of minority nationalities, and the power allocation model between the central governmetn and special administrative regions.The evolution of vertical allocation of state power can be devided into two stages: the establishment of macro-framework in history and the development during reform and opening-up. Manyfolded systematic dilemmas have come up, including power centralization lack of authority, continuous power expansion in local governments short of conficence, cross-boundary administration and omission due to unclear division of power between the central and local governments, lack of expression and balancing mechanism of local interests, the non-balance and polarization of power allocation, non-institution of the power allocation model, imperfect supervision mechanism of vertical allocation, and so on. For vertical allocation of state power, either absolute centralization or decentralization is an extreme expression of power allocation with obvious disadvantages. It is impossible to implement thorough-going decentralization or centralization in China. A more reasonable practice is to build a dynamic balance mechanism for limited centralization and moderate decentralization.The allocation of legislative power between the central and local governments is the core of the vertical allocation of state power, which decides the shape of power allocation and basic relation pattern between the central and local governments. If the legislative power can be allocated properly, a well-ordered, efficient and healthy power operation will come true. If not, it can cause harms, especially internal confusion in legislative system, for example, tort legistation and ultra vires activities, duplication of the legislative, regional protectionism and trade barrier preventing the unification of domestic market and national legal system. Furthermore, it can lead to conflict of competence between the central and local governments, political conflicts, local rebellion or even regime change. So, every country has been placing emphasis on legislative competence, especially the allocation between the central and local governments. And they have tried to improve factors effecting the authorization configuration, through reasonable models, methods and principles of allocation, so as to ensure effective operation of state power, promote political stability, economic development, national unity, and unify the country.It is impossible for state administrative authority to concentrate completely on central governments. State power should be divided scientifically between the central and local governments. In substance, it involves administrative divisions and government levels which are the crux of the administrative system in a country and shapes the spatial distribution and operation mechanism of administrative power between the central and local governments. For example, China has a five-levelled protection administrative power system that has serious drawbacks. According to the evolution of government levels in China and practices in other countries, the fundamental solution for redressing abuses is to reduce the area of a provice, increase the number of provinces, add municipalities directly under the central government, build reasonable administrative regional management levels, reduce middle levels and abolish township governments. Under the multi-levelled government system, different functions are given to government at different levels in order to realize the aimed governance. And administrative rights should be decomposed according to functions. While administrative rights come true on the basis of financial rights, financial division have to be made according to administrative rights. The key here is to divide the administrative and financial rights between the central and local governments rationally.In jurisprudence, in a unitary constitutional system in China, judicial power falls into authority of state with no hint of local autonomy, therefore, a local government has no judicial power apart from legislative and administrative power. The localization of judicial power in present China has effected legal unification and trial independence which are the most important constitutional principles in our country. And it has posed a threat to socialist principles of rulling by law. Problems in the localization of judicial power should be considered in the light of relation between the central and local governments. To optimize the allocation of judicial authority is the next reform step. In fact, localization of judicial power is due to abuses in judicial system, accordingly, the solution lies in reforming the judicial system. Specifically, the court system should be rearranged, jurisdiction and administrative division be separated, the tribunal financial management system and selection mechanism for judicial officials be reformed, too.更多还原