转售价格维持的反垄断法规制

【作者】 唐斐；

【导师】 曹明德；

【作者基本信息】 西南政法大学 ， 经济法学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 转售价格维持是指处于同一产业不同环节的交易者相互约定,就供给之商品转售与第三人时,或第三人再为转售时,应遵守一定的价格,否则给予违约金处罚,或者停止供应等经济制裁手段。对转售价格维持行为进行规制最早源于美国1911年的迈尔斯医药案,至今已有近百年的历史。而作为纵向限制的一种形式,转售价格维持在现实生活中大量存在,其对竞争的影响一直以来也都是经济学界和法学界争论的焦点。各个国家和地区的反垄断法对待转售价格维持的态度也随着研究结论的不同不断在进行变化。丰富的理论探讨文献、立法资料和司法判例也为中国反垄断法中规制转售价格维持行为提供了研究的基础和借鉴的对象。转售价格维持的复杂性主要体现在两个方面。首先,转售价格维持作为纵向限制的形式,对竞争效果的影响并不确定。它既可以促使经销商提供更优良的服务、开拓新市场,也可以限制品牌内部的竞争,并进而影响到品牌之间的竞争。其次,虽然转售价格维持通常被作为纵向关系来理解,但它也可以为制造商之间、经销商之间的水平共谋提供掩护。而反垄断法对共谋的规制都非常严厉。因此,当纵向关系和横向关系在现实案例中纠缠在一起的时候,规制的难度也就因此而提高。本文通过对转售价格维持的理论和案例的梳理,从纵向、横向两个方面分析了转售价格维持的内在逻辑,指出现有理论存在的一些不足。在反垄断法对这一行为的规制中,可以通过两个层面来进行。首先是对转售价格维持的一般规制。一般性规制主要要求转售价格维持的实施者具有市场支配地位。因为只有具有市场支配地位的企业所实施的转售价格维持才可能造成对竞争的损害。在此基础上,对转售价格维持引发的问题进行分类处理,并相应地予以规制。具体而言,本文的主要内容包括:第一章对转售价格维持的概念和分类等进行了介绍,厘清作为研究前提的基本问题。在转售价格维持的行为主体上,主要是各国和地区反垄断法所界定的“企业”,包括公司、联合会、同业工会、个人、政府等。母、子公司公司之间尽管从法律责任的角度来看相互具有独立性,但是,由于子公司通常完全受制于母公司的经济决策,在经济行为上并没有独立性,因此,相互之间设定转售价格的行为不适合成立反垄断法意义上的转售价格维持行为。而在行为的客体上,尽管有学者认为应当同时包含商品和服务。但是,由于服务和主体本身的不可分割性,无法在真正意义上实现“转售”,因而被排除在外。第二章是从纵向限制的角度分析转售价格维持的内在逻辑。纵向限制是市场——企业替代方式的中间形态,通常而言,厂商采用纵向限制可以出于消除上下游的双重加价效应、服务和信誉方一面的搭便车效应、提供在市场不确定情况下的风险分担机制、提供在信息不对称情形下的恰当激励等多种考虑。而作为纵向限制形式的一种,转售价格维持同样可以具有上述的合理性。在反垄断法历史上,芝加哥学派的学者首先提出转售价格维持可以克服机会主义,防止搭便车,从而促使经销商提供服务。这一理论成为对转售价格维持适用合理原则最为主要的理论。但是,经销商服务理论在对简单商品、经销商效率区分等方面不具有全部的解释力。此外,转售价格维持还被认为对防止双重加价具有正面的效果。但上上世纪50年代“加尔布雷斯假说”的提出,以及后来对该假说的证明,都表明,即便没有转售价格维持的限制,市场的双重加价现象也可以在一定程度上得到遏制。因此,转售价格维持的合理性也不能完全由防止双重加价来解释。实际上,从这一部分的分析可以看到,转售价格维持作为纵向限制的一种形式,其对竞争的影响往往很难从一个方面用一种理论来完全解释。而且它可以同时具有负面和正面的效果。因此,在实际的市场运作中企业会使用转售价格维持来实现何种目标,无法简单地从理论上得出明确的结论。第三章是从横向限制的角度来分析转售价格维持行为的内在逻辑。虽然通常从纵向关系的角度来理解转售价格维持行为,但转售价格维持行为事实上可以为横向限制竞争协议提供掩护。对此,本文首先分析了横向限制竞争协议的基本理论。早期哈佛学派认为横向限制竞争协议完全可以成功实施。而芝加哥学派发现了竞争者之间共谋的不稳定性,主张通过市场自身的竞争予以瓦解。新产业组织理论的发展则再次证明于一定的市场结构下,共谋可以长期有效地存在。因此,特定的市场结构会使得共谋存在于转售价格维持行为中。在实证的调查中,也的确发现了竞争者之间的卡特尔行为在通过转售价格维持行为予以实施,同时,市场结构与共谋的发生存在直接的关联性。第四章是探讨对转售价格维持行为的一般性规制。在对转售价格维持行为的违法性认定中,传统的观点认为,规制的理由在于其限制了经销商对自己产品的自由处分权利。但是,限制处分理论更多地是从私法的角度来看待市场竞争的问题,而非反垄断法。同时,即便从合同法自身的发展来看,现代的关系契约理论已经在很大程度上改变了传统理论分析问题的视角。因此,转售价格维持的违法性在于对竞争秩序的破坏。在对待转售价格维持行为的基本分析方法上,当然违法原则和合理原则应该说是各有优势。合理原则能够更好地将转售价格维持中的合理因素与限制因素在具体案件中予以区分,但占用的司法资源较多,且难以为市场参与者提供稳定的预期。而当然违法原则则与之相反,在操作上比较简便,但可能会将具有合理性的转售价格维持也同时禁止掉,不利社会福利的提高。因此,基于前文对转售价格维持内在逻辑的纵、横向分析,在规制的思路上,本文认为应该采用一般性禁止,再对特殊类型进行适用除外的方式对转售价格维持行为进行规制。一般性禁止中,主要是对市场结构有所要求,并提出要回归到改良后的SCP范式中。这里实际上也就否定了对转售价格维持适用当然违法。SCP范式是确定企业行为构成对整个竞争损害的基础,如果没有这一基础,市场的自我调节可以处理掉负面效果,而不需要反垄断法的介入。同时,对于转售价格维持的横向效果来说,具有一定的市场结构是共谋能够持续进行的一个条件。因此,对市场结构的要求可以允许绝大多数有利于市场效率提高的转售价格维持行为存在。对转售价格维持行为规制上是否需要主观要件上,笔者持否定态度。因为在纵向关系上,价格限制的表明结果非常容易观察;而在横向关系上,对主观要件的特别强调会削弱规制的力度。因此,即便不存在主观意图的证据,也可以从限制竞争的效果上出发予以规制。第五章是对转售价格维持行为的类型化规制。在一般性禁止规定的基础上,本章主要讨论对相关的转售价格维持行为进一步区别对待的问题。首先,对于纵向限制中是否区分价格限制和非价格限制上,本文认为这一区分实际上没有经济学理论的基础,在实务操作中也难以区分,而二者可以达到的限制竞争效果又基本相同,因此没有区分的必要。其次,在最高转售价格维持行为和最低转售价格维持行为上,通过对埃布尔雷克特案的分析可以发现,最高转售价格维持行为可以防止双重垄断加价,在一定程度上实现上游垄断者对下游垄断力量的限制,从而有利于消费者。而最低转售价格维持更容易转化为价格共谋,更容易弱化经销商降低经销成本的努力,禁止的理由更为充分。最后,在代理销售与转售价格维持上,由于代理销售中商品本身并没有转移所有权,商品销售所产生的风险仍然归属与上游生产商,因此,与转售价格维持行为中所有权转移后进行的限制有所不同,不应当用规制转售价格维持的方法予以对待。在实践中,最主要的问题是区分出商品是否真正转移了所有权。在转售价格维持的适用除外中,名牌产品的产品形象往往和价格紧密联系在一起。特别是其中的奢侈品,其消费特性更多地表现为炫耀性消费。转售价格维持可以帮助产品保持统一的价格,从而对产品的销售具有正面的影响。而出版物在德国、日本等国一度被作为适用除外的领域,其理由主要在于对文化的保护。但是,出版物领域的转售价格维持更多地提高了出版物的价格,并没有看到对言论自由等方面的正面促进。在日本取消该领域的转售价格维持后,出版物市场也没有出现负面的影响。建议零售价通常不具有强制的约束力,因此和转售价格维持协议的可执行性有所区别。夏普公司案是建议零售价案件中比较典型的案件。通过对这一案件的分析,对建议零售价存在的理论纷争进行了梳理,对其可能的正面效果和负面效果也进行了归纳。第六章中首先对中国大陆现有立法关于转售价格维持规制进行了一个总结。目前尽管有几部立法都对转售价格维持有所规制,但是,由于中国大陆采用市场经济的时间比较晚,偏向于模糊的立法使得在实务中如何具体地对转售价格维持进行规制还并不清晰。对此,在立法技术上可以对世界其他国家和地区反垄断立法对转售价格维持规制有所借鉴。日本对转售价格维持的规制经历了完全禁止、对符合法定要件的商品允许实施再到原则性禁止的过程。欧盟由于对形成统一大市场的追求,对转售价格维持的态度较为严格,能够得到豁免需要满足较为苛刻的条件。我国台湾地区在转售价格维持上积累了较多判例,从制定法到判决结果,对转售价格维持都比较严厉。由于我国的大陆法传统和以行政为中心的政治体制都与德国、日本、台湾地区类似,因此,在立法上应当采用和他们比较一致的原则禁止、特别例外的模式。更多还原

【Abstract】 Resale Price Maintenance("RPM") means dealers at the different stages in transaction chains agree on arrangements that one shall comply with fixed prices pre-aligned by the seller when it resell the same products to a third party,and/or the third party resell the products in accordance with certain fixed prices;otherwise liquidated damages or other civil sanctions,e.g.ceasing supply,shall be imposed consequently.Restriction on RPM originated from the case Dr.Miles Medical Co.in 1911.As a form of vertical restrictions,there are a large quantity of cases related to RPM in exist.The impact on competition is always a focus of arguments among economists and legal scholars.The provisions on RPM in Anti-monopoly laws varied from time to time based on conclusions from academic research.Abundant articles, legislation materials and judicial precedents provide study bases and objectives on how to regulate RPM in the anti-monopoly law of China.The complexity of RPM is shown in two respects.First of all,RPM,as a kind of vertical restriction,delivers uncertainty to competition effect.It can spur distributions to provider better services and explore new markets,but also can restrict inter-brand competition so that affect inter-band competition.Secondly,although RPM usually is interpreted from the aspect of vertical relationship,it can provide a cloak to horizontal conspiracy between manufacturers and dealers.The restriction on conspiracy is always extremely rigorous.Therefore,when a case mixed by vertical and horizontal relationships,the difficulty of restriction is lifted accordingly.This article analyzes inner logic from vertical and horizontal perspectives by hackling RPM theories and cases and points out deficiencies of the existing theories. To restrict RPM,there usually are two levels.The first is general restraints to RPM, which require the performer of RPM has dominant market position,because only the enterprises dominating the market can hurt competition.The second is to tackling problems triggered by RMP by imposing corresponding restraints.The major contents of the article specifically including the following: The first Section introduces the concept and classification and clarifies the fundamental questions of research.The performer of RPM is undertaking defined by most countries,including corporation,association,guild,individual,governments and so on.Although a parent company and its subsidiary are independent from each other in terms of legal liability,the business decision of subsidiary is fully subject to parent company.It has no economic independence,and therefore RPM between them does not constitute RPM in anti-monopoly law.With regard to the objective of RPM,some scholars think it consists of products and services.However,services are undividable and resale of services cannot realize in practice,and hence they shall be excluded.The second section analyzes the logic of RPM from the perspective of vertical restraints.Vertical restraints are interim form of inter-substitute between markets and enterprises.Generally speaking,manufacturers utilize vertical restraints in view of elimination of dual-pricing effect,free-riding of services and credibility,risk-sharing under market uncertainty and motivation under the situation of information imperfect. RPM,as one of vertical restraints,may own the same reasonableness as above.In history,the scholars of Chicago School brought out a conclusion that RPM could refrain opportunism and prevent free-riding,so as to motivate distributors to provide services.The theory became the major base of application of rule of reason.However, it cannot present comprehensive explanation in relation to simple merchandise and distinguishing efficiency of distributors etc.In addition,tt is deemed that RPM has positive effect on preventing dual pricing. But in the middle of 19 century,Galbraith hypothesis and the proof thereafter indicate that even if there is no restriction from RPM,dual pricing can be refrained to a certain degree.Thus,RPM’s reasonableness cannot be verified by preventing dual pricing.In fact,based on the analysis of this portion,we can see that RPM’s impact on competition hardly can thoroughly elaborated by one theory from one aspect. Furthermore,it has both negative and positive effects.Hence what goal is the using RPM of an enterprise in a market cannot be simply concluded from theories.The third section analyzes the logic of RPM from the perspective of horizontal restraints.Usually we understand RPM from the angle of vertical restraints,but RPM actually may cover agreements in connection with horizontal restraints.The article therefore construes the fundamental theory of horizontal restraints.Early Harvard School thought horizontal restraints can be implemented successfully.While Chicago School found the uncertainty between competitors’ conspiracy and thought market competition can destroy conspiracy.The development of Neo-industry Organization proves again that conspiracy can exist for in a long run under a certain market structure.A special market structure may allow conspiracy to exist in RPM.It is found that competitors’ cartel is implemented through RPM in real cases and market structure is related to occurrence of conspiracy.The fourth section discusses general rules of RPM.With regard to how to allege the lawbreaking of RPM,the traditional view thinks RPM restrict the free right of transaction of distributors.However,given the development of contract law, cotemporary关系契约理论has broken through the traditional analysis angles. RPM’s illegality is due to the breach of competition orders.As of the basic analysis methods of RPM,per se rule and rule of reason have respective advantages.Rule of reason can better distinguish the reasonable factors and restraint aspects of RPM case by case.But it occupies more judicial resources and hardly can provide stable anticipation to market players.To the contrary,per se rule is easy to use,but it probably bans reasonable RPM as well and does not increase social welfare.Therefore,given the analysis of the logic of vertical and horizontal restraints, the article thinks we shall generally prohibit RPM,but make exception to special cases.General restriction requires adjusting market structure and returning to renovated SCP paradigm.It actually deny per se rule to be applied to RPM.SCP paradigm is the basis of ascertaining competition injury by enterprises.Without the basis,the self-adjustment of a market can get rid of negative effect,rather than having anti-monopoly law to involve.Meanwhile,a certain market structure is a condition of conspiracy for horizontal effect of RPM.Thus,the requirements of market structure may allow most RPM practices which do good to markets to exists.As to whether RPM restricts need subjective requirements,I am negative on that. Because the outcome of price restriction is easily observed in vertical relationship; while in horizontal relationship,stressing subjective requirements will weaken restricts.So even there is no subjective intention,it can be restricted from the competition effect.The fifth provides typolization restriction on RPM.On the ground of general restricts,the portion mainly discusses how to further distinguish RPM cases.First as to whether differentiate price and non-price restricts,the article thinks there is no economic theory and in practice it is hard to operate.So there is no need to distinguish them.Secondly,as to maximum RPM and minimum RPM,though Alberta,we can find out that maximum RPM can prevent dual pricing and benefit consumers.But minimum RPM is easily converted into price conspiracy and is more inclined to temper the efforts of cost-cutting by distributors.There are more reasons to restrict it. Last,as to agency sale,as the title of goods has not been transferred and the risks remain with the manufacturer,therefore it shall not been treated as RPM.In practice, the core issue is to distinguish whether the ownership of goods has been transferred.Regarding the exceptions of RPM restriction,luxury products’ brand images are closely linked with price.Consumption of those goods is to show off.RMP may help products to maintain unified price and deliver positive effect to product sale.Publication was ever treated as exception in Germany and Japan for the reason of culture protection.However,RPM in publication mainly heighten the prices of publication and rarely enhance freedom of speech.After Japan cancels RPM in that area,there is no negative impact.RPM usually is not compulsory.That is why it is different from an agreement of price maintenance.Sharp is a typical case regarding RPM.Through the analysis of this case,the article clear up all the controversies of recommended retail price and summarizes the positive and negative effects.The sixth section first summarizes the legislation of RPM in China’s mainland.In despite of regulations on RPM,as China’s mainland adopts market economy relatively late,the ambiguous regulations do not provide specific restricts on RPM.We have to learn from other countries in terms of legislation of RPM of anti-monopoly. Japan went through a process from full constraint,permission on specified merchandise to general constraint.EU takes rigorous attitudes towards RPM in order to form a unified market.Requirements of an exemption are quite hard.Our law system originated from continental laws with administration-oriented political system, like Germany,Japan and Taiwai.Therefore we can also adopt the similar model, namely,general prohibition supplemented by special exceptions.更多还原