【作者】 王红梅；

【导师】 荣朝和；

【作者基本信息】 北京交通大学 ， 产业经济学， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 创业企业对新产品、新产业及经济与社会的发展等起到了很大的推动作用,此类企业的剩余索取权与控制权分配问题引起了国内外学术界及实业界的高度关注。本文研究了创业企业剩余索取权与控制权分配的现象,发现上述权利分配具有“双分离”的特点:(1)创业者与创业投资者的剩余索取权与出资或实物资产比例分离:创业者往往获得高于甚至远高于其出资或实物资产比例的剩余索取权,创业投资者的剩余索取权则低于其出资比例;(2)创业者与创业投资者的控制权与剩余索取权分配分离:主流企业理论所倡导的“一股一票”现象在创业企业中并不成立,创业投资者往往获得相对于其剩余索取权更大的控制权。以上述现象为切入点,本文首先分析了有关企业所有权分配的理论与观点的立论依据,发现对企业性质的认识在很大程度上影响着对所有权分配依据的认识。在接下来的篇幅中,本文探讨了企业的性质,并在此基础上提出了企业剩余索取权与控制权分配谈判力的影响因素。然后,本文解析了创业者与创业投资者剩余索取权与控制权的分配过程,并对创业者与创业投资者对创业企业资本增值所做贡献及风险制造等问题进行了分析。最后,以上述工作为基础,本文构建了创业企业融资契约模型并解释了创业企业剩余索取权与控制权分配的“双分离”等现象。论文的研究还发现:(1)目前对创业企业所有权分配的研究主要在主流企业理论,如委托代理理论、GHM理论及GHM理论二代模型等的框架内进行。上述研究套用主流企业理论的研究方法,将创业投资者视为仅提供资金的投资者及“中心签约人”,将创业者视为具有“逆向选择”、“道德风险”和“敲竹杠”等机会主义行为的经营决策者,主要从防止或弱化创业者机会主义行为的角度进行创业企业所有权分配的研究;(2)“剩余创造性”是企业的根本性质,主流企业理论所倡导的“契约性”源自于企业的“剩余创造性”,“契约性”是“剩余创造性”的实现条件;(3)既然企业的根本性质在于剩余创造,因此企业所有权分配不应仅从防范“逆向选择”、“道德风险”和“敲竹杠”等机会主义行为的角度出发。企业的“剩余创造性”使不同要素所有者对企业剩余所做贡献成为其剩余索取权分配谈判力的主要影响因素,而不同要素的专有性和专用性程度将分别增强和削弱其所有者剩余索取权谈判力;由于剩余索取权所有者是企业的风险承担者,因此剩余索取权是企业控制权分配谈判力的影响因素之一;另外,由于企业剩余的风险主要来自人力资本所有者尤其是经营决策者的“道德风险”及“事后无能”等,因此强化对风险制造者的控制成为企业控制权分配谈判力的又一个影响因素;(4)创业者与创业投资者剩余索取权与控制权分配发生在创业投资过程的签约阶段,签约之前创业投资者与创业者对彼此的选择将为双方提供剩余索取权及控制权分配谈判力影响因素的相关信息;(5)创业者与创业投资者对创业企业资本增值所做贡献是双方人力资本与非人力资本的综合体现,其中创业者的主要贡献在于由其人力资本体现的发现商机和经营决策,创业投资者的贡献则主要在于提供资金和管理支持,创业者的主要贡献由其人力资本体现是创业企业剩余索取权与双方出资或实物资产比例分离的主要原因;创业者是创业企业的主要风险制造者,创业企业的风险承担者则还包括创业投资者,风险制造者与承担者的不对称是创业企业控制权与剩余索取权分配分离的主要原因。更多还原

【Abstract】 VC-backed firm’s ownership allocation has attracted much attention from academic and industrial fields due to extraordinary contribution they brought forward to emergence and development of new products,new industries and advancement of economy and society.The author analyzes VC-backed firms’ ownership allocation phenomena between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists and finds that there are two distinguished features which are different from views held by mainstream theories:(1)Residual claim distribution between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists is far from symmetric with that of capital or physical asset contributed by the two parties.Entrepreneurs always gain more residual claim over the share of capital or physical asset they offered,venture capitalists,in contrary,gain less residual claim over the share of capital they offered. (2)Distribution of control rights between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists is not symmetric with that of residual claim:venture capitalists always gain more control rights compared with residual claim they gain.In order to explain the above phenomena,the author first analyzes foundations of theories and views on ownership allocation and finds that different foundations arise from different standpoints on the nature of firm.Accordingly,this paper investigates into the nature of firm and thus advances factors in bargaining power over residual claims and control rights of business enterprise.Then the author illustrates the distribution process of residual claim and control rights between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists and analyzes contributions and risks brought forward by entrepreneurs and venture capitalists respectively.Finally,the paper constructs financing model of VC-backed firms and eventually explains the ownership distribution phenomena in such firms.The paper also gains following points:(1)Most literature which has been limited in mainstream firm theories such as Principal-Agent Theory and Incomplete Contract Theory regards venture capitalist as central contractor and regards entrepreneur as decision-maker who will adopt opportunistic actions such as adverse selection,moral hazard and holdup etc.,and thus this literature focuses on how to prohibit or weaken the entrepreneur’s opportunistic activities.(2)The fundamental nature of the firm lies in creation of surplus,the contractual nature serves as a tool to fulfill the firm’s function of creation of surplus.(3)As the firm’s fundamental nature lies in creation of surplus, distribution of ownership should not only be a mechanism of prohibiting or weakening decision-maker’s opportunistic activities.As to the bargaining power over allocation of residual claim,the firm’s nature of creation of surplus implies that contribution to the surplus is the principal factor;exclusiveness and specificity of capital contributed by each party strengthen and weaken the owner’s bargaining power respectively.As to the bargaining power over allocation of residual control rights,residual claim is the principal element;control over risk-maker is an important influential factor.(4) Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists bargain over residual claims and control rights in deal structuring phase,and information on factors that influence bargaining power over allocation of residual claims and control rights engenders from deal selection and investment selection phases.(5)The principal reason for VC-backed firms’ asymmetric allocation between residual claim and capital or physical asset lies in that the main contributions provided by entrepreneurs are opportunity identification and decision making which is human capital instead of non-human capital functions.VC-backed firms’ asymmetric allocation between control rights and residual claim owes to the asymmetric allocation of risk-makers and risk-bearers:the entrepreneurs are the main source of risk while the risk-bearers include not only entrepreneurs but also venture capitalists.更多还原