集装箱港口竞争分析与对策研究

【作者】 张庭发；

【导师】 赵庆祯；

【作者基本信息】 山东师范大学 ， 管理决策理论与应用， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 全球经济一体化和供应链的快速发展,使得港口作为海上运输网络体系的枢纽和对外交流的窗口,在促进国际贸易和地区经济发展中起着越来越重要的作用。从世界枢纽港的发展来看,存在着“马太效应”,即己经建立起枢纽港的港口,会因其航线覆盖面广、班次多、运输及时而吸引到更多的货载,使班轮密度越来越大,航线覆盖面越来越广,枢纽港的地位越来越稳定。但是港口现在也面临着机遇和挑战。航运船舶大型化、专业化以及航运公司联盟化的发展趋势日益明显,从而提高航运公司的市场谈判地位;航运船舶大型化使得港口为争夺干线港日趋激烈;门到门运输的要求带来以供应链管理为基础的无缝运输和产品配送带来新的运输模式的转变,使得港口物流操作日趋集中;各个港口相互之间在腹地货源、集疏运设施等方面竞争激烈;港口进一步向深水化、大型化和专门化方向发展;港口投资主体多元化更加剧了竞争。面对这种局面,港口采取何种策略成为港口业必须面对的问题。目前对港口竞争问题的研究多从管理体制、港口所有权结构、政府政策等方面开展研究,从定量的角度考虑港口的竞争问题较少。在讨论过程中很少考虑港口使用者和港口竞争对手的反应。对集装箱港口竞争过程中各种因素对港口策略选择影响的分析不够。论文主要研究了以下几方面的内容:(1)港口竞争力因素调查研究及港口竞争力评价。首先,通过国内外文献实证调查的研究成果,找出影响港口竞争力的相关因素,调查结果显示不同的调查群体的看法存在一定差异。其次,对国内外调查结果进行对比分析。最后,依据文献结果,利用PCA模型对东亚主要港口的竞争力进行排序。(2)两个港口非合作多维博弈分析在完全信息条件下,两个港口同时进行基础设施投资、港口价格的选择、服务质量的投入三个方面,建立了需求函数,分析两个港口的静态非合作多维博弈和动态非合作多维博弈,给出了均衡状态下的港口的最优策略向量,同时给出算例。动态非合作多维博弈采用逆向归纳法求解,表明先动港口的利润大于后动港口的利润,也就是在动态博弈中,先行动的港口可以凭借先动优势,按照自己的最优策略生产,而后行动的港口只能跟随,在剩余的市场份额条件下决策。当港口相互之间具有一定联系或者具有影响的多个方面博弈时,港口必须把所有方面的策略联合考虑进行多维博弈,这样在均衡条件下利润才能最大化,所选择的策略才是真正的最优策略。(3)基于Stackelberg博弈的港口竞争分析在介绍供应链及集装箱港口供应链管理的流程、特征及其作用的基础上运用Stackelberg博弈建立了港口与货主的竞争模型以及港口与船公司的竞争模型。集装箱港口与货主的Stackelberg博弈中,首先分析港口供应链条中未给予货主一定的成本补贴时集装箱港口与货主静态博弈,其次分析给予货主一定的成本补贴后的集装箱港口与货主的Stackelberg博弈;最后对两种模型进行对比:港口和货主采用Stackelberg博弈的供应链要比Nash博弈的利润大,这就会使得港口与货主更愿意采用Stackelberg博弈。然后分析了供应链条件下集装箱港口与船公司分别作为领导者的Stackelberg博弈,比较分析之后发现整个供应链的最优利润是一样的,但是无论港口还是船公司作为领导者,都愿意作为领导者获得更大的利润。(4)多个港口非合作博弈分析目前,港口间的竞争己不再局限于一个国家之间,而是跨越国家的界限,最为典型的是同一洲内不同国家的港口相互竞争干线港的地位。在本文中,在分析集装箱运输业务流程的基础上,运用双层规划模型研究多个港口相互竞争情况下的港口价格(主要是集装箱装卸费率)策略设计问题。上层是多个港口之间的非合作竞争Nash均衡模型,下层是发货人港口选择博弈模型。发货人在区域内港口的竞争下,合理选择不同港口以使自己的成本总费用最小。发货人选择港口方式采用了广义费用函数。针对本文建立的双层规划模型,采用基于灵敏度分析的启发式算法SAB求解。同时进一步建立了不确定条件下的双层规划模型,并且根据随机规划理论转化为确定型双层规划模型。最后针对环渤海三大港口建立模型求解并进行了分析。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the increasing integration of the global economic and the rapid development of the supply chain, the port, which is a hub of marine transportation network and foreign exchange window, is playing an increasingly important role in the promotion of international trade and regional economic development. From the development of the world hub port, we can find there is a "Matthew Effect", namely, the ports that have already established hub ports, will attract more cargo due to their route coverage, frequency and more timely transport, which will bring about bigger liner density, more extensive coverage of routes to make hub port more and more stable. But now the port is facing the opportunities and challenges. Ship development towards large-scale, specialization, as well as the alliance of the shipping companies will improve the negotiating position of shipping companies in the shipping market Large-scale ship makes the port to compete fiercely the port for the trunk line port; door-to-door transportation will lead to seamless transport based on supply chain management and product distribution can bring new changes in transport modes. With the severe competition for the hinterland sourcing, collection and transmission facilities between the ports, the port will develop further to the deep water, and large-scale and specialized direction and investment diversification will exacerbate the competition. Under this situation, the port must face the issue to take the strategy.At present, the study of port competition is mainly about the management system, port ownership structure, government policy and so on, but the research of the port competition is less from the quantitative viewpoint .The previous researches could little think about the response of port users and port competitors. The article mainly contains four aspects as follows:(1)The factors affecting port competition and evaluation of port competitivenessBy empirical analysis about foreign and Chinese researches, we can find out the correlative factors affecting port competitiveness. The results show that different port users have different options. Furthermore, a PCA model is used to evaluate the East Asia port competitiveness.(2)Two ports non-cooperative Multi-dimensional Game AnalysisWe assume that in full information conditions the two ports compete at the same time in investment in infrastructure, the port price selection, service quality investment, two port static non-cooperative multi-dimensional game and dynamic non-cooperative multi-dimensional game are built, and we give the optimal policy vector in an equilibrium status and an example. Multi-dimensional dynamic non-cooperative game is solved by use of reverse inductive method. The result indicates that the profits of first-mover are more much than the profits of the lately-move, that is, in the dynamic game, the first action of the port can carry out its own optimal strategy of production by virtue of first-mover advantage, then the late-action port can only follow the former and make a decision in the surplus market share.(3)Port competition analysis based on Stackelberg gameIntroducing the supply chain and container port supply chain management processes, characteristics and the role, we use Stackelberg game to set up the model between port and the shipper, as well as the model between port and shipping companies. Between the model between container port and the shipper, first we analyse static game in the port supply chain when port must not give the shipper the subsidies, then, when port must give the shipper the subsidies, the Stackelberg game is analysed; Finally comparison of two models is given, the result shows that the profit of Stackelberg game is much bigger than the profit of Nash game, which will enable the port and the shipper more willing to adopt Stackelberg game. And a comparative analysis of the Stackelberg game where container ports and shipping companies separately act as a leader under the condition of the supply chain show that the whole supply chain has the same optimal profits, but regardless of the port or shipping company, they are willing to be a leader to obtain greater profits.(4) In the current, the competitions among ports outline one country boundary, such as competing for the mainline port in a continent. In the section, a multi-container port bi-level programming model is presented where the upper is non-cooperation competition Nash equilibrium model about ports, the lower is non-cooperation competition game model of shipper. And port selection mode of shippers is used generalized cost function. Furthermore, a multi-container port bi-level programming model under the uncertainty conditions is established, and stochastic bi-level programming model is transformed into deterministic bi-level programming model according to random programming theory. Finally a heuristic algorithm SAB based on sensitivity analysis is used to solve the bi-level programming in the Surrounding Bohai Zone.更多还原