【作者】 段春明；

【导师】 王华；

【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 ， 会计学， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 高管激励与外部审计是现代企业两个重要的公司治理机制。由于合约的不完全性固有缺陷,高管激励报酬合约不仅存在激励效应,而且在其制定和执行过程中还存在代理冲突增加效应。作为公司外部监督和担保机制,高质量审计可以缓解企业代理冲突问题,因此,研究高管激励与外部审计需求的关系,对完善我国上市公司高管激励机制,发挥证券市场审计的作用具有重要意义。本文首先运用规范研究方法,运用不完全合约理论和制度均衡理论对管理者激励和外部审计这两个合约的性质及其关联性进行分析。认为基于经典激励理论的现代企业激励合约是不完全的,合约的不完全性使得激励合约发生异化,并在合约制定、执行等过程中产生一系列的代理冲突问题;激励合约和审计合约分属于不同经济博弈域,具有制度互补性。然后以我国证券市场2002-2005年数据为样本,对高管激励报酬与审计需求的关系进行了实证检验。主要的实证结论包括:1、我国上市公司高管激励报酬安排中存在代理冲突增加效应,高管激励报酬高的公司对高质量审计需求也较高,高质量审计能缓解这种代理冲突增加效应,降低代理成本,提升企业价值;2、高管激励报酬会诱发盈余管理行为,高管权力对激励报酬诱发盈余管理行为有影响,审计师能关注盈余管理行为、并出具合理审计意见,对高管激励报酬诱发的以可操控应计项目衡量的盈余管理出具非标准无保留审计意见的概率显著减少,激励报酬诱发的高管盈余管理行为总体上属于“信息传递”盈余管理;3、高管激励报酬高的公司有通过审计师变更或通过支付异常审计费用收买审计意见的动机,但只有通过支付异常审计费用收买的动机显著,两种方式收买审计意见结果均不成功。在附录部分,本文就高质量审计对高管激励报酬制定过程中程序公正性的监督问题进行了初步实证检验,没有发现高质量审计能显著提升高管激励报酬制定过程中程序公正性的证据。在上述研究发现基础上,本文提出政策建议:加强上市公司高管薪酬审计,完善上市公司高管激励的监督与约束机制;完善上市公司高管激励报酬制定的独立性、公正性规则,提高高管激励报酬的透明度;尽快出台薪酬审计相关审计准则或指南,进一步完善审计市场信誉机制、行业自律以及相关监管措施。更多还原

【Abstract】 Executive incentives and external audit are two important corporate governance mechanisms of modem enterprises.There are not only incentive effects,but also agency conflict increasing effects in the conclusion and implementation of executive incentive contracts because of inherent defect of incomplete contracts.As an external monitoring and security mechanism,high-quality audit can ease agent conflict,and therefore study about the connection of executive incentive contracts and demand of extemal audit is significant to perfecting executive incentive mechanisms of listed companies of China,to improving audit role in the security market,and to promoting listed companies’ sustained development.First,using incomplete contract theory and system equilibrium theory,this thesis analyses the nature and connection of these two contracts in normative research method. Based on the classic motivation theory,incentive contracts are incomplete,which catablizes them,and a series of agency conflicts will be produced in the conclusion and implementation of executive incentive contracts.Incentive contracts and audit contract belong to different economic game domains,and are complementary systems.Second,this thesis tests the connection of executive incentive compensation contracts and demand of external audit by drawing samples of China’s security market from 2002 to 2005.The main conclusions are as follows:1.Executive incentives in listed companies of China have agent conflict increasing effect.Companies that have higher executive incentives have more demands for high-quality audit,high-quality audit can alleviate the agent conflict and improve corporation values.2.Executive incentives may induce earnings management,which is influenced by executive power. Auditors give attention to earnings management and can issue right audit opinions. Probability of giving modified reports to earnings management measured by discretionary accruals decreases significantly.As a whole,earnings management induced by executive incentives can communicate information about future firm profitability.3.Whatever from auditor change or abnormal audit fee perspective,study finds that there are motives of shopping audit opinion for higher incentive compensation. Motive of shopping audit opinion by abnormal audit fee is significant while not by changing auditors,but both of shopping audit opinion are unsuccessful.In the Appendix,this thesis conducts a preliminary empirical test about if high-quality audit can improve procedural fairness of executive incentives,and finds no evidences.Based on the result of above study,this thesis proposes some policy recommendations.It is important to strengthen the audit of listed companies’ executives compensation for perfecting the supervision and restraint mechanisms of executive incentives.So it is necessary to consummate the independence and fairness rules of executive incentive compensation conclusion and improve the transparency of executive incentive compensation.Of course,it is important steps to enact auditing standards and guidance,and to further improve credibility mechanisms of the audit market,industry self-regulation and other regulations.更多还原