【作者】 叶志锋；

【导师】 胡玉明；

【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 ， 财务管理， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 当前中国企业的资金主要来源于银行体系,而利用虚假财务报表资料进行贷款欺诈是较普遍的现象。以往文献主要是从股权融资动机来研究企业的业绩操纵行为,还缺乏系统全面的基于银行债权保护角度的企业业绩操纵方面的研究。在国有银行深化改革以及全球金融危机蔓延的历史时期,分析和研究企业业绩操纵与银行债权保护之间的联系,提出一些防范信贷风险的建议,有着重要的理论和现实意义。通过对相关文献的回顾,找到了本文的切入点和位置,即从商业银行自身经营的角度,研究企业的业绩操纵行为是否影响银行的资源配置。本文首次检验了企业基于银行借款融资动机的业绩操纵行为。通过借助创新的方法将银行借款融资动机与其他动机的业绩操纵区分出来,分别运用分布检验和多元回归分析,得到了企业基于银行借款融资动机进行利润操纵和现金流量操纵的证据。同时还发现为获得银行借款,私有企业比国有企业进行了更多的利润操纵。在得到了企业基于银行借款融资动机进行业绩操纵的证据后,本文进一步考察了银行是否能够识别这些行为,以及如何应对这些行为,结果发现银行无法整体上识别企业的利润操纵和现金流量操纵。本文还尝试将中国银行业识别企业业绩操纵行为的意愿和技术进行分离而予以单独检验。通过选择微正利润和微正现金流量这些明显有业绩操纵嫌疑的企业以控制住银行的识别技术,本文发现,银行仅在一定程度上对微正利润和微正现金流量的企业产生怀疑,给予了它们较严格的债务期限。检验业绩操纵是否导致资源的不合理配置是学术界的一个难题,本文也进行了有新意的探索。业绩操纵的动机不只一种,它并不必然是银行借款违约的直接原因,因此缺乏将债务违约率作为因变量、业绩操纵程度作为自变量进行回归分析的理论依据。也不宜直接用业绩操纵程度与债务违约率的单变量相关性分析,来证明业绩操纵程度越高的企业其债务违约率亦越高,因为诸多经验文献的描述性统计发现,业绩操纵程度竟然与企业的盈利能力或现金流量获取能力显著正相关,本文的描述性统计也显示债务违约率与业绩操纵程度的相关性基本不显著。本文再次选择明显有业绩操纵嫌疑的企业作为研究对象,比较其与相邻区间企业的债务违约率是否存在显著差异,结果发现微正利润(现金流量)企业的债务违约率与其左边相邻企业没有显著差异,但显著大于其右边相邻企业,表明中国银行业不能有效识别企业的业绩操纵行为,这些行为给银行带来了不良的经济后果。另外还发现,私有企业的违约率高于国有企业,市场化程度越高地区的违约率越小。本文最后的建议是要采取有效措施降低银行的信息收集成本、提高银行在信贷评估中识别企业会计信息质量的意愿和技术。更多还原

【Abstract】 The capital of Chinese enterprises primarily comes from banking system at present time.It is a common phenomenon for credit defrauding by means of fraudulent financial statements. There are so many literatures which studied companies’ performance manipulation behavior at the view of equity financing,but lack of systematic and comprehensive research at the view of creditor protection.It is very important to study the relationship between companies’ performance manipulation and creditor protection and puts forward some recommendations to reduce credit risk at the time of deepen reforming for Chinese banks as well as spreading of global financial crisis.Through the review of related literature,this thesis finds its entry point and location that is from the perspective of commercial banks’ business to study the influence of enterprises’ performance manipulation behavior to bank’s resources allocation.This thesis firstly studies companies’ performance manipulation behavior for the motive of debt financing.It respectively uses distribution test and multivariate regress analysis to differentiate the debt financing motive of performance manipulation from other motives and achieves the evidences for Chinese listed companies manipulating their earning and cash flow to exceed thresholds in order to get funds from banks.At the same time,it finds that private enterprises make more earnings management for debt financing than state-owned companies do.After obtained the evidences of company to manipulate their profit and cash flow for debt financing,this thesis goes further to investigate whether bank can discern companies’ defrauding behaviors and how bank to cope with these behaviors.The result of this thesis is that Chinese banks can not discern companies’ manipulating behaviors as a whole.This thesis also tries to disentangle the aspiration and the technique for Chinese banks to discern companies’ manipulating behaviors and check them separately.By selecting the companies with little profit or little cash flow which are easily identified as fraud to control the technique for Chinese banks to discern companies’ manipulating behaviors,this thesis finds that Chinese banks only suspect these companies at a certain extent and grant them more stringent debt maturity than others.It is difficult to test whether performance manipulation affects resource allocation.The thesis also studies this problem creatively.There is more than one motive for enterprises’ performance manipulation,and they are not certainly direct cause for the default of bank loan. As a result,there is not enough evidence to take loan default rate as the dependent variable and performance manipulation level as the independent variable to make multivariate regress analysis.It is also not appropriate to make univariate comparisons to testify higher performance manipulation level with higher loan default rate because lots of experienced papers found that there was significant and positive relevant relationship between performance manipulation level and profitability.The descriptive statistics of this thesis also shows that the relevance between loan default rate and performance manipulation level is almost not significant.The thesis selects these companies which are obviously with performance manipulating suspects as study samples again.By comparing the loan default rates of these special companies with that of adjacent interval companies,the thesis find that the loan default rates of these suspected companies does not have significant differences with that of left adjacent interval companies but significant larger than that of right adjacent interval companies.It manifests that Chinese banks can not effectively discern companies’ manipulating behaviors,and this situation brings negative economic consequences to banks.In addition,the thesis finds that the loan default rates of private enterprises is higher than that of state-owned enterprises,and the loan default rates in high market-oriented area is lower than that of low market-oriented area.Finally,the policy suggestions of the thesis are that must reduce the cost of Chinese banks to collect information and improve their aspiration and technique for evaluation the qulity of companies’ accounting information.更多还原