【作者】 许传永；

【导师】 梁樑；

【作者基本信息】 中国科学技术大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 随着电子商务的迅猛发展,网络作为一种销售渠道日益受到学术界和企业界的重视。为了降低成本、扩大市场,企业纷纷建立网络销售渠道。由于实体零售渠道的存在,网络渠道的引入必定造成竞争和冲突,对于企业来说既是机遇也是挑战。理解双渠道情形下的供应链运作机制,提高双渠道供应链的运作效率,这是本文的出发点。本文通过建立博弈模型分析两层双渠道供应链成员之间的互动关系,探索供应链无效性的根源,度量供应链无效性的尺度,提出协调和优化的机制。本文以两层双渠道供应链为研究对象,综合运用优化理论、非合作博弈理论、随机库存理论和消费者效用理论对两层双渠道供应链的运作机制和优化协调机制进行了研究,建立了相关的决策框架。对双渠道情形下的定价机制、库存优化与协调、促销投入努力的决策和协调机制、渠道选择策略进行了深入研究,扩展了已有的理论研究,相关的结论为分析和理解网络环境下制造商和零售商的关系提供了理论支持,建立的模型为企业的优化决策提供了理论参考。本文的主要研究工作和成果包括以下几个方面:(1)总结了国内外关于双渠道供应链管理的研究现状,分析了双渠道供应链管理的主要问题和已有研究存在的不足,指出在双渠道供应链的运作机制和优化协调方面仍然需要进一步研究,尤其是库存优化和促销努力协调。此外零售商的电子渠道选择也是值得研究的重要问题。(2)研究了网络直销和实体零售构成的混合渠道供应链的定价问题。通过研究制造商和零售商的交互关系,揭示直销渠道的作用和影响。综合考虑了消费者的购买成本和对渠道的接受程度,通过消费者效用模型导出直销和零售渠道的需求。在批发价外生的情况下得到了直销和零售渠道的定价均衡,并进一步分析了制造商的定价策略。发现直销渠道对于制造商而言作用是多重的,一方面,直销渠道拓展了制造商的产品市场,在零售商的市场区隔之外满足了更多用户的需求;另一方面,直销渠道给零售渠道以潜在的威胁,迫使零售商降低零售价格。此外,分析了制造商具有批发价定价权时的渠道结构选择问题。(3)对两层双渠道供应链的库存系统优化与协调问题进行了研究。其中制造商通过直销和零售两个渠道销售产品,两个渠道的需求是相互独立的Poisson流。制造商和零售商都使用one-for-one库存策略,即每个顾客需求都会触发一个补货订单。通过研究每个需求和订货单元的对应关系,给出了制造商和零售商的单位产品的平均成本和系统单位时间平均成本的计算方法。研究了集中控制下库存系统的优化方法,并提出一种分散控制下的库存决策协调机制,通过设定制造商的缺货等待成本参数以达到优化系统的目的。最后通过数值分析验证了方法的有效性。(4)研究了混合渠道中的制造商和零售商在促销投入方面的互动。制造商和零售商都可以付出一定的销售努力,以刺激顾客的总需求。总需求在两个渠道之间的分配模式有两种:在第一种模式下需求分配的比例与促销努力无关,而在第二种模式下,促销努力会影响顾客的购买渠道选择,进而影响总需求在渠道之间的分配比例。考虑了以下因素对促销努力的影响:促销的效率、物料处理的效率与客户忠诚度。获得了系统集中控制时的最优的销售努力水平,以及非集中控制下的均衡结果。还研究了制造商的批发价格政策对促销努力均衡水平的影响。(5)研究双渠道供应链在促销投入方面的竞争与协调。考虑了两种类型的促销努力:品牌促销努力与店铺促销努力,品牌促销努力由制造商付出,作用在于提高品牌的接受度;店铺促销努力分别由直销和零售店铺付出,作用在于提高访问各自店铺的消费者数量和预期购买量。本文通过建立博弈模型分析了促销努力的博弈均衡,识别了分散控制的双渠道供应链中无效性的来源,并进一步提出了协调促销努力决策的机制。本文发现分散控制下双渠道供应链无效性的来源在于:在分散控制时,(ⅰ)正的批发价造成零售商的边际利润低于系统的边际利润,降低零售商促销动机;另一方面,零售商不需要顾虑对直销渠道造成的销售争夺作用,倾向于投入更多的促销努力。(ⅱ)制造商低估了直销对零售渠道的替代作用,倾向于投入更多渠道促销努力。(ⅲ)制造商不能将品牌促销投入的效果完全内部化,品牌促销投入不足。进一步发现通过渠道指向机制和广告费用分摊机制可以消除这些无效性,实现供应链协调。(6)着眼于网络渠道和实体渠道的地理差异探讨了零售商的电子渠道选择策略,尤其是双渠道零售模式究竟对零售商是否有利以及何时更有利。构建了一个圆周城市模型,零售商拥有的多家实体连锁店铺等距的分布在圆周城市上,网络商店位于圆心,因而与所有的消费者的距离是相同的。从消费者的效用函数出发分析实体商店和网络商店的需求。考虑在制造商的影响下零售商的决策,使用Stackelberg博弈对制造商和零售商的决策行为进行建模,分析了零售商面临的三种渠道结构:纯实体零售模式、双渠道零售模式和混合渠道模式。通过比较得出了零售商的选择策略。本文发现:只有当产品的利润空间足够大的时候,或者是在线购物的成本足够小的时候建立在线零售渠道才是对零售商更为有利的选择,但同时,对于制造商来说,零售加直销的混合渠道模式才是最有利的,因此此时制造商有很强的动机建立直销渠道。本文的创新之处在于:(1)进一步拓展了学术界对于双渠道供应链的认识,包括定价机制、促销努力博弈、库存控制、渠道选择,弥补了已有研究的部分不足。(2)首次提出了分散控制的两层双渠道供应链库存系统的协调方案。(3)对两层双渠道供应链中的促销努力博弈进行了深入的刻画,并提出了协调方案。(4)提出了制造商影响下的零售商电子渠道选择策略。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the rapid development of E-Commerce,the Internet as a sales channel has received much attention from both academia and industry.Companies have setup Internet sales channel one after one in order to reduce costs and expand market.Due to the existence of physical retail stores,the introduction of the Internet channel certainly leads to channel competition and conflicts.This is both an opportunity and a challenge for companies.The goal of this dissertation is to understand the operating mechanism of dual-channel supply chains and improve the operating efficiency of such supply chains.The interaction between supply chain members in dual-channel supply chains is investigated through a game model analysis.The inefficiencies of dual channel supply chains are analyzed and measured. Optimization and coordination mechanism are proposed.This dissertation studies two-echelon dual-channel supply chains.Optimization theory,non-cooperative game theory,inventory theory and consumer utility theory are utilized to analyze the operating mechanism and coordination methods of the supply chains.Decision frameworks related are established.This dissertation provides an in-depth study into topics including dual-channel pricing,inventory optimization and coordination,decision and coordination of sales effort and channel choice strategy.This dissertation expands the existing research on dual-channel supply chains,provides useful conclusions to help understanding the relationship of manufacturer and retailer,and provides theoretical basis for decision making of related enterprises.The main research work and achievements of this dissertation include the following:(1) Chapter one provides a comprehensive survey of related research literature on dual-channel supply chain management both of abroad and domestic.The main research questions are analyzed and some drawbacks or shortcomings of existing research are pointed out.It is pointed out that operating mechanism and optimization and coordination of dual-channel supply chain still needs further study,especially optimization of inventory control and coordination of sales effort.Furthermore it is proposed that channel choice strategy of retailers relating to internet channel is worth studying.(2) In chapter two the pricing decisions in a hybrid channel supply chain composed of a direct channel and a physical retailer channel are studied.Through investigating the interaction between the manufacturer and the retailer,the role and impact of direct channel is investigated.Both the purchasing cost and acceptance level of customers in each channel are considered.The demand of both channels is derived from a consumer utility model.The pricing equilibriums are obtained and the manufacturer’s pricing strategies are analyzed when wholesale price is exogenous.We find out that the role of direct channel is multifold:(ⅰ) the direct channel can extend the manufacturer’s market,satisfying more customers’ demand beside the retailer’s market segment;(ⅱ) it can pose an underlying threat to the retailer and thus make the retailer lower the market selling price.In addition we analyze the channel structure choice problem when the manufacturer has the right to set wholesale price.(3) Chapter three studies the optimization and coordination of a two-echelon dual-channel supply chain inventory system.The manufacturer at the top echelon sells its product both through a traditional retail channel and a direct online channel. Both channels face independent Poisson demand.One-for-one replenishment policy is assumed.The operational costs considered include inventory holding cost and shortage waiting cost.The relationship between each demand and the inventory unit which satisfies the demand is investigated.An exact evaluation of average costs per unit at the manufacturer and the retailer is obtained.The optimal inventory policy under centralized control is obtained.Moreover,an effective coordination mechanism under decentralized control is proposed.We present a formula for computing the control variable—artificial manufacturer’s shortage waiting cost. Numerical analysis is developed to illustrate the effectiveness of our method.(4) In chapter four the interactions between the manufacturer and the retailer in a hybrid channel with respect to sales effort are investigated.Both the manufacturer and the retailer can exert costly sales efforts to stimulate customer demand.Total demands are then allocated between two parties.This paper focuses on manufacturer-retailer interaction in sales efforts.Factors including sales promotion efficiency,material handling efficiency and customer loyalty are considered.Two kinds of demand allocation rules are considered.In the first model demand allocation is independent of sales efforts and in the second model the sales efforts affect where customers purchase.We obtain optimal sales efforts in centralized system and equilibrium results in decentralized system.The effects of the manufacturer’s wholesale pricing policy are also studied.(5) In chapter five sales effort competition and coordination in dual-channel supply chains is studied.Two kinds of sales effort are considered:brand promotion and store promotion effort.Brand promotion effort is exerted by the manufacturer to enhance brand acceptance.Store promotion efforts are exerted by both members to improve the customer access to the respective store.Through a game analysis the equilibrium of sales effort is obtained.The in-efficiencies of dual-channel supply chains in decentralized control are identified.Furthermore coordination mechanism is proposed.The in-efficiencies of decentralized system have three sources:(ⅰ) Positive wholesale price leads to lower profit margin of retailer and low sales effort of retailer. On the other hand,the retailer tends to exert more sales effort as he need not worry about the cannibalization effect to direct channel.(ⅱ) The manufacturer underestimates the substitution effect of direct channel and therefore tends to exert more store sales effort than optimal.(ⅲ) The manufacturer cannot internalize his brand promotion effort and tends to invest less when in decentralized system.Further study shows that a channel referral and sales cost sharing mechanism will coordinate the supply chain.(6) Chapter six investigate the retailer’s electronic channel choice problem focusing on the geographic difference between the internet channel and the physical retail channel.Specially whether and when the dual-channel retail structure is more beneficial to the retailer is studied.A circular city model is build where the retail stores are located on the circular city with even space.The internet store is located at the center,thus all the customers have equal distance with the internet store.Based on the consumer utility function the demand of the physical store and the internet store are derived.This chapter focuses on the retailer’s decision making under the manufacturer’s influence.The decision making process is modeled by a Stackelberg game.Three structures the retailer faces are analyzed and compared:pure retail, dual-channel retail,hybrid channel.The optimal choice of the retailer is provided.It is shown that only when the profit margin is large enough or the purchase cost of online shopping is small enough setting up an online retail store is more beneficial to the retailer.However to the manufacturer it is optimal for him to use a hybrid channel structure when these conditions hold.The manufacturer will have a strong motive for setting up a direct channel under such circumstance.The innovations of this dissertation include the following:(1) This dissertation extends the knowledge of academia on dual-channel supply chains,including pricing mechanism,sales effort gaming,inventory control and channel choice strategy and remedy some shortcoming of existing research.(2) For the first time this dissertation proposes a coordination mechanism for the two-echelon dual-channel inventory system under decentralized control.(3) An in-depth characterization of sales effort game in dual-channel supply chains is provided.Moreover a efficient coordination mechanism is proposed.(4) An electronic channel choice strategy is provided for the retailer taking account of the influence of the manufacturer.更多还原