【作者】 路云峰；

【导师】 刘国常；

【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 ， 会计学， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 国外的研究表明,审计定价反映了审计重大错报风险。但是国内不少研究表明,中国的审计师在收费时较少的考虑审计风险。那么是什么原因造成这种情况?是中国的审计市场存在问题,还是研究人员的研究结论不可靠?归根结底,中国审计市场上重大错报风险是否影响审计定价?为了回答上述问题,本文采用比较全面的数据,使用较为合理的方法进行研究,以期得出更为准确的结论。本文首先通过规范研究,构建了重大错报风险影响审计定价的理论框架,并提出本文的假设。然后以2001-2007年证券市场相关数据对假设进行了实证检验。本文不仅使用了传统的审计定价研究中使用的方法,而且采用了Heckman(1979)两阶段模型控制样本的自选择影响,并对样本分组检验来控制不同类别审计师客户的回归模型可能不同的截距、斜率对结果的影响;对模型可能出现的共线性、异方差、自相关等问题也采用了妥善的办法进行了处理。通过理论分析与实证检验,得出以下几个主要结论:(1)重大错报风险影响审计定价。重大错报风险越大,投入的审计资源成本越高,审计后未被发现重大错报的可能性也越大,从而对审计师可能带来的潜在损失也越大。因此,重大错报风险从审计投入资源成本和风险溢价两个方面影响审计定价,重大错报风险越大,审计定价越高。文章从重大错报风险的综合指标和分项指标两个角度进行了检验,支持了上述结论。(2)代理成本的大小影响着重大错报风险,并影响审计定价。代理成本越大,表明被审计单位存在着更为严重的代理冲突,存在重大错报风险可能性越大,并进一步提高审计定价。(3)投资者监督和法律环境是影响重大错报风险定价的两个重要环境因素。整体上说,投资者监督力度和法律环境都与重大错报风险的定价正相关。对具体的审计师类型来说,两种因素可能单独,也可能协同作用于重大错报风险的审计定价:对四大的审计师来说,投资者监督作用较为显著,法律环境作用不显著;对国内五大来说,投资者监督作用不显著,但是当法律环境同时较为完善的情况下,投资者监督则与重大错报风险定价显著正相关。(4)审计师声誉影响了重大错报风险的审计定价,审计师声誉越高,对审计重大错报风险的定价越高。与审计市场监管相关的重大突发事件会导致监管环境的变化,会计政策或者会计准则的变化又往往导致重大错报风险及其评估难度增加,实证结果表明,声誉越高的审计师更为重视上述变化对重大错报风险定价的影响。由于重大错报风险的定价机制实际上体现了审计市场的运行效率,与审计质量密切相关,所以上述关于审计定价的结论在一定程度上表明:中国审计市场在一定程度上是有效的,投资者的监督,审计师声誉、法律环境在保障审计市场运行方面起着一定的作用。为了进一步提高审计市场的运行效率,需要从审计师声誉机制、法律环境,投资者保护环境等方面,全方位的构建审计市场运行保障机制,促进证券市场的健康运行。更多还原

【Abstract】 Foreign research has proved that risk of material misstatements(RMM) affects audit pricing.But domestic study has no clear results.What’s the reason that causes such differences? Is it because there are some problems in Chinese audit market,or our study,including data or method,was not correct or perfect? In order to reply these questions more corrcetly,the author collected more data and use more accurate method in this dissertation.This dissertation first construct a theory frame about audit pricing on RMM,and then give the hypotheses on RMM audit pricing.Secondly,hypotheses are tested with the data of Chinese stock market from year 2001 to 2007.This dissertation not only used the traditional audit pricing study method,but also adopt Heckman(1979) two-stage method to control the self-selection affection on samples.The possible problems of heteroscedasticy,multicollinearity, or autocorrelation are all controlled by relatively appropriate method.Through hypothesis testing and analysis,some primary results can be concluded as follows:1.RMM affects audit pricing.The higher the RMM,the higher audit pricing,i.e.,RMM and audit pricing has positive correlation.RMM can increase the resources cost of auditing,and can also increase the material misstatements that cannot be founded by auditing,so increase the risk premium for potential losses.Both aspects mentioned above can increase audit pricing.2.Agency cost affects the RMM,and further affects audit pricing.More agency cost means more accurate agency conflicts,and brings higher RMM,so that increase audit pricing.3.Investors’ supervision and law environment are two important aspests that affects audit pricing on RMM.The ability of investors’ supervision and the completion degree of legal environment will both increase RMM audit pricing.These two environmental factors may singly,or cooperatively affects audit pricing on RMM,but the concrete conditions are different according to different auditor types.To big 4 auditors,investor’ supervision is more significant, the legal environment effect is not significant;to domestic big 5 auditors,investor supervision is not significant,but if under perfect legal environment at the same time,investor supervision is significant.4.Auditor reputation has affected audit pricing on RMM.Auditors with Higher reputation will price higher on RMM.The mechanism of audit pricing means auditor’s reputation is bringing an effect into efficiency of auditing market.In fact,audit pricing mechanism reflects the operating efficiency of audit market,so the conclusions mentioned above indicates that Chinese audit market is efficiency to a certian extent.In order to improve the operation efficiency of the audit marketplace further,legal environment,investors’ supervision,auditor reputation are all needed to improve comprehensively.更多还原