【作者】 魏立江；

【导师】 宋献中；

【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 ， 财务管理， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 国外丰富的多元化文献为分析中国上市公司经营范围战略抉择提供了有益的视角,但对于兼具新兴市场与转轨经济特征的中国而言,西方的多元化理论并不完全适合解释中国上市公司多元化经营行为和绩效后果。本文根据中国上市公司的实际情况,遵循“终极控制人——多元化经营——公司绩效”这一动因驱动行为、行为引致经济后果的逻辑思路,从代理理论、交易成本理论和政府干预观出发,在系统刻画终极控制人的特征和多元化状况基础上:探究终极控制人特征对多元化经营的影响,以期发现多元化背后终极控制人的动机;通过设置终极控制人各项特征与多元化的交互项,从而探寻终极控制人通过多元化经营对公司财务绩效产生的作用。本文研究表明:首先,不同产权控制下的公司多元化水平存在显著的差异,政府对国有公司经营范围的管控导致国有控制上市公司多元化程度低,多元化功能追求上的差别造成了国有控制公司多元化绩效并不理想,而私有控制公司有通过多元化实现内部市场功能的诉求,因此它们的多元化水平高,相应地公司绩效并没有降低。其次,随着终极控制人控制权的变化,经理代理问题和股东代理问题的可能此消彼长,导致了多元化水平和终极控制人的控制程度之间呈现出U型关系,而国有控制公司的终极控制人控制程度与多元化绩效之间呈现出倒U型形态;但由于私有控制公司的多元化存在实现内部市场目的,导致了多元化绩效和控股程度之间并没有呈现出与国有控制公司那么明显的倒U型形态。再次,多元化并没有明显成为控制权和现金流量权分离状态下的利益掠夺手段,两权分离度高组的多元化绩效并没有呈现出明显的降低。最后,由于多元化的内部市场优势可以在集团层面实现,因此终极控制人通过公司经营实体实现对上市公司的间接控制时,在上市公司这一平台进行多元化的可能性降低;终极控制人间接控制上市公司的情形下,由于集团内部资本市场的存在,上市公司层面的多元化绩效优于直接控制公司的,但统计意义上不具显著性。基于以上分析结论和中国制度背景,本文认为发挥多元化积极效应的关键在于以下若干方面:防止政府股东的过度干预;合理改善股权结构,强化股权制衡的治理功能;优化集团公司组织中内部市场功能,提高内部市场效率。更多还原

【Abstract】 A numerous works focused on diversification about foreign firms provide a beneficial perspective in analyzing the choice of scope strategy in domestic companies in China.But those theories and literature are not suitable thoroughly for explaining the cause and performance of firms’ diversifying behaviors in China,which is characterized by emerging market and transitional economy.Within the context of the listed companies in China,this paper follows the thinking route "ultimate controller(motive)-diversification(behavior)-corporate performance (result)",and comprehensively considers those theories,such as the agency,transaction cost and government intervening doctrines.Based on the systematic describing about the characters of ultimate controller and firms’ diversification,the paper investigates the influence of ultimate controller on firms’ diversification,and attempts to identify the diversifying motive which may be implicit.Furthermore,the paper examines the effect of diversification on the corporate performance in the perspective of ultimate controller, by means of setting the interaction items with the variables which indicated the characters of ultimate controller and corporate diversification.The paper indicates,(1) Government intervention is the major cause makes the level of diversification and performance show a significant difference among the companies which is controlled by the central government,local government and the private.(2) There exists a U-shaped relationship between the levels of ultimate controller’s control and corporate diversification.Correspondingly,the relationship between the diversification and the corporate performance appears an inversed U-shaped profile in government controlled companies.However,maybe there exists internal market function in private companies;foregoing relationship is not appearing here.(3) Diversification does not become the expropriating means within the context of the deviation between the control right and the cash flow right.Corresponding to that evidence,the corporate performance does not show a significant decrease than other companies’.(4) For the internal market function can be realized under the group platform,the companies controlled indirectly by ultimate controlling shareholder do not prefer diversification.Furthermore,maybe there exists internal market under the group platform;the diversified performance of the indirectly-controlled companies is higher than others’,but the relationship has no statistical significance.Based on the aforesaid analysis and the context in China,the paper indicates that the positive effect lies in those reforms and improvements,such as avoiding excessive intervention of government,bettering the ownership structure,reinforcing the balance between the ultimate controller and the other shareholders,optimizing the internal market function within group to alleviate agency problems,etc.更多还原