【作者】 黄民礼；

【导师】 胡军；

【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 ， 产业经济学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 随着中国的工业化进程的深入,长期以来积累的环境问题也越来越突出,环境事故频发。我国环境规制的实施已经将近30个年头,然而,环境状况总体上呈进一步恶化趋势。因此,对我国环境规制的有效性问题进行研究显得非常必要。本文以工业企业的环境污染为研究对象,主要目的在于探究影响环境规制的有效性的因素以及这些因素之间的相互作用。全文基于“信息不对称—主体行为—环境规制的有效性”这一分析框架,从信息不对称和主体行为(包括企业行为、政府行为和公众行为)两大因素展开理论分析和进行实证检验。理论分析部分,本文将信息不对称与主体行为两个因素相结合,运用博弈分析的方法和图表数据说明的方法,部分章节运用比较分析的方法,从企业行为、政府行为和公众行为三个方面对环境规制的影响因素进行分析。首先,通过分析指出,环境规制中规制者所面临的信息不对称和环境违规成本过低是导致企业环境机会主义行为的根源。在承受能力范围之内,企业环境治理决策与治理成本大小关系不大,而主要受信息不对称导致的机会主义空间大小影响。不过,信息不对称具有“双向”作用,除了信息不对称的负向作用外,政府还可以通过声誉机制及其溢出效应来发挥正向作用,即促进企业对环境规制的遵从和超越遵从。其次,环境规制的制度有效性、政府进行环境规制的执行有效性和环保投资有效性是政府影响环境规制的有效性的重要途径。其中,环保系统的监控能力、环境规制的执行力度和环保基础设施投资尤为重要。最后,论文分析指出,公众行为对政府和企业都存在一定的监督作用,公众对企业的环境监督必须通过政府起作用。但由于参与机制的缺失,使公众对企业污染行为的监督优势没有发挥出来。公众监督的弱质性是中国目前的一个重要特点。实证分析部分对理论分析部分所提出假说进行分类检验。实证数据的总样本范围覆盖1997—2006年中国29个省市的面板数据和1990—2006年的时间序列数据。运用经济计量分析的方法进行实证发现:(1)信息不对称对我国环境规制的有效性有着明显的负向影响,环境机会主义行为的数量受规制者的信息不对称程度和环境违规处罚成本影响较大,即哈里顿悖论现象在我国并不存在;(2)政府的环境监控力量、环保基础设施投资以及环境规制力度与环境规制的有效性呈显著的正向关系;而且,还存在鲍莫尔和克莱沃里克所提出的规制滞后效应,即政府对企业的环境规制效果有1年左右的时滞效应;第一类政府行为(基础性环保投资)对环境规制有效性产生影响的时滞效应为6年左右;第二类政府行为(环境规制力度)的时滞效应为5年左右;并且,第一类政府行为最强作用表现在第4年,而第二类政府行为的最佳作用表现在第3年。(3)污染企业的治理资金和设备投入与环境规制的有效性呈较显著的正相关;而且,于我国企业而言,环境规制过程中还存在一定程度的环保投资A—J效应;(4)公众行为和政府行为都会显著受到环境状况的影响,即随着环境恶化程度增大,公众的环境监督意愿增强,政府的环境规制力度加大;(5)实证发现:公众的环境监督行为在1%显著水平上对环境规制的有效性有正向作用,但公众对政府和企业的实际监督效果却非常弱小,这说明我国公众的环境监督渠道不畅。另外,公众对政府的环境规制执行效率方面的影响比对政府的环境规制力度的影响更显著,且我国公众行为对政府行为产生影响的时滞效应约为3年。最后,论文针对提高中国环境规制的有效性提出了若干建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the deepening of China’s industrialization process,environmental problems accumulated for a long time begin to break out frequently.Environmental regulation in China has been carrying out for almost 30 years,however,environmental status as a whole seems to be worse.Study on the effectiveness of environmental regulation appears to be in urgent need.This paper studied industrial pollutions from firms,and mainly aimed to research the factors and their interactions for the effectiveness of environmental regulation. Based on the analytical framework of information asymmetry,action of participants and the effectiveness of environmental regulation,theoretical analysis and empirical study were carried on from two aspects both information asymmetry and action of participants such as firms,government,public.In the theoretical analysis,the paper incorporated information asymmetry and action of participant,applied analytical instruments including game theory,graphs and tables,comparison to the whole analytical process.Firstly,it pointed out that low environmental violation cost and information asymmetry between environmental regulator and the regulated are root causes for environmental opportunism.Within its capability,environmental dicision of firm is subjected to opportunity scope created by information asymmetry rather than cost of effluent abatement.Information asymmetry has reversible effects.Besides its negative side,government could exploit its positive effect through reputation mechanism and its spillover effects.Namely,to spur firms to comply or even over-comply environmental regulation.Secondly,effectiveness of environmental institution,regulation enforcement,and environmental investment are important to improve the effectiveness of environmental regulation.Especially, monitoring ability of environmental administration system,strictness of environmental regulation and investment on environmental infrastructure are most important.Finally,the paper assumed that the public could play a role of supervision on government and firms but the effect seems feeble.And currently,the weakness of public supervision is a significant characteristic in China.In the empirical study,basically all the hypotheses or assumptions from theoretical analysis were tested.Panel data sample covered 29 provinces or cities of China during 1997-2006,and series data were within range of 1990-2006. Econometric analysis through Eviews5.1 found that:(1) Information asymmetry indeed has a significant negative influence on the effectiveness of environmental regulation.Probability of environmental opportunism has a negative relationship with the degree of information asymmetry of regulator and the cost of environmental violation.Actually,Harrington Paradox doesn’t exist in China.(2) Ability of supervision,environmental infrastructure investment,and vigorously environmental regulation from government has a significant positive relationship with the effectiveness of environmental regulation.In addition,there is a time-lag effect of regulation just as Baumol and Klevorick proposed.Specifically,there was a time lag about 1 year for the effect of environmental regulation on firms,6 years for environmental infrastructure investment,and 5 years for the strictness of environmental regulation.(3) As for firms,the money input and equipment applied for pollution abatement have a positive relationship with effectiveness of environmental regulation,and there is an A-J effect for environmental investment in China.(4) Results also showed that action of the public or government would be affected by environment status.(5) Effects exist but seem weak for public supervision on government and firms,and there is a time lag about 3 years.In the end,some suggestions were put forward to enhance the effectiveness of environmental regulation in China.更多还原