【作者】 王劲松；

【导师】 宋冬林；

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 政治经济学， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 作为一种先进的激励机制,自20世纪80年代以来,经理股票期权(ESOs)被美国企业广泛使用。经理股票期权制度具有以下优点:经理股票期权制度将经理人的利益和股东的利益密切地结合在一起,能较好地解决经理人和股东之间的利益冲突,有利于解决委托-代理问题;经理股票期权激励制度能有效地吸引、保留、激励优秀经理人,且具有成本低,无需支付现金等优点。但任何一项制度的实施都会有正反两个方面的效应,经理股票期权制度也不例外,其“免费期权”制度造成的激励与约束不对称、业绩考核指标不合理易导致激励与监督失衡、经理人为谋取自身利益而产生操纵股价的道德风险等一些负效应,这些要通过优化激励契约设计和加强监管等方式加以克服。本研究以经理股票期权及其契约要素作为研究对象,在对经理股票期权制度内涵、激励机制等理论进行系统阐述的基础上,对我国实施股权激励的上市公司,特别是对中国2006年-2008年88家实施经理股票期权激励的上市公司进行实证研究,并结合Black-Scholes期权定价模型,对影响经理股票期权价格的因素进行实证分析,得出中国上市公司样本企业股票期权价格与股票期权行权价、授予时股票价格、股票价格波动率、无风险利率和股票期权有效期的敏感性相关系数,最后,本文结合大量数据计算和统计分析,对中国经理股票期权契约中的行权价格、期权有效期、行权限制期、行权时机和行权安排等要素提出了优化建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 Principal-agency problems, which arise from the separation of ownership from management in modern enterprises, are brought forth by the information asymmetry between owners and managers, lack of conformity in their aims, as well as the complexity and uncertainty of the economic environments. Monitoring mechanism, though partially relieving some of the principal-agency problems, is proved to be inefficient without the incentive mechanism. Therefore, incentive mechanism becomes one of the important research topics in resolving the principal-agency problems in modern enterprises, among which the incentive mechanism of the Executive Stock Options(ESOs) is a hot topic in the past two decades.ESOs is one of the most popular types of incentives used by US companies after the late 1980s. There are various reasons for firms to grant ESOs: The payoff structure of ESOs ties the wealth of senior managers to that of shareholders, which is expected to reduce the interest conflicts between shareholders and senior managers, and thus solve the principal-agency problems; ESOs is the most efficient way to attract, retain and motivate senior managers; Other reasons for granting stock options are the low cost and cash conservation.In the western world, ESOs system has been taken as a long-term incentive for over fifty years and has proved to be effective in motivating mangers of enterprises. Therefore, it is of great significance to study ESOs incentive mechanism in China. Issues of ESOs motivation have been systematically studied since 1998 in academic fields as well as by the government authorities. And many of the research results have been published in newspapers and magazines. In recent years, the study of ESOs in China developed a lot both in theory and in practice. However, it is still sluggish compared with that in western countries and it is out of proportion with the rapid development of the stock market in China. What’s more, the current study mainly focuses on the introduction of foreign theories and practices. Scholars seldom deal with the optimization of the elements of Stock Options Contract. Thus the further study of ESOs is rootless. In viewing the fact that people pay less attention to the theory but attach much importance to the practice, we conclude that it hinders the improvement and development of corporation governance structure.This paper starts from the perspective of contract design, aiming at studying the optimization of ESOs through systematically studying the ESOs incentive mechanism and its effect. Thus it promotes a better understanding of Stock Options incentive mechanism. Moreover, the conclusions based on the empirical study of ESOs of Chines listed companies will provide consult and reference for Chinese listed companies to make ESOs incentive plan.Based on the principal-agency theory, this paper studies the stock option incentive mechanism by using mathematical analysis. It integrates theories from information economics, institutional economics and econometrics with the current research results, and probes many aspects such as the effects of stock options on the companies’achievement and their value, the constituent elements of the stock option contracts, the optimization of the stock option contract, etc. This paper also has an empirical study on the practice of stock option incentives of the listed companies in China.This paper is organized into seven chapters: In Chapter 1, we start with the focus, the scope, the main concepts as well as the research and logic structure of this paper. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature on the stock options. Theoretical basis of stock options (business contract theory, principal-agent theory, business efficiency theory, theory of property rights, etc.), and the correlative studies on stock option incentives in China and the USA are surveyed in this chapter, thus laying a solid foundation for the following chapters. Chapter 3 analyzes the connotation of ESOs, its property, constituent elements and working mechanism, etc. Through the analysis of the relationship between ESOs and options, this chapter reveals the characteristics of ESOs. Through the discussion of three pay incentive mechanisms and the principal-agent theory as well as the incentive and restrictive mechanisms, this chapter also reveals the property and the system superiority of ESOs. Chapter 4 studies the incentive mechanism of the Executive Stock Options. Based on the standard principal- agent model, a mathematical model of the Stock Options incentive is set up, proving the existence and feasibility of optimized stock options contract. The incentive mechanism of the Executive Stock Options is also analyzed in this chapter. Chapter 5 has a comparative study of Chinese and American stock options. On the one hand, this paper analyzes the American stock options system, its contract elements, system foundation and the problems arising from its practice. It also reveals the enlightment to Chinese stock options. On the other hand, it reviews development of stock options in China, and thus has a comprehensive study on stock option system in China. Chapter 6 has an empirical survey on the listed companies in China. It reviews the developing process and the current situations of stock options in the listed companies in China, and has an empirical analysis on listed companies that has adopted stock options plan through Black-Schokles model and the improved model. It tests the optimized stock options contract with relevant data. Chapter 7 concludes the paper with important conclusions and new interpretations. Besides, possible insufficiencies and future research consideration of this paper are also discussed in this chapter.The study intends to focus on optimization of stock option contract based on systematic data analysis and from mode-design perspective. To be more specific, it discusses the following correlative issues: the incentive function of stock option mechanism, variables that influence the effectiveness of incitement of stock option to managers, variables that affects the stock price, correlations between stock option contract and stock price, and how to optimize stock option contract as an incentive mechanism in listed companies in china. This study tries to bring forth some new ideas in the following aspects:1. The study has carried out the research from a new perspective. Most researches on the incentive mechanism of ESOs were done from the perspective of company performance, managers’rewards, and the relationship between business performance and the level of manager shareholding. However, this study tries to view this issue on the basis of the cost of company, and specially focus on sensitivity of the factors in the stock option contract. Meanwhile, the study also maintains that stock option price, as one form of cost to the company, needs a compensation mechanism. That is, when the managers are granted stock options, they are required to pay for its cost, i.e. royalty. or on the other hand ,the contract needs to define clearly the exercise price of option strictly based on“non-present value”rule, that is to add premium price of stock price to option, in order to optimize the balance between incitement and restraints of stock option.2. Based on principal-agent model, the study advocates that when one designs and optimizes the contract mode of ESOs, one should always follow 5 principles: 1) quote the factor which has minimized measurement error in performance evaluation into the contract;2) quote the factor which has the highest correlation in performance evaluation;3) keep balance between the restraint mechanism and incentive mechanism;4) equal pay for the equal performance; 5) adopt relative performance assessment method.3. The study has made quantitative research on the data collected from 88 listed companies in china and inferred the correlation coefficient of stock option price and the exercise price,the price of the stock on the day when granted to the managers, fluctuation rate of the stock price, stock option period and non-risk interest rate and based on the study, this paper made a tentative conclusion that the exercise price of the stock options is the most sensitive factor to the change of stock option price; the price of the stock on the day when granted to the managers is the second most sensitive factor to stock option price, after it follows the fluctuation rate of the stock price, whereas stock option period and non-risk interest rate are the least two sensitive factors to the change of stock option price. Based on the data analysis from the samplings, the study has put forward some suggestions on optimization on validity of stock option exercise, restricted term of exercise, exercise timing、exercise arrangement, quantities of granted stock options.This paper concludes that stock option is a good mechanism in incitement, but its problems mainly lie in the internal governance, external monitor and the design of stock option contract. If the contract could be improved by following the above mentioned methods, and ESOs contract could be optimized, ESOs mechanism will still play a“Golden handcuffs”role in management.更多还原