【作者】 刘辉；

【导师】 曾福生；

【作者基本信息】 湖南农业大学 ， 农业经济管理， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 农业技术进步是农业效益和经济增长的引擎,农业技术创新活动是提升农业整体竞争力的有效途径。由于传统较单一的以政府公有产权形式无偿提供农业技术体系的僵化,制约了私有及混合等多种形式农业技术创新活动积极性的提高,最终导致农业技术创新总量的有限性和难以产业化。而产权清晰和合理产权制度的设计将为农业技术创新主体提供内生的激励机制和外部环境。特别是近6年中央“一号文件“、政府工作报和十七届三中全会强调必须着眼增强农业技术自主创新能力,加快农业科技成果转化应用,提高科技对农业增长的贡献率,切实加强知识产权保护,引导涉农企业开展技术创新活动,促进现代农业持续发展,带动农民增收和农村繁荣。论文在深刻剖析当前农业技术创新产权研究的基本范畴、基本理论和历史演变的基础上,通过实际调研,从政府、企业、科研机构和农业技术需求者信息不对称角度分析农业技术产权交易价格的决定;同时结合农业技术创新的特点,设计最优的产权制度组合,构建农业技术创新的制度体系和产权保护体系,并提出针对性强、可操作的对策与建议。本文共分八章。第一章为导论。阐明本文研究的背景、目的和理论与现实意义:进行国内外关于科技创新的产权制度问题研究,特别是关于农业科技创新的产权制度问题研究进行综述,把握农业技术创新与产权的研究前沿,找准论文的突破口,梳理出农业技术创新产权问题研究的基本框架。第二章主要阐述农业技术创新及产权(制度)的基本概念,理清技术创新、农业技术创新的特点和产权的基本功能,把握农业技术的产权结构和属性,明确知识产权(专利、植物品种权等)是农业技术创新产权的核心。并梳理技术产权、农业技术产权的基础经典理论,把握农业技术产权的生成机理,创新知识产权促进农业技术创新的作用机制。第三章从制度变迁动态视角,研讨农业技术创新产权的起源和演化,将沿袭财产—产权—技术产权—农业技术创新产权的思路展开,进而说明农业技术创新产权制度的形成。第四章根据农业技术产权主体交易双方的信息不对称(逆向选择和道德风险问题),结合激励相容理论,通过数理模型推导出有区别的农业技术创新成果的交易价格契约,进而决定其价格的生成机理与模式选择。第五章考虑到专利是农业技术产权研究的核心环节,已专利为例,在剖析Nordhaus-Scherer经典模型的基础上,结合信息经济理论,从专利的两个纬度(专利长度、专利宽度)构建产权制度绩效模型(竞争博弈I-E模型,信息披露模型等),分析有效激励农业技术创新的产权组合。第六章是产权制度对农业技术创新主体作用的实证分析。论文选择有代表性的涉农企业、科研机构、农业高等院校和农村地区进行座谈和问卷调查,了解各主体对农业技术创新研究的制度偏好、面临的困难和预期,以及他们对农业科技创新产权改革的预期与建议。然后以农业品种权为例,根据实践调研数据和相关统计资料数据就产权制度对农业技术创新主体的作用进行计量实证。第七章在阐释我国现阶段农业技术知识产权保护现状和分析存在问题的基础上,引入Romer(1990)和Barro(1997)的内生技术进步模型,充分考虑产权保护在激励中国农业技术自主创新和模仿国外农业技术的影响,结合农业技术比一般技术更强公共产品的特性,从中引申出促进中国农业技术创新的知识产权保护制度选择。第八章归纳了本文研究的基本结论,形成了农业技术创新产权交易、最优制度设计和产权保护的具体实施策略和对策建议,提出了农业技术创新产权问题研究的进一步展望。本文在汲取前人研究成果的基础上,结合中国实际,对农业技术创新的产权问题进行经济学研究,自己认为可能在以下四个方面取得了一定的研究创新:一是通过知识产权与农业技术创新的关联分析,创新产权制度促进农业技术创新的作用机制:二是基于农业技术产权主体交易双方的逆向选择和道德风险问题,结合激励相容理论有区别的制定农业技术创新成果的交易价格,进而决定其价格的生成机理与模式选择;三是将Nordhaus-Scherer经典模型拓展到非对称信息领域,基于专利长度和专利宽度,通过数理模型,探讨农业技术创新最优产权制度的确定。四是利用Romer—Barro内生技术进步模型引申出促进中国农业技术创新的知识产权保护制度选择。更多还原

【Abstract】 Agricultural technology progress is the engine of agricultural efficiency and economic growth, agricultural technology innovation is an effective way on enhance the overall competitiveness of agriculture. As the agricultural technology system of government owned property is a single and rigid, and constraints the positive such as private and mixed forms of agricultural technology innovation activities , lead to limited and difficult to industrialization of total amount in agricultural technology innovation. Clear property rights and reasonable design of the property rights system provide the incentive mechanism of endogenous and external environment for agricultural technology innovation. Especially, 6 central "One document" reported the work of the Government and the Third Plenary Session of 17 emphasis on enhancing the capability of independent innovation in agricultural technology, speed up the achievements of agricultural science and technology applications, raise the contribution rate of science and technology agricultural growth, strengthen protection of intellectual property rights, guide to carry out technological innovation activities of agriculture-related enterprises, promote the sustainable development of modem agriculture, driven income of farmers and rural prosperity.In this paper, we profound analysis basic category, basic theory and the history of the evolution in property rights of agricultural technology innovation. Through practical research, analysis property prices decisions of agricultural technology from perspective of information asymmetry on the government, enterprises, research institutions and agricultural technology needs. At the same time, combine the characteristics of technological innovation in agriculture, design the optimal combination of the property rights system, construction of agricultural technology innovation system and property rights protection system, and put forward operational Countermeasures and suggestions.This article is divided into eight chapters: The first chapter is introduction, it discusses the background to the study, the purpose and the theory and practical significance, and property rights issues of technological innovation system in china and abroad, Especially, research summary on property rights of agricultural technology innovation system. grasp the forefront of research in agricultural technology innovation and property rights, find a breakthrough, sort out the basic framework of the study on property rights of agricultural technological innovation. The second article discusses the basic concepts of agricultural technology innovation and property rights , sort out the basic functions on the characteristics of technological innovation, technological innovation in agriculture and property rights, grasp the structure of property rights and property on agricultural technology, clear intellectual property rights (patents, plant varieties, etc.) is the core of property rights in agricultural technology innovation. The papers sorted based on classical theory of technical property rights and property rights in agricultural technology, grasp the formation mechanism of agricultural technology property rights, Innovative mechanism of action on property rights to promote agricultural technology innovation. The third chapter from the dynamic view of institutional Change, study the origin and evolution of property rights in agricultural technology innovation, follow the property - property rights - property rights - property rights, agricultural technology innovation to start, and explain the formation of property rights in agricultural technology innovation system. The fourth chapter according to information asymmetry on two sides of property rights transactions of agricultural technology (adverse selection and moral hazard problems), combination of incentive compatibility theory, through the mathematical model derived from different agricultural technology innovation price contract, and then determining their own pricing model for options. Chapter V taking into account the property rights of agricultural technology patent is the core part of the study, in the analysis of Nordhaus-Scherer classical model, combination of the information economy theory, construction of the property rights system performance model(competitive game I-E model, information model, etc.) from the two patents (the patent length, the width of the patent), analysis of the optimal property portfolio effectively on agricultural technology innovation. Chapter VI choose a representative farm enterprises, research institutes, agricultural universities and rural areas to execute discussion and questionnaire survey,understanding of the system of preferences, difficulties and expectations about technological innovation in agriculture, as well as their expectations for reform and recommendations. Then agricultural Varieties as an example , according to the practice of research data and relevant statistical data, property rights system to promote technological innovation in agriculture execute empirical measurement. Chapter VII based protect the status quo and problems of intellectual property rights in agricultural technology , lead into Romer-Barro endogenous technological progress model, consider the impact on Protection of property rights in stimulating innovation of agricultural technology in China and to imitate foreign agricultural technology, combination the characteristics of public goods in agricultural technology more than the general technical, come out intellectual property protection system to choose on China’s agricultural technological innovation. Chapter VIII summed up the basic conclusions of the study, draw relevant conclusions on research of intellectual property rights for agricultural technology Innovation , put forward specific measures on property transactions of agricultural technology innovation, optimal system design and protection of property rights, Making specific Countermeasures.In this paper, on the basis of proceeding research results, in close connection with China’s national conditions, I think may be in the following four areas of study has made some innovations:Firstly, through correlation analysis of intellectual property and technological innovation in agriculture, innovative mechanism of action on property rights to promote agricultural technology innovation. Secondly, based on adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the main agricultural property transactions, combination of incentive compatibility theory, draw up transaction prices of agricultural technology innovation, and decided the price formation mechanism and mode selection.Thirdly, extended the classic model of Nordhaus-Scherer to the field of asymmetric information, based on patent length and patent width, pass through mathematical model, discussion on the determination of the optimal system of property rights in agricultural technological innovation.Finally, based Romer-Barro endogenous technological progress model, come out intellectual property protection system to choose on China’s agricultural technological innovation.更多还原