【作者】 何静；

【导师】 黄华新；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 科技哲学， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 如果说20世纪60年代的认知科学研究是以计算机科学为基础的话,那么到了20世纪80年代则转向了以心理学和生物学为基础的研究.进入21世纪,神经科学对认知科学研究的关键性和基础性作用越来越突显了出来。认知科学界对神经科学研究成果的重视带来的一个“效应”就是具身性在认知科学研究中的重要作用越来越引起学者们的关注。但是,如果对神经科学研究的重视走向了极端,就会将身体在人类体验和认知中的重要作用仅仅还原为神经生物学上的过程.这是我们所要避免的。尽管“具身性”在认知科学的研究中已经成为一个新的热点,但是目前国内对具身认知的研究还主要是建立在现象学分析的基础上在概念层面对具身性进行探讨.可是,单凭哲学和现象学上的反思无法精确地告诉我们具身性到底是如何在我们的认知中发挥作用的以及我们对身体的觉知在何种程度上并且是以何种方式进入到我们的意识内容中去的,因为当现象学遭遇非现象过程的时候,就自然而然显现了其局限性。我认为想要深入探究身体是如何在我们的认知和行动中发挥重要作用的,我们就必须抛弃那种自下而上的用神经元机制来解释任何事物的过于简单的进路,同时也要抛弃那种自上而下的用认知状态来解释任何事物的过于复杂的进路,而诉诸于经验性研究的哲学进路。本文试图借助神经科学、生理学、行为科学、心理学等经验性学科的研究成果,考察身体意象和身体图式的不同功能,并进一步探讨具身性是如何通过身体意象和身体图式,以一种前意向性的方式对我们的行动和认知产生重要影响的。这是一种将哲学与经验性的科学成果融合在一起的全新的、大胆的尝试。在这个方面,对一些具有代表性的病理学案例和经验科学实验的探讨将使我们受益匪浅。患有偏侧忽略病症的病人,尽管在身体意象上忽略了自己的半侧身体,但是由于身体图式系统仍完好无损,他们仍然能够运用那部分被他们“忽略”或“遗忘”的身体完成意向性的身体活动。患有传入神经阻滞病症的病人,尽管身体图式缺失了,但是在身体意象的帮助下,仍然能够通过视觉和认知上的努力来维持身体的平衡和基本运动。这两个案例有力地证明了,在心理学和哲学传统上认为是同一的“身体意象”和“身体图式”其实是两个完全不同的概念.尽管在具身的行为层面,两者共同发挥作用、密不可分,但是我们却有必要在概念层面对它们进行明确的区分,因为两者在我们的具身性的知觉和行动中发挥着不同的功能。身体意象不是一个心灵哲学范畴中的概念,它是一种精神建构、表征或关于身体的信念.它包括了我们对自己身体的知觉经验、信念、情感态度等三方面的内容.而身体图式则是一种知觉-运动系统能力,它通过对身体姿势和身体运动无意识的调适,使得世界中许多有意义的部分被整合到我们的经验中。但是,我们却不能将身体图式的功能简单地还原到神经生物学上的过程,因为身体运动的方式不但迎合了行动者的意图,而且能够支持或限制行动者在环境中的运动需要。学术界普遍认为,身体意象和身体图式是后天习得的。也就是说,它们并不是先天就有的,而是建立在我们所具有的对自己身体长期的知觉体验之上的。这种传统的观点受到了经验性科学研究成果的挑战。一些先天性的缺肢患者也会出现幻肢以及新生婴儿从出生之时起就能够对他人的面部表情进行模仿的科学事实表明:从本质上来说,身体图式是先天的;尽管身体意象内容本身不是先天的(受到社会、教育、习俗、文化的很大影响),但是构成身体意象的元素以及身体意象的基本框架是先天的;并且不同的知觉模块之问先天地就能够进行交互。在新生婴儿对他人的面部表情进行模仿的实验中,我们发现新生婴几不但对自己的脸部有着本体感受的觉知,而且在对自我和他人进行区分的同时,能够意识到他人是和自己一样的人。这似乎有些不可思议,但是却因为它们先天的身体图式、本体感受器、模块交互能力、镜像神经元等的存在而成为可能。本文通过对一些病理学案例和经验性科学实验的分析表明了具身性在人类体验和认知中的重要作用。其实,从人类语言的获得和创造到包括判断和隐喻在内的更高级认知能力的发展都离不开具身性的作用。而具身性对我们认知和体验的作用正是通过身体意象和身体图式系统的功能来实现的。因而,从某种程度上说,亚里士多德“人类的心灵是身体的一种表述”的观点,在当代认知科学的研究中得到了确证.尽管我们可能意识不到,但是身体所发挥的前意向性功能使得我们能够在周围的环境中从事意向性活动并且在与他人和世界的交互活动中体现我们的人类本质。更多还原

【Abstract】 In the 60s of last century, the study of Cognitive Science was mostly based on Computer Since, and in 80s, the study turned to be on the basis of Psychology and Biology. However, when time comes to 21th century, the importance of Neuroscience becomes more and more obvious. One of the results is, the broad argument about the role of embodiment for understanding cognition has been made in numerous ways, and also there is a growing consensus across a variety of disciplines within which this basic fact is inescapable. But if we let neuroscience go to the other end, the importance of our body in human experience and cognition will be only reduced into the processes of neurobiology. This is the approach that I try my best to avoid."Embodiment" becomes one of the hottest topics in the study of cognition, but the research of embodied cognition in China is mostly based on the analysis of Phenomenology and discusses the usefulness of embodiment as a theoretical concept. In some sense, this poses that Philosophy and Phenomenology run into their natural limitations when it comes up against non-philosophical and non-phenomenology processes. They cannot tell us exactly how embodiment works in human cognition and to what extent and in what way awareness of body enters into the content of conscious experience. In my view, in order to explore how body plays the important role in our cognition and action, we should not work exclusively from either the bottom-up or the up-bottom approach, because the approach of bottom-up which tries to discuss everything from the neural mechanisms is too simple and the approach of up-bottom which tries to explain everything from the state of cognition is too complicated for our study of embodied cognition.In my view, there is no one approach could provide a full picture of the setting that we intend to explore. We should resort to the philosophical ways that are informed by empirical studies. As a result, in this thesis, I try to borrow from already established insights and results provided by different empirical studies, such as Neuroscience, Physiology, Behavioral Science, Psychology, to explore the different functions of body image and body schema system and further our understanding of how embodiment play an prenoetic role in our action and cognition through them. This is a new as well as strategic danger to combine Philosophy and empirical studies together.On this aspect, I work my way through specific issues by exploring into some specific problems and examples—case studies, experiments or some pathological symptoms. Some people who suffer from Unilateral Neglect fail to perceive or attend to one side of their body in their body images, but their body schemas may remain intact or operational. Thus, they are still able to use the neglected or forgotten side of their body to do intentional bodily activities. The patient who suffers from Deafferentation misses body schema, however, with the help of intact body schema he is still able to make the balance of his body by vision and cognition. These two cases strongly prove that body image and body schema which are regarded as one thing in psychological and philosophical traditions are different concepts. Body image and body schema refer to two different but closely related systems. In embodied behavioral level the two systems interact and are highly coordinated. It is nonetheless useful and precisely distinct them in conceptual level, since they have different functions in our embodied consciousness and actions. Body image cannot be relegated to the mentalistic side. It is, as we first defined it, a system of spiritual construction, representation or beliefs pertaining to one’s own body. It at least contains contents in three aspects: (1) our perceptual experience of our own bodies; (2) our emotional attitude toward our own bodies; and (3) our conceptual understanding of our bodies in general. But body schema is a sensory-motor system. By the adjustment of our bodily gestures and bodily activities, it integrates the meaningful part of the world into our experiences. However, we cannot simplify the functions of body schema into neurobiological processes, because the ways of our bodily activities not only cater for our intentions, but also support and constrain the need of our actions in the environment.A central tenet of empiricist philosophy is that experience, in the sense of relatively prolonged practice of the sense organs, educates perception. On this view, throughout most of the past century, the received doctrine had been that the body image and body schema were acquired phenomenon; built up in our perceptual experience of our own bodies. But this established scientific doctrine was directly challenged by the results of empirical studies. The facts that phantoms existing in the case of congenital absence of limb and invisible imitation do occur in newborns prove that body schema is innate, and it works non-consciously to allow the infant to control and coordinate his/her imitative movements. Body image may in fact develop its content over the course of childhood and be influenced a lot by the factors of social, education, custom, but its framework and basic elements has an innate status; and the intermodal translation is operative from the very beginning of human beings. From the experiments of neonate, we found that the new born baby has a proprioceptive awareness of his/her own body; and knows the differentiation between self and other and also has recognition that the other is the same sort as him/herself. It sounds incredible, but does become possible because of the existence of innate body schema, proprioception, intermodal system and mirror neuron.In order to give a whole and better picture of the importance of embodiment in human experience and cognition, my approach herein involves the interpretation of a large amount empirical data and studies. It is the work of body schema and body image that make the importance of embodiment possible. Thus, to some extent, the Aristotelian insight that the human soul is an expression of the human body has found significant verification in contemporary studies of cognition. Before we know it, the prenoetic function of our body is setting us on a course in which our human nature is expressed in intentional action and in interaction with others.更多还原