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中国商业银行高管人员激励约束机制研究
【作者】 樊蓓姣；
【导师】 吴冬梅；
【作者基本信息】 首都经济贸易大学 ， 劳动经济学， 2008， 博士
【摘要】 高管的绩效表现对商业银行的经营发展产生巨大影响,因此,激励高管采取使商业银行价值最大化的行为成为提高商业银行竞争力的重要因素。本文对激励理论进行了研究与分析,重点分析了高管激励问题的一般规律,运用博弈论的研究方法,搭建了商业银行高管显性激励模型、隐性激励模型和高管人员之间的博弈模型,作为中国商业银行高管激励问题研究的理论基础。本文以美国、德国、日本三国商业银行为例,深入研究了国际商业银行高管激励的做法与经验,追述了中国商业银行高管激励的演变过程,并以上市银行为例,运用实证方法,分析了中国商业银行薪酬激励的现状,剖析了中国商业银行高管激励存在的问题,最后从环境建设、高管选聘机制、绩效考核、薪酬激励等方面,提出了构建中国商业银行高管激励体系的政策建议。
【Abstract】 Senior managers’ performances make tremendous impacts on commercial bank’ s operation and development, so that it is one of important factors for promoting commercial banks’ competitiveness to encourage senior managers acting for the purpose of maximizing the value of commercial banks. In order to set up general theory fundament for China commercial bank’ s issue, this paper researches incentives theory, analyses general law of senior managers incentive issue, and builds up a dominant commercial bank executives motivation model, hidden incentive model and Game model between executives with the use of game theory. Based on the example of United States, Germany and Japan commercial bank, this paper studies deeply on the practices and experiences of international commercial bank executives encouragement, and sum up the history and process of Chinese commercial banks executives encouragement, and analyses the status quo and existing problems of China’s commercial bank’ s motivation issues on base of empirical methods and listed bank data. Finally, author put forth some advices for building more efficient incentive system for Chinese commercial bank from the angle of environmental construction, hiring executives mechanism, performance appraisal and compensation incentives.