【作者】 周允程；

【导师】 蔡曙山；

【作者基本信息】 清华大学 ， 科学技术哲学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 本文是关于第一人称信念的弗雷格哲学研究。通过对比佩里、刘易斯和斯塔尔内克的信念理论,突显信念研究过程中的罗素哲学倾向和弗雷格哲学倾向之间的比照,从而在更深的层次上探究信念(尤其是第一人称信念)的本质所在。传统的弗雷格信念理论坚持两个基本主张:第一、信念体现为有生命的主体和抽象的思想实体之间的关系,这个抽象的思想实体通常被称为命题;第二、命题具有真值,其真值不随说话的时间、地点和人称的改变而改变。传统的信念理论无法解释第一人称信念问题,构成第一人称信念内容的思想实体不是传统的命题概念所能够概括得了的,即使存在能够概括第一人称信念内容的命题,其真值因不同说话时间、地点和人称而不断发生改变。基于此,佩里和刘易斯对传统的弗雷格理论进行修正,以期达到解释第一人称信念的目的。在他们各自的理论重构过程中,他们分别在不同方面表现出了罗素哲学倾向。佩里在本体论上接受了罗素的单称命题,而刘易斯在认识论上认同于罗素的亲知关系。信念理论的罗素哲学倾向无助于理解信念的本体意义。与此相对照,斯塔尔内克则从维护传统的弗雷格信念理论的立场出发,对传统的命题概念进行了形而上的分析,并给出了关于命题的逻辑构造。斯塔尔内克提出了命题概念(propositional concept),并建立了命题概念分析模型。在这个模型之中,第一人称信念的内容是由对角线命题表征出来的。在斯塔尔内克的理论框架中,第一人称信念内容不仅得到了充分的理论说明,同时,也获得了形而上的理论解释。第一人称信念在理论上所反映的是元语义事实,元语义事实构成了信念赖以产生的事实基础。这样的一个事实基础其实就是弗雷格的涵义概念所要概括的理论内容。一旦,我们通过元语义事实来解读弗雷格的涵义概念,那么,我们就达到了关于第一人称信念的弗雷格哲学研究。本文首先对弗雷格语言哲学进行必要的阐释,继而展开对第一人称信念问题的理论说明和理论解释,最后建立关于第一人称信念的弗雷格哲学研究取向。更多还原

【Abstract】 This dissertation is designed to do a Fregean study of the first-personal belief. Through the detailed discussions of Perry, Lewis and Stalnaker, there surfaces the contrast between Russellian and Fregean understanding of belief. Thereafter, the essence of belief (especially the first-personal belief) will be explored on a new level. The traditional Fregean belief theory holds the following two doctrines: (1) Belief is a relation between an animate subject and an abstract object which is called a proposition; (2) Propositions have truth-values, and their truth-values do not vary with time, place, or person. This traditional belief theory fails to explain the first-personal belief. The content of the first-personal belief is not to be characterized merely as a proposition. The truth-value of a sentence expressing the first-personal belief varies with time, place and person. Seeing that, Perry and Lewis attempted to revise the traditional Fregean theory in order to make it account for the first-personal belief. In the process, they proposed the new belief theories, which reveal a strong Russellian philosophy. Perry’s theory contains singular propositions while Lewis recognizes relations of acquaintance in his theory. Compelling otherwise though it is, Russellian belief theory does not provide anything about what belief in nature is. In contrast, Stalnaker tried to defend Fregean belief theory, giving a philosophical analysis of proposition and constructing a propositional structure. Stalnaker proposed a theory of propositional concept, in which a diagonal proposition represents the content of the first-personal belief. In the two-dimensional theory of propositional concept, the first-personal belief is interpreted as established on meta-semantic facts. In essence, meta-semantic facts constitute what Frege means by sense. Meta-semantic facts can be used to account for Frege’s sense, which is the focus of Frege’s philosophy. As a consequence, a Fregean philosophy of belief is achieved.更多还原