维护决策权与平衡主要对手：美国的联合国安理会组成政策分析

【作者】 毛瑞鹏；

【导师】 朱明权；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 国际关系， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 安理会组成问题是联合国安理会改革的核心问题之一。现有的主流观点认为,美国总是希望维持安理会组成的现状。本文对此持不同意见,认为这种观点忽视了美国在安理会组成问题上的利益的复杂性,本文提出美国并不是一概地反对安理会扩大,而是取决于维护决策权和平衡主要对手两种利益。本文认为在安理会理事国候选国中,从维护决策权出发,美国将以候选国是否同它具有相近的投票倾向为标准做出选择性的支持政策;从平衡主要对手出发,美国将接受主要对手的竞争者以及对维持美国与主要对手之间的权力平衡具有重要影响的国家。本文重点研究了当维护决策权与平衡主要对手发生矛盾时,美国将采取何种政策,认为当两者发生矛盾时,平衡主要对手是美国的主要考虑,维护决策权是次要考虑,出于平衡主要对手的需要,美国将在决策权方面做出让步。文章以此为分析视角分析了四次关于安理会组成的重要事件:美国在联合国创立时期对中国、法国成为安理会常任理事国的政策;美国对20世纪60年代初亚非国家推动的安理会扩大的政策;美国尼克松政府对中华人民共和国恢复在联合国、包括安理会的合法席位的政策;美国对冷战后安理会扩大问题的政策。本文发现:美国在中国、法国成为安理会常任理事国的问题上采取了不同的态度。美国对中国的支持政策是维护决策权与平衡主要对手要求相结合的产物。而对于法国的政策则反映了维护决策权是美国对待安理会组成问题的直接出发点,然而出于平衡主要对手的需要,它不得不在决策权方面做出退让。美国对亚非国家扩大安理会的要求的政策经历了由拖延、抵制到最终接受的过程。美国不希望安理会扩大的原因在于美国相信增加亚非国家的席位将削弱其在安理会的决策权,而美国最终接受扩大是因为当时亚非国家在美国平衡苏联的战略中具有重要的地位,美国担心拒绝安理会扩大将迫使亚非国家倒向苏联。美国尼克松政府对中华人民共和国恢复联合国、包括安理会的合法席位采取了默许的政策,主要体现为:在意图上,已经事实上接受中国的权利要求;在行为上,放弃了试图加以阻止的各种积极筹划;在对结果的影响上,客观上为中国顺利恢复在联合国的权利扫清了一个重大障碍。尼克松政府采取默许政策的原因在于将平衡主要对手作为主要的政策考虑,拉拢中国平衡苏联。美国对冷战后安理会扩大问题的政策是积极支持日本、德国(后期仅为日本)成为常任理事国,同时试图限制发展中国家进入安理会的数量。美国采取上述政策的原因是在冷战后美国的主要对手模糊化的情况下,维护决策权成为美国在安理会组成上的主要考虑。从维护决策权出发,美国支持同它具有相近投票倾向的国家,同时抵制同它具有较大立场差异的发展中国家。尽管如此,美国国内仍有人主张利用安理会扩大平衡潜在的对手。更多还原

【Abstract】 The composition issue is one of the key issues in the UN Security Council reform. The current mainstream argument on the U.S. position towards the Security Council expansion is that the United States always hope to maintain the status quo. However, from my point of view, this opinion does not pay enough attention to the complex national interests of the United States. I argue that the United States do not object all of the expansion proposals, on the contrary, its policy depends on two kinds of its interests, one is protecting the decision-making power in the Security Council, the other is balancing the main adversaries through supporting or accepting the Security Council member candidates. Among the candidates, from the decision-making power perspective, the United States will support the states which share the similar voting preference in the United Nations, and from the perspective of balancing the main adversaries, the United States will support the competitors of its main adversaries and accept the ones that have great impacts on the balance of power between itself and the adversaries. I focus on the U.S. policy in the situation that the two kinds of interests contradict. I believe that balancing the main adversaries will be its prime consideration, while protecting the decision-making power will be the secondary consideration.This article analyzes four pieces of events on the composition of the Security Council. The first one is the U.S. policy to the permanent member status of China and France during the founding of the United Nations, the second one is the U.S. policy to the Security Council expansion pushed by the Afro-Asia states in the early 1960s, the third one is the Nixon administration’s policy on the Chinese Representation issue, and the fourth one is the U.S. policy on the post-Cold War Security Council expansion issue.Through these cases, I find that:In the first case, the United States took different policies to China and France. The reason that the United States actively supported China was that China was viewed as a follower and an important balancing power after the World War II by the American leaders. And the change of the U.S. position to France showed that when the United States believed its hegemony was challenged by the USSR, balancing became the prime consideration, and protecting the decision-making power became the secondary consideration. In the second case, The policy of the United States to the Security Council expansion pushed by the Afro-Asia states experienced a process from trying to delay and block it to finally accepting it. On the one hand, the United States feared that accepting the expansion would damage its decision-making power, so hoped to maintain the status quo, or to limit the size of expansion. However, on the other hand, the United States realized that if it denied the demand of the Afro-Asia states, these states would probably took the retaliatory actions, and would cause great damages to US on the Cold War issues. Under this consideration, the United States accepted the Security Council expansion finally.The Nixon administration took a policy I called acquiescence on People’s Republic of China restoring the seat at the United Nations, including the permanent membership of the Security Council. This policy can be understood from three aspects: on the intention aspect, the US government had in fact accepted the demand of the PRC, on the behavior aspect, the US government gave up the active preparations to block the restoration, and on the result aspect, the actions of the US government objectively cleared an important obstacle for China’s restoration eventually. I believe the reason was President Nixon tried to carry out a strategy to balance the Soviet Union through improving its relationship with the PRC.After the Cold War, the United States have supported Japan and Germany (Japan only after 2003) to be the new permanent members of the Security Council. At the same time, it has tried to limit the number of the new members of the developing countries. For the United States, there are no specific main adversaries since the end of the Cold War, so protecting the decision-making power has become the prime consideration. And from this point, the US government makes decisions on this issue depending on whether the candidates share the similar voting preferences with the United States.更多还原