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控制权私利、公司效率与金融发展

Private Benefits of Control, Corporate Efficiency and Financial Development

【作者】 周世成

【导师】 张亦春;

【作者基本信息】 厦门大学 , 金融学, 2008, 博士

【摘要】 上市公司中的代理问题一直受到学界和业界的关注。早先的着眼点主要在管理层和股东之间的利益冲突。进入1990年代以来,大股东和小股东之间的利益冲突问题逐渐成为新的焦点。大股东尽管在监督管理层方面具有优势,但是,同时她也具备剥削小股东的能力和动机。控制权私利的存在被认为是大股东剥削小股东的证据,而其规模的大小则成为投资者保护程度的衡量。控制权私利是国际上研究企业代理问题的一个新视角。剖析我国上市公司治理状况,上述两类代理问题也客观存在。国内目前从控制权私利角度进行公司金融研究的文献还比较少,相关的研究还主要停留在引入和介绍国外理论和方法阶段。因此,关于控制权私利的研究,无论是从理论角度还是从实践角度看,都是非常必要的,而且是紧迫的。本文的研究目的在于从理论和实证角度廓清控制权私利的影响。文章运用大宗股权交易溢价法,采用1997—2006年上市公司控制权交易196个样本,对我国控制权私利规模进行测度,然后分别通过理论模型分析和实证检验,从微观和宏观两个层面研究控制权私利对公司效率和金融(股票市场)发展的影响。笔者发现我国控制权私利对公司效率和金融(股票市场)发展显著正相关。本文的创新点首先表现在研究内容上的创新。本文首次对我国上市公司控制权私利与公司效率的关系进行研究,并进一步从宏观层面探索了我国上市公司控制权私利对金融(股票市场)发展的影响。其次是研究方法的创新。既有文献关于控制权私利的研究主要是从微观的公司层面进行的。本文则把微观的上市公司控制权私利和宏观的金融(股票市场)发展联系起来,通过理论模型论证两者的关系,就金融发展理论构建微观基础作了尝试,并实证检验了结论。

【Abstract】 Agency problems in public corporates have been a hot issue for a long time. Earier literatures focus on the conflict between managers and shareholders. From later of 1990s,researchers pay more and more attentions to the agency relationship of the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders. Though controlling shareholders have the advantage of monitoring managers,they are provided with the incentive and capability to expropriate minority hsareholders. It is said that the exisistence of private benefits from control proves the expropriation of controlling shareholders,and the size of private benefits is the measurement of investor protection. Private benefits of control is a new sight for agency problems reserch. Examing the situation of corporate governance in China,the agency problems mentioned above really exist. There are few literatures of finance in sight of private benefits of control in China,and much issues have not yet be addressed. So researching along the direction has not only academic value but also practical meanings .This dissertation contributes to study how private benefits of control affect corporate efficiency and financial development. Based on the 196 control transactions between 1997 to 2006 the writer uses the block-trade-premium method to calculate the size of private benefits from control of China listed corporations firstly. Then the writer builds theoretical models to discuss the effects of private benefits from control impacting on corporate efficency and financial development. The following emperical studys draw the same conclusions with the models. The result of the dissertation is that larger private benefits of control indicate better corporate efficiency and financial development significantly.The major contributions the dissertation,as well as its innovations, are manifested in the following aspects. Firstly, the dissertation extends the study fields. The existing rsearches don’t address the relations between private benefits of control and corporate efficiency in China. And no paper focuses on how private benefits of control affect financial development witnin one country. This paper attempts to research in these fields.Secondly,the paper experiments on new research. The writer relate the micro factor, private benefits of control,with the macro one,financial development. In the dissertation he provides theoretical and emperical research to build the micro base for financial development.

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 厦门大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2009年 08期
  • 【分类号】F272;F830
  • 【被引频次】3
  • 【下载频次】552
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