【作者】 洪卫青；

【导师】 陈少华；

【作者基本信息】 厦门大学 ， 会计学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 会计信息在资本市场中起着非常重要的作用,尤其在证券估值、信息披露中发挥着不可替代的作用。维护信息公平,提高信息效率,是保障投资者利益,实现资源优化配置的关键,也是体现中国证监会公开、公平、公正的要求之一。业绩预告制度作为一项信息披露制度,使得业绩可能发生大幅变动的上市公司在定期财务报告正式对外披露之前,预先将业绩信息向投资者披露,以期帮助信息使用者做出理性决策。作为对定期报告的有益补充,业绩预告提高了信息及时性,有利于消除资本市场信息的不对称和信息滞后,有利于抑制内部交易行为并实现资本市场的公平和效率,因而该制度也在人们的关注之下越来越完善。业绩预告在形式上属于会计信息披露范畴,实质上它属于公司治理的研究范畴,原因在于业绩预告是由公司内部控制人发布的,内部控制人从属于实际控制人,实际控制人的背后是终极控制人。终极控制人对上市公司控制的方式之一,就是经过他们的代理人——内部控制人实现对信息的控制,而会计信息又是信息的重要一环,因此,从某种角度来说,业绩预告的特征打上了终极控制人的烙印。从终极控制人角度来研究公司治理问题是目前学术界的前沿领域。过去学术界对公司治理的研究基本都囿于经理人与股东之间的代理问题,鲜有从终极控制人对中小股东掠夺的角度来研究的。有关终极控制人的概念,首先出现在La Portaet al.(1999)的一篇研究全球的所有权结构问题的经典文献中。在分析上市公司所有权特征过程中,为揭示不同国家大股东的主体类型和所有权分布状况,他通过追溯控股股东的终极控制人(Ultimate Controller),进而分析其对公司的所有权也即终极所有权(Ultimate Ownership),同时,考虑到控制权杠杆效应,终极所有权还被进一步分解为控制权(即投票表决权)与现金流量权(实际权益投资)两个概念。而后,这几个概念所蕴涵的新的代理成本之产权分析框架在研究东亚和欧洲资本市场的文献中得以承袭和发展(Claessens et al.,2000,2002;Faccio etal.,2002;Lins,2003;Lemmon&Lins,2003;Fan&Wong,2002,2005)。无疑,这些概念都是基于新的公司治理范式和突破传统治理理论而提出的。本文从终极控制人的角度研究我国上市公司业绩预告披露问题,不同的终极控制人特征会通过业绩预告来表征,因此,通过对终极控制人的分类来研究业绩预告,是一种全新的视角。在对终极控制人分类时,根据产权性质,我们将终极控制人分为两种类型:政府控制与非政府控制;根据所有权的实际行使主体,我们分为三种类型:国有资产管理公司、国有实业公司、非政府(自然人、法人)。在此分类基础上,逐层剖析业绩预告表象背后隐藏的公司治理问题。在本人目前所涉猎的文献中,鲜有发现同样的研究视角。本文结构安排如下:第一章导言。本章阐述了本文的研究动机,终极控制人与实际控制人、控股股东辨析,业绩预告相关概念辨析,研究思路,研究方法,基本结论与创新点,以及研究的局限与论文改进方向,对全文起到提纲挈领的作用。第二章业绩预告的制度变迁。本章从制度变迁的角度梳理了业绩预告制度在国内外的发展历程。第三章文献回顾。本章对国内外业绩预告的研究文献进行了梳理,对已有的研究结论进行了总结。第四章终极控制人特征与代理成本。本章对终极控制人特征与代理成本之间的关系做了深入剖析,层层剥开终极控制人的自利性行为的根源和表征,这是一种完全不同于经理人代理的治理问题。第五章终极控制人特征与业绩预告。本章首先分析了业绩预告属于一种代理问题,其次对终极控制人特征与业绩预告表征之间的关系做了研究,并提出实证假说。第六章实证研究设计。实证研究部分由以下几部分构成:1、终极控制人特征与业绩预告类型2、终极控制人特征与业绩预告准确性3、终极控制人特征与预告修正4、终极控制人特征与业绩预告的市场反应第七章研究结论、政策建议与展望。相关实证研究支持了我们提出的大部分假说,但也揭示出存在的问题。目前我国只要求上市公司披露实际控制人,并未要求披露终极控制人,为了规范预告信息披露,有必要采取相应措施:首先是要求上市公司披露终极控制人及其控制权行使方式;其次要依照终极控制人分类制定业绩预告制度,加大对预告违规、修正的处罚力度。更多还原

【Abstract】 Accounting information plays a leading role in capital market,especially in security valuation and information disclousure. To maintain fair information and promote information efficiency is the key to protect the investors’interest and to realize resources-compounding. So it can realise the demand of CSRC, which demands the stock market of china to be an open, fair and justice market. Earnings preannouncement practices the ideal of high quality information. As an information system, the earinings preannouncement demands the listed companies whose earnings will vary largely to disclose the information to the investors before periodic report, and it is helpful to them to make rationl decision. As a useful supplement to the periodic report, earnings preannouncement eliminates the asymmetry of information and information lag, improve the timeliness of information. It would help to suppress internal transactions and achieve a fair and efficient capital market. The rule is gradually revealed under the concern of more and more people. the earnings preannouncement belongs to the accounting information disclosure arena on the surface, actually it belongs to corporation governance arena. Because the preannouncements are disclosed by the companies’ internal controllers, who are subject to actual controllers, and behind the actual controllers are ultimate controllers. To ontrol the listed company’s information through agent-internal controller is one of the measures that ultimate controller control the listed companies. Specifically, accouting information is one of the important information in listed company, so the preannouncement characeristics are branded in the ultimate controller’ to some extent.Researching the governance from the aspect of ultimate controller is an advanced arena. The current main international literatures related to the governance performance of audit committee mostly make use of the agency cost and governance analysis framework based on the traditional governance theory (paradigm). Study from the aspect that ultimate controller exproprate the minority sharesholder is rare. The concept of ultimate controller is showed first on a paper published by La Porta et al. (1999) which analyse the ownership structure in the world. For disclosing the strong stockholder’ ownership characteristics, he tracked to the ultimate controller and its ultimate ownership which is the controller of the strong stockholder. Furthermore,he divided the ultimate ownership into controlling right(voting right) and cash flow right(real equity investment).After his paper, the new agent cost analysis framwork is inherited and progressed in the literatures which reaearch the eastern asia and european capital market. The concept is based on the breakthrough of the new governance framework without queston.The article studies the earnings preannouncement from the aspect of the ultimate controller. Ultimate controller characteristics will show by preannouncement phenomenon, so it is a new viewpiont to research the preannouncement by classifing the ultimate controller. According to ownership characteristics, we put the ultimate controller into government and non-government; according to control entity, we classify the ultimate controller into three kinds:state institution, state-owned corporation, non-govoernment entity. The papers I have searched rarely research from the ultimate controller aspect. The article has the following chapters:Chapter One: introductionThe chapter introduce the study motivation; concept of ultimate controller, real controller and strong sharesholder; concept of preannouncement and alike; study methold; main conclusion and innovation viewpoint; study limitation and the progressing orientation.Chapter Two: study on preannouncement system evolution.The chapter introduces the progress of preannouncement system domestic and foreign.Chapter Three: literature review.The chapter summarizes the literature about preannouncement domestic and foreign.Chapter Four: study on the relationgship between ultimate controller characteristics and agent cost.The chapter analysizes the relationgship between ultimate controller characteristics and agent cost deeply. Through the analysis we find the self-profit reason of the ultimate controller, it is different to the administrator governance cost.Chapter Five: ultimate controller characteristics and preannouncementThe chapter first explains that the preannouncement belongs to the arena of agent, then we study the ultimate controller characteristics and the preannouncement phenomenon. Based on the study, we develop the hypothesis.Chapter Six: empirical studyThe chapter combined by the following content1. Ultimate controller characteristics and the preannouncement type;2. Ultimate controller characteristics and the preannouncement accuracy;3. Ultimate controller characteristics and the preannouncement estatement;4. Ultimate controller characteristics and the preannouncement market effect.Chapter Seven: conclusion, suggestion and expectationThe empirical test supports mojority hypotheses. Also it discloses the existing deficiency. Now we only demand the listed company to disclose the real controller behind, but not ultimate controller. Therefore, it is necessary to draw the regulation to demand the listed company to disclose the ultimate controller for information symmetry. Second we should draw the preannouncement regulation by ultimate controller characteristics.At last we should punish the restatement and other phenomenon in the preannouncement strongly.更多还原