【作者】 俞春江；

【导师】 吴水澎；

【作者基本信息】 厦门大学 ， 会计学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 本文以深交所年度信息披露考评数据为公司透明度代理变量,以操控性应计为盈余管理代理变量,系统检验了公司透明度与盈余管理之间的相互关系。本文发现:(1)深交所年度信息披露考评等级与公司规模、长期债务率、资产利用效率、业绩表现、信息不对称程度、股权集中度、董事会规模、审计意见等已被证明的公司透明度影响因子具有符合预期的关系,因此能充当公司透明度代理变量。但深交所评级偏爱上市公司报告当期高盈余,因而该变量很可能是有偏的变量。(2)公司透明度抑制盈余管理,但公司透明度主要抑制向下盈余管理,对向上盈余管理却没有约束力。公司透明度的变动会导致前期是向上盈余管理的公司调整盈余管理策略,但对前期是向下盈余管理的公司的盈余管理策略调整却没有显著和稳定影响。(3)盈余管理损害公司透明度,但主要是向下盈余管理损害透明度,向上盈余管理只有在坏消息且导致盈余性质变化才会损害公司透明度,其余情形对公司透明的影响则不确定。任何对前期向上盈余管理的偏离都会导致年度评级降低,前期是向下盈余管理公司的任何调整对年度评级却没有显著和稳定的影响。(4)管理当局根据年度评级的偏好实施和调整盈余管理策略,而年度评级如实反映了对盈余管理行为的一贯偏好。本文的学术贡献在于:(1)为用盈余透明度替代公司透明度的做法提供了经验证据。(2)本文首次系统检验了公司透明度与盈余管理的相互影响,用Heckman矫正和2SLS技术克服自选择偏差,同时估计公司透明度与盈余管理的参数。(3)为基于深交所年度数据进行的相关研究提供了良好的参照。本文的政策意义在于:(1)为通过加强公司透明度建设和完善年度评级来抑制机会主义盈余管理提供了支持性证据。(2)支持年度评级数据应当及时公布。更多还原

【Abstract】 This Dissertation empirically tests the interactive relationship between corporate transparency and earnings management by using SZSE’s annual-rating and discretionary accruals as proxy for corporate transparency and earnings management respectivelly.This Dissertation finds that (1) SZSE’s annual-rating has predicted relation with proved corporate transparency factors, such as corporate size, leverage, asset utilization efficiency, performance, information asymmetric level, share concentration level, board size and audit opinion. This means SZSE’s annual-rating can proxy for corporate transparency. However, such rating could be a biased proxy becasue it is more likely to high earning. (2) Corporate transparency can restrain the opportunistic earnings management; in particular, it mainly restrains the downward earnings management in stead of upward earnings management. Corporate with past positive discretionary accrual will adjust their earnings management according to the change of SZSE’s rating, but not with past negative discretionary accrual. (3) Earnings management impairs corporate transparency. Corporate with downward earnings management will be rated low level, while corporate with upward earnings management will be rated low level under the condition that bad news changes the earnings direction. As for corporate with past positive discretionary accruals, any deviation from the level of last upward earnings management will be punished by annual-rating decreasing. But the change of discretionary accruals of corporate with negative discretionary accruals has no significant and stable impact on the change of its annual-rating.(4) Corporate adjusts its earnings management strategy according to the preference of SZSE’s annual-rating on earnings, while SZSE’s annual-rating maintains its preference.The dissertation has following contribution: (1) It provides empirical proof for using earning opacity proxy for corporate transparency. (2) It systematically tests the interactive relationship between corporate transparency and earnings management by controlling the selection bias and endogenous problem with Heckman’s correction and 2SLS, which simultaneously estimates the parameters of corporate transparency and earnings management. (3) It may serve as a decent reference for related study based on SZSE’s annual-rating.This dissertation has following policy implications: (1) Providing supportive evidence for restraining opportunistic earnings management by strengthening the construction of corporate transparency and improving SZSE’s annual-rating. (2) Indicating the importance of the timely SZSE issue on corporate annual-rating.更多还原