节点文献
我国政府投资项目建设市场规制研究
Research on the Construction Market Regulation of Government Projects in China
【作者】 胡杰;
【导师】 尹贻林;
【作者基本信息】 天津大学 , 工程管理, 2007, 博士
【摘要】 我国政府投资项目正经历着一次建设管理模式的改革,在这个过程中,市场失灵与政府规制失灵并存。本文引入激励性规制理论,把宏观的可竞争性市场建立、代建人选择机制与微观的项目建设激励问题结合起来,取得了以下研究成果:(1)首先对国外规制实践作了简单回顾,对国外规制理论研究进行了综述,国内研究方面,对我国政府投资范围的界定、政府投资项目建设管理模式、公共事业规制改革和政府投资项目建设市场这几方面的研究作了一个简单梳理。(2)总结归纳了我国政府投资项目建设管理制度的制度变迁,分析了我国政府投资项目规制的组织结构、规制内容和方式,总结了我国当前的政府投资项目建设市场规制中存在的问题和现象。在此基础上,进一步与市场经济发达国家和地区的政府规制体系、规制内容和法律法规等进行比较研究。(3)从政府投资经营性和非经营性项目的建设市场分析入手,研究了我国建设市场的竞争态势,继而分析我国政府投资可竞争性代建市场所面临的各种壁垒。本文认为,对一般盈利性政府投资项目建设市场,以建立充分竞争,良性竞争的市场竞争环境和秩序,规范其竞争行为,培育强大的市场竞争主体,避免无序竞争。对于政府投资非经营性项目建设市场,更多的是应该考虑培育竞争性的代建人市场,减少各种行政壁垒,从而给不同代建人在竞争性策略壁垒上提供一个平等竞争的平台。(4)从机制和方法上研究了政府投资项目代建人的选择问题。分析了现行的代建模式下代建人选择方法和机制弊端,探讨了基于拍卖理论的竞标模型和竞标策略,从代建人的声誉建立和代建人声誉维持上研究代建人的选择机制,并且探讨代建人声誉市场的建立条件和可行性。采用以Hausdorff度量的模糊TOPSIS方法,分析了单一决策者和群决策两种不同决策环境下的多属性混合评价代建人的方法。(5)将代建人的激励类型进行了分类,接着分析了政府投资项目的各种风险类型和风险分配原则,在此基础上,对代建取费激励的现状、特点和取费机制进行了分析,分析了代建取费对代建人激励的影响。尝试通过引入竞争模式来改善政府投资项目规制激励,研究了两类激励性规制问题,一类是特许权与敌意接管,另一类是标尺竞争。(6)从培育可竞争性的政府投资项目建设市场和构建激励性项目规制机制两方面提出了切实可行的政策和建议。
【Abstract】 The reformation of the government projects is being carried on in the area of construction and management mode and the market failure and government regulation failure coexist in the process. In this paper, the incentive regulation theory was introduced integrating the buiding of competitive construction market、the choosing of construction agent and the solve of incentive problems in the micro area of project constrction.This paper achieved the following results of study:1. This paper recalled the development station of the regulations practice and regulations on foreign theoretical research were reviewed. Also the scope of government investment, construction and management model of government projects, the regulation of public utilities reform and government investment projects construction market were made a simple carding.2. By analyzing the institutional changes of government projects construction and management、the regulatory organization、content and mode were summed up, the problems and the phenomena on market regulation were summed up and the compared study with the foreign counties were made on the regulatory system、content and the laws.3. The competition situation and the entry barriers were studyed from the point of the profitable and unprofitable government projects. In this paper, the view was that suitable way to the profitable government projects consruction market should be fully and benign competitive, and the competitory entironment or order should be well-behaved. To the unprofitable government projects, the competitive constuction agent market should be built up and the administrative barriers must be reduced, thus the different constuction agents owned the au pair competitory platform.4. The mechanism and method on the option of constuction agent was studied by analyzing the abuse of the present way. The research on the bid model and strategy based on the auction theory was made. An analysis of was made including the built-up condition、feasibility and the maintenance of the reputation of constuction agent. Also, the fuzzy TOPSIS mehod based on Hausdorff metric to evaluate the multiattribute of constuction agent in the single and group-decider circumstance was studied.5. The content、characters and mechanism of agent cost were disscussed based on the research of the type of incentive and the agent’s risk allocation. Also, the impact between the agent and the incentive was analyzed. To improve the effect of the regulatory incentive, two kind of competitive mode including franchise biding and yardstick competition were analyzed.6. Finally, based on the analysis forementioned, the paper carried out the feasible suggestion from the two different perspectives, that is the nourishment of competitive construction market and the incentive regulatory mechanism.
【Key words】 Public Projects; Construction Market; Regulation; Competitive Market; Construction Agent Option; Micro Incentive Regulation;