【作者】 高雅琴；

【导师】 张维；

【作者基本信息】 天津大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 本文概括了中小企业经营风险高和认知风险高的风险特征,指出在我国以间接金融为主的市场条件中,中小企业融资问题源于其高风险与银行低风险偏好不匹配,信贷模式的创新要能降低和分担风险以弥补资金供求双方的风险匹配差距,这也是本文贯穿始终的研究视角。本文首先回顾了中小企业融资的相关理论,并阐述了已有理论对上述相关问题方面研究中的不足。从本研究的视角本文分析了我国中小企业融资方式的风险分担机制。进而对团体贷款和多银行贷款池展开研究,以从降低认知风险、分担经营风险两个方面弥补中小企业贷款问题上资金供求双方风险不匹配的差距。对降低认知风险的信贷模式,本文研究团体贷款模式中的还款激励问题,从贷前选择和贷后惩罚机制两方面研究团体贷款的还款激励问题,获得促进还款意愿减少策略违约的团体组成在社会资本方面的重要特征,并证明企业间惩罚机制能有效促进企业还款;进而本文从企业的角度比较了独立贷款和不存在策略违约情况的借款者团体,研究在银行对利率的定价没有上限限制的条件下,团体贷款是否能增进中小企业获得贷款的机会。研究表明,由于团体的自选组成机制,对于同一个企业团体贷款能比独立贷款向企业提供更优惠的贷款利率,使得对于满足借款参与约束条件的企业,对其项目成功概率的要求降低,对企业的项目成功时的产出要求也降低,进而改善了中小企业获得贷款的机会。对分担经营风险的信贷模式,本文构建了多银行贷款池风险分担模式,研究该贷款池风险分担合约,获得了封闭解,并进一步讨论了该合约的特征,证明了该模式的有效性,即这种分担合约保留了小银行的信息优势,同时有效地分担了风险,为中小企业贷款难的问题提供了一个解决方案。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper disclosed the risk characteristics of SMEs (Small and medium enterprises) with high business risk and high perceived risk, and indicated that the SMEs financing difficulty is due to the fact that the high risk of SMEs is not matched with the risk preference banks in our financial market which is dominated with indirect finance. So the innovation of finance mode should be able to reduce and share risks in order to make up the gap of the risk matching. It is also the viewpoint throughout the paper.The paper started from reviewing the theories related to SMEs finance, and disclosed the shortage of previous theories related to the above problems. Then it analyzed the risk sharing mechanism of finance mechanism for SMEs from the viewpoint. Then it studied group lending (GL) and multi-banks loans pool to make up the gap of risk matching which can reduce perceived risk and sharing business risk respectively.For reducing the perceived risk, the paper studied the repayment incentive of GL by studying the selection before lending and punishment after lending, obtaining the characteristic of group formation which can decrease strategic default. The characteristic is related with social capital. It is the selection before lending. Then it studied the punishment after lending by set the punishment mechanism between SMEs. The set was proved to be effective. Then the paper compared the individual lending and the GL which has no strategic default to study whether the GL can give SMEs better chances of finance when the bank has no restriction on the upper limit of interest rate than the individual lending. The result showed that due to the self-selection programme of GL, for the same individual SME, the GL can provide a better interest rate. It will reduce the required success probability of the SME which is satisfied with the participation constraint condition, reduce the requirement yield of the success project and it will ultimately improve the chances of loans of SMEs.For sharing the business risk, the paper tries to diversify the non-system risk of small banks through the multi-small-banks’loans pool as well se to avoid the reverse problem. We design the multi-bank risk sharing contract and derive closed-form solutions, discussing the characteristics of the contract. Conclusion is that the risk sharing contract can efficiently diversify the risk while remaining the information advantage of small banks, thus providing a resolution to the SME loans.更多还原