【作者】 王镜；

【导师】 邵春福；

【作者基本信息】 北京交通大学 ， 交通运输规划与管理， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 城市公共交通票价的制定对于城市公共交通的发展至关重要。在公交服务水平一定的情况下,票价水平将决定城市公共交通的分担率,由此也将决定城市公共交通运营企业的生存和发展。为了响应国家大力推进公交优先的号召,应当以公交票价和财政补贴为研究对象,确定科学、合理的票价及补贴,促进公交优先发展。本论文首先简要描述城市公共交通系统的定义、构成和特性,详细阐述城市公共交通价格及补贴的特征和原则,总结现行的定价及补贴方法,在此基础上,提出运用博弈论研究城市公共交通票价制定及补贴计算的合理性。其次,运用博弈的方法分析不同公交方式间价格竞争,研究它们之间的定价策略对自身及其他局中人收益的影响,并建立相应的非合作定价博弈模型,最后以深圳市地铁和公共电汽车在相同起讫点的线路的定价博弈为例,给出相应的博弈模型,并求出均衡票价,验证模型实用性。第三,针对城市公共交通系统中不同公交方式和不同公交企业,运用博弈理论分析它们的合作竞争定价策略,并且对非换乘合作建立定价模型并对实例进行博弈分析;对换乘合作,以票价优惠幅度为决策变量建立stackelberg博弈模型,并进行实例分析。第四,根据公共交通的特性分析对其进行财政补贴的重要性,并对出行者在公共交通和私人交通不同出行方式选择的问题上进行博弈分析,得出对中、低收入人群而言,出行者更关心的是公交票价;而对高收入人群而言,出行者更关心的是公共交通的服务水平(包括快捷、及时、准点、舒适等)的结论,进一步揭示财政补贴对于加快城市公共交通优先发展的必要性。针对城市公共交通补贴问题,分析乘客—政府—公交企业的双重委托—代理关系,并改进政府与公交企业之间的委托—代理博弈基本模型,提出一种新的博弈模型。最后,根据改进的政府与公交企业之间的委托—代理基本博弈模型,分别建立在统包补贴、包干补贴、客运量补贴、服务及成本监督补贴这四种不同的补贴方式下具体的博弈模型,分析其补贴效果,得出包含有激励相容约束的按客运量补贴方式和在行动上建立激励合同的服务及成本监督的补贴方式效果较好的结论,并推导出合理的补贴额度以及奖惩力度系数。论文取得的主要研究成果包括:归纳总结了城市公共交通的特性、定价与补贴的理论与方法,并分析了运用博弈理论研究公交定价与补贴的科学性;研究了适合不同公交方式选择的MNL模型,对简化后的不同公交方式间博弈进行了实例分析;以公交的合作为研究对象,分析了公交之间竞争合作策略,并建立了公交合作的定价博弈模型,研究了基于惩罚函数的求解方法;量化研究了市民的出行选择支付,运用博弈的方法分析了财政补贴前后出行者的出行选择的均衡;运用委托—代理博弈理论研究了城市公共交通财政补贴的博弈模型,并针对不同的补贴方式分别建立相应的模型,对其补贴效果进行了分析。更多还原

【Abstract】 Urban public transit pricing is vital to the development of urban public transit. At the designated level of services in public transit, the partaking rate is determined by price. Thus, the price is very important to the operation and development of public transit enterprises. In response to the nationwide requirement of vigorously promote of the public transit, the price of public transit and financial subsidies should be concerned about to determine the suitable price and government subsidies.Firstly, the definitions, constitutions and characteristics of urban public transit system are introduced. After that, some principles about the price of public transit are expatiated. On the basis of summarization of the pricing and subsidy principles, the game theory has been established in ticket pricing and subsidy of urban public transit.Secondly, price competitions are analyzed by using game theory. The profit influences to public transit enterprises companies and other participants are also explained by pricing strategies. Subsequently, some non-cooperative pricing game models are built in this paper. The subway system and buses with same origination and destination are taken as the example to verify the reasonableness of the model, from which the equilibrium price is calculated.Thirdly, for different modes and different transit enterprises in urban public transit system, the paper uses the game theory to analyze their competitive pricing strategy of cooperation. Furthermore, the paper put forward a non-cooperative transfer model, which some examples are analyzed in game theory. For the cooperative transfer, a Stackelberg game model is established, which mainly concern about the fare ranges.Fourthly, according to the characteristics of public transport, the importance of financial subsidies is aroused. So, some game analyses about mode choice of public or private transit are tested, from which the following conclusion are: mid or low-income groups are concerned about the price; but the high-income groups are more concerned about the level of service of public transit. These conclusions reveal the importance of financial subsidies to the rapid development of urban public transit. For the problem of urban public transit subsidies, the double principal - agent relationships between passengers, the Government and public transport enterprise are analyzed. Besides, a new game model is proposed, which modified the basic principal - agent game model with government and transit companies. Finally, according to the modified principal - agent game model four game models are proposed based on whole subsidy, lump subsidy, passenger volume subsidy and service & cost supervision subsidy. After that, the result of these four subsidy policies are analyzed, it can be found that the passenger volume subsidy with consistent stimulus constraint and service & cost supervision subsidy based on stimulated contract have better results, leading thereby to the reasonable subsidies level and coefficient of rewards and punishment strength.The following are the main conclusions of this dissertation:(1) Summarized the urban transit’s characteristics, pricing and subsidy theory and methodology, and researched the reasonability of game models of pricing and subsidy in urban transit;(2) Researched the MNL model which suitable for multiple transit modes, and use the actual data to test the model in different transit modes;(3) Analyzed the cooperative competition strategies, established the cooperative pricing game model and researched the algorithm of punishment function for public transit’s cooperation;(4) Determined the travel avail choice model quantitatively, analyzed the equilibrium of mode choice with or without financial subsidies using the game methods;(5) Researched the urban public transit financial subsidies’ game model using principal-agent theory, established some models under the different circumstances, and analyzed the subsidy results under these models.更多还原