【作者】 夏志豪；

【导师】 王卫国；

【作者基本信息】 中国政法大学 ， 民商法学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 在专利技术逐步朝标准化方向发展之下,3G技术相关标准(简称3G标准)在中国之实施,因其巨大的利益冲突,导致中国政府、电信运营商和相关参与者、国外掌握3G核心技术之跨国公司及中国电信市场消费者相互之间利益分配的失衡,成为需要被解决的重要议题。其中,在3G标准与专利权保护机制的冲突,和专利使用者无其它选择性的支付专利许可费等两部分,出现明显的争议,核心即是在特定的市场或行业中,如电信市场,当政府指定采用某些技术,并成为行业标准时,对既存的知识产权保护制度即形成严峻的挑战,需要以其它的途径或措施取代既存法律体系对知识产权的保护。从过去实证的文献观察发现,在特殊市场之中,为了兼顾运行效益和竞争效率的考虑,政府藉由政策引导,甚至强制性地规定行业运行规则或标准的制定,乃是市场能否成功运行的关键。从电信行业中的参与者角度观察,当由国资委所控股之中国移动或中国联通在政策的指导下,采用WCDMA或CDMA2000为3G运行的标准时,行业中的参与者,如基础设施提供商所提供的机站、手机与终端设备制造商、增值业务服务商等,都必然的将依其所涉及的相关业务,支付可观的许可费给特定的相关专利所有权人。而电信是一个典型的寡占市场,任何业者只要进入此行业,就必须依现行知识产权的保护机制,无其它选择性的支付相关的专利费,自然也就大幅提高企业经营成本,这就存在着明显不合理之处。另一方面,从专利所有权人的立场,在取得专利权之前已投入非常大量之时间、人力与金钱,当专利被使用时,自然应向使用者索取补偿;同时,从市场机制角度观察,为鼓励新技术与市场发展,有效且完整的知识产权保护是极为重要之机制因此,二者之间,从本身发展观之,均属合理,却又存在一定程度上的矛盾,需要一定程度的解决与调整。只是若以关键设施理论为基础来解决此类争议时,将可以发现此理论之重心在于纳入标准后的专利,是否完全符合理论的特定要件,以成为关键设施,倘若符合要件,则再以强制许可的方式,开放此专利供业界使用。但这样的论述,未能从根本性解决争议,而只是针对涉及严格定义下的“关键设施”提出部分解决方案,同时,由使用者自行协商并支付专利费的方式,也未必适用于在政府指定行业标准后,特殊环境之下所引发之冲突。本文认为,基于知识产权本属私权之一部分,当然应予以保护,只是当知识产权被纳入政府所指定的行业标准后,将动态的向公共性、公益性倾斜,因而产生公权与私权上的冲突。所以本文引用利益平衡理论为基础,以说明当知识产权符合本文所提出之要件时,即不应受既存知识产权体系的保护,而应以利益平衡理论所阐明之原则,对知识产权所有人与使用者,分别公平地采取相应的措施,求取公权和私权在价值取舍上、法律体系中,到具体方案裹等三个层次的平衡,以有效解决上述争议。而在3G专利技术之许可费的支付上,实行由政府来支付费,并对专利权使用者合理的收费,达到实质上的利益平衡,以促进全社会的和谐。为此,本文分为六个部分对上述问题予以阐释。第一章着重阐述了3G标准问题之由来与争议的实质,并指出,从利益的角度审视3G标准议题,其症结在于知识产权之保护与非自愿性专利费支付之间的冲突,而从知识产权保护角度而言,3G标准中的专利技术之保护与否问题,成为解开3G标准制定中最大争议的关键。第二章分析中国电信市场、技术标准与专利之联动关系。发现中国之电信市场具有厂商数目少、市场寡占、自由进出困难、价格垄断、竞争不强、高技术性等特点,这些特点所形成之行业环境是指定3G标准的制定过程中,必须考虑的市场因素;并进一步探讨“公共性”乃是标准之主要特征与本质,同时将知识产权中的独占性特征与标准之公共性特征予以对比分析,在3G标准框架下,技术性特点具有决定意义,关系电信行业的成功发展,以技术性特点为核心所形成之标准、专利技术保护、利益分配三者之融合与协调问题,乃是3G标准中之核心争议。第三章探讨了标准之获取方式不同所产生之差异与权衡问题,在不同的标准产生方式中,3G标准在政策指导下产生,进而促使中国政府在3G执照许可使用费之谈判中的积极斡旋与参与具有高度积极意义。但另一方面,其指定中国的电信运营商采用特定3G标准时,却让其它电信行业的参与者无其它选择性的支付专利许可使用费之行为,与市场自由选择之价值目标不符。第四章就标准与知识产权保护之调整与需要,指出在标准制定与适用上,中国3G标准制定乃是知识产权保护机制中明显的争议点,因为电信行业是典型的寡头垄断性市场,电信行业之运营商、技术掌控者为独占、寡占事业,电信产业链之利益群体巨大,当利益分配不均衡,或知识产权保护也因其自身界限,而不易融入标准之中时,即形成标准之公共性与知识产权的垄断性的冲突,只是3G标准争议之解决在无成例可鉴之情形下,便不适合以既存的知识产权体系,对标准中的知识产权予以保护,即使部分学者以关键设施理论为基础以调整各方利益,或采用强制许可的方式,开放专利权以供市场其它参与者来使用其专利,但仍有其适用范围与要件上之缺憾。因此,制定3G标准问题之解决就要寻求更完善的方法,以求取各方利益之平衡。本章进一步指出,当市场某一行业之技术标准,在由政府指定之后,政府应该积极实行不同于既存的知识产权保护机制予以解决,以平衡多方利益之公平分配。第五章提出对于政府指定标准与知识产权的平衡保护,可以引用利益平衡理论作为解决3G标准制定与适用上争议的基础。以利益平衡理论为原则,当专利融入标准体系后,进而提出在3G标准中专利技术之许可费之支付上,可由政府来支付,这是对专利权人在我国电信市场之有效参与予以制度或政策上之保护,也公平地对待电信行业中的参与者,乃至保障社会大众的权益,并且还可以平衡各方利益之分配。也就是在政府指定3G标准下运行的中国电信市场环境中,标准中之专利权利不应受既存的知识产权体系之保护,将开放给各方业者合理使用,同时由政府合理支付专利许可的使用费,对专利所有权人进行补偿,以鼓励其持续创新,更进一步的提出以此论述中各要件所组成的法律架构,不仅适用于3G标准制定政策之中,亦可以就本文所引用的利益平衡理论为基础,延伸引用于其它行业、市场的知识产权保护机制之中。在结论部分,本文认为,在政府指定3G标准以及该标准中,知识产权虽然已经赋予我国法律制度框架内之保护,但是在3G标准中专利技术之许可费用之支付上,若由政府来付费,是对专利权人对我国市场之有效参与予以制度或法律上之保护,亦将能够平衡且合理的分配公有与私有在知识产权中的利益,进而使得3G标准中因专利技术受法律制度保护所导致之问题,也得到有效解决,同时也可以符合各方利益平衡之要求。从而在事实上与法律上既解决问题,又为将来相似问题之解决提供借鉴之蓝本。至于对3G标准中其它课题之研究,需中国政府及电信市场中的各个主体积极参与,以平息相关争议,同时促进3G标准的制定与适用上更为完善。而就相似标准制定与知识产权之间的争议之解决,则可以上述架构为基础,进行深入探讨与分析,谋求真正解决之路径,本文所阐释之机制与原则也可以延伸,更进一步的作为知识产权保护体系的一个重要环节。更多还原

【Abstract】 Under the evolution towards standardization of patented technologies, and the current efforts in China to standardize the technologies related to 3G standards("3G standard"),a critical topic that needs to be addressed is the conflict of interests,and the resulting imbalance in profit distribution, between the Chinese govemment,telecommunications operators and affiliated participants,foreign and multinational corporations that hold the core patents,and the telecommunications consumers in China.The two most contentious issues are the conflicts between standardization and patent protection mechanism,and the lack of alternatives for the patent users who must pay royalties.Central to the issues is the need for means or regulations to supplement existing intellectual property("IP")protection mechanisms to resolve the challenges to the system when a govemment designates certain technologies to be part of the standards for specific industries like telecommunications.From research of past cases and publications,the key to the success of certain industries and markets often hinges on the government’s policies, in the name of promoting operating efficiencies as well as competition, to guide,even force,operating rules or standards.Taking the perspective of the mobile telecommunications industry,when either one of the State-Owned operators,China Mobile or China Unicorn,adopts WCDMA, CDMA2000 or TD-SCDMA as the standard for 3G operations,under the guidance of policies,all participants in the industry,like infrastructure, base station,and handset equipment supplier,will have to pay significant amount of royalties to patent holders.But,the obvious absurdity lies in a oligopoly,like the telecommunications industry;any participant,once enters the industry,must,based on existing IP protection mechanism and without any alternative,pay huge sums of royalties and significantly increases it operating costs.On the other hand,taking the perspective of the patent holders,it is natural to demand royalty payments from users after tremendous amount of time,human resources,and money invested in obtaining a patent.At the same time,to encourage research and development of new technologies,effective and comprehensive IP protection is crucial.Therefore,both views are reasonable from its own perspective but there also exists a certain degree of conflict that requires adjustment and resolution.When trying to resolve the issue purely based on "Essential Facilities Doctrine",a discovery was soon made that this doctrine focuses more on compliance of patents after being adopted into standards to be included in essential facilities.Once compliance is assured,the doctrine involuntarily opens the patent for use by the industry.This only addresses partially the strict definition of "essential facilities" but fails to address the root cause of the issue.This is also not necessarily the fight solution to resolve the conflict of individual entities having to negotiate royalty payments based on government’s mandate.The view of this thesis is that,the conflict is caused by government mandate,which tilts the dynamic balance towards Publicity and Public Interest,even though the protection of IP,which is part of the private property domain,is necessary.And when IP rights meet the necessary conditions of this thesis,the balance of interest doctrine should be applied, and such IP rights should no longer be protected by existing IP protection mechanism.The balance of interest doctrine seeks to fairly address the balance between the interest of the IP owner and the IP user from the perspectives of legal,public vs.private property rights,and the specific case at hand.In the case of 3G standards,the government should be responsible for paying the royalties and charge the users reasonable fees in order to achieve the balance of interest and societal harmony.To further elaborate this view,this thesis is divided into the following six parts.Chapter one discusses the origins of the contentions on 3G standards. It stipulates that,from a pure interest point of view,the problem lies within the conflicts of IP protection and involuntary payment of royalties. It further stipulates that,from an IP protection point of view,the most serious contention is whether to offer IP protection to those patented technologies in 3G standard.Chapter two analyzes relationships between the China telecommunications market,technology standards,and patents.The market is characterized by limited number of players,oligopoly,high entry barriers,monopolistic pricing power,weak competition,and high technology content.These characteristics must be taken into account during the 3G standardization effort.We then analyze and compare between "openness",a key characteristic of a standard,and the exclusive nature of IP.Within the 3G standard framework,the merging of and coordination between technology,patent protection,and interest distribution is at the core of all contentions.Chapter three discusses the differences and factors in how a standard gets established.3G standard was established under policy guidance,and it gave the government a special role in royalty negotiations.On the other hand,the imposed standard onto all telecommunications participants goes against free-market principles.Chapter four focuses on the need to adjust IP protection for standardization based on the argument that the conflict between openness and the monopolistic power of IP protection in an oligopolistic market like telecommunications with long and capital-intensive supply chain.There is no legal precedence of similar scale when it comes to the 3G standard and thus any imbalance in interest distribution can not be resolved from existing IP doctrine.The resolution,which includes involuntary release patent from IP protection mechanisms as proposed by scholars who base their arguments on essential facilities doctrine,has major weaknesses. Therefore,this calls for a new approach that advocates an active role by the government,after establishing standard,in implementing a IP protection mechanism that is different from existing ones to achieve the proper,and fair,balance among all parties involved in 3G standard.Chapter five proposes that the balance of interest doctrine can be applied to the issue of balancing standard by govemment mandate and IP protection.It further proposes that the government,after selecting the set of patents to be included in the standard,also pays the respective royalties as a means to not only protect the patent holders,offer fair treatment to all industry participants,ensure public interest,but also,in the process, properly balances the interest for all parties.It also means that the patents in the 3G standard are not subject to the protection under existing IP protection mechanisms,are open to reasonable use by the participants, with royalties paid by the government as a way to compensate and to encourage continued innovation.It further proposes that the same approach,based on this legal framework,can be extended into the IP protection mechanisms of other industries.The thesis concludes that,even though China has already established legal protection of IP,but in mandating 3G standard,the most effective way to balance IP protection,distribute interest reasonably,and resolve other legal issues stemming from existing IP protection mechanisms,is to make the government liable for paying the royalties.Not only this resolves all the legal and implementation issues,it also offers a blueprint to resolve similar cases in the future.Through active participation by the government and all telecommunications industry entities other issues involving the 3G standard can be properly addressed and perfected.But the contentious issue of IP rights can be investigated and analyzed based on the proposed framework of this thesis so that a true solution can be found.And the mechanisms and principles of this thesis can be extended further as a key element in IP protection.更多还原