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论公司债信用风险的法律控制

Legal Control of Corporate Bond’s Credit Risk

【作者】 周慧

【导师】 符启林;

【作者基本信息】 中国政法大学 , 经济法学, 2008, 博士

【摘要】 发行公司债是发达国家公司融通资金的重要方式,而在我国,公司债券市场的发展却远滞后于股票市场。政府出于对信用风险的担心,长期以来一直没有放开公司债券市场,究其根源与风险控制制度的缺失不无关系。有效的制度构建需要充分的理论支持,然而迄今为止,国内对公司债的风险控制与监管的研究整体上还处于起步阶段。尝试对公司债的风险控制问题进行深入的法学分析和研究,无论对于公司债的立法、司法还是公司债券市场的建立与健全,应该都有一定的积极意义。不同于现有研究思路的是,本文尝试以公司债的信用风险为研究对象,对公司债券市场的法律控制制度进行剖析。通过对控制权配置、债券投资者保护和风险监管法律制度的分析,本文提出如下观点:公司债的信用风险是必然存在的,但是有效的法律控制制度可以防范、降低和化解信用风险,从而促进公司债券市场的良性发展。为达成对上述观点的论证,本文将主体部分框架安排如下:第一章,“法律视野中的公司债信用风险”。本章是全文的立论基础,主要完成对公司债信用风险的理论梳理和说明。本文认为,公司债的信用风险是指,发债公司不愿或无力履行债券信托契约构成违约,或者是公司的信用评级、财务状况变动或履约能力变化导致公司债的市场价值变动,致使公司债投资者遭受损失的可能性。关于公司债信用风险的产生根源,产权理论、交易成本理论、信息经济学理论、不完备契约理论、心理预期理论都从各自的视角进行了解释,而这些理论也为本文以下的分析奠定了基础。公司债信用风险控制上的严重滞后引发了一系列的现实问题,涉及债券市场、投资者、公司和政府等等。法律之所以关注公司债的信用风险,目的在于控制、降低及化解公司债的信用风险,保障投资者利益,促进公司债券市场发展。第二章,“控制权的配置与公司债信用风险的法律控制”。本章首先提出,公司债信用风险中最为核心的问题是公司的控制机制存在巨大漏洞。控制权的有效配置将会提升公司的经营绩效和履约能力,在提高公司质量的同时从根本上提高了公司债券的质量,进而降低公司债的信用风险。本章从控制股东、经营者和公司债持有人三个层次对公司控制权的配置进行了分析:在股权集中的公司当中,控制股东垄断公司各种控制权,其权力滥用威胁到公司的偿债能力,因此有必要通过控制股东的信义义务和股权制衡对此进行限制;自从现代公司制度建立以来,公司所有权与控制权分离所造成的一个直接结果就是经营者控制,公司经营者也往往会利用手中的控制权侵蚀公司利益而为个人牟利,对其课以信义义务,可以防范和制约公司经营者的道德风险;公司债持有人对公司的控制权则体现于企业处于破产状态之时,在法律上,这表现为一套包括破产和解、重整和清算在内的债券持有人控制权的行使机制。第三章,“传统视角的检讨与公司债信用风险的法律控制”。本章关注的焦点是债券投资者保护。在提出传统的法律设计对于公司债信用风险的控制而言有明显缺陷后,本章对相关法律制度的演进与修正进行了分析。公司债市场主体以及市场环境的变化往往会削弱担保的效果,一概的强制性担保带来的弊端要远甚于其好处。现代法律的发展是取消了强制设定公司债担保的规定,并赋予担保更多的弹性。公司债持有人的分散性和流动性决定了以其个人力量难与发行公司抗衡,因而有必要创设可以使公司债券持有人采取集体行动的法律制度,即公司债券持有人会议和公司债券受托人制度。基于契约保护的强调,确定债券信托契约的内容、解释债券信托契约就成为了公司债信用风险控制的重要法律问题,这就要求法院的积极介入并在债券信托契约的解释中发挥更大的作用。股东的有限责任往往是股东机会主义的护身符,因此可能导致公司债信用风险的增加和债权人保护的真空。在一定的条件下,需要揭开公司面纱,寻求实现债权的特殊途径。传统公司法下,董事仅对公司本身负有信义义务,依照平衡各利益主体利益的精神,强化董事对于公司债持有人的责任成为现代公司法发展的一种趋势。第四章,“自由、管制的平衡与公司债信用风险的法律控制”。伴随着公司债券市场自由化而来是公司债信用风险的加大,如何在防范风险的同时优化效率和资源配置,成为世界各国监管部门面临的重要课题。通过对古典自由契约原则、卖方注意理论、公司债券市场失灵、政府管制的讨论,本章得出,完善风险监管法律制度能够更好地防范信用风险,使公司债券市场更有效更自由,是平衡管制与自由的有效手段。各国公司债券市场监管法律制度的变迁史,恰恰反映出不同时期和不同背景之下监管的放松或加强。接下来,本章重点分析了对公司债发行、信息披露以及信用评级的法律监管。对风险的过度恐惧导致了过于严厉的发行管制和萎靡的市场,适当的放松管制将有助于公司债券市场的发展。法律在赋予公司债券市场更大空间的同时,必须强化信息披露,保证信用评级的独立与公正。通过信息披露和信用评级来揭示风险,帮助投资者规避风险,促使发债公司改善公司治理结构,提高监管的效率,最终实现公司债券市场的发展和繁荣。

【Abstract】 Issuance of corporate bond is one of the most important finance method in developed countries. While in China, the development of the corporate bond market is far behind the stock market. Worried about the credit risk, the governments took strict restriction on the corporate bond market. To settle this problem needs the construction of an effective risk control system. But so far, the research on this topic in domestic is still at the starting stage. As a result, the attempt to analyze and study on the legal control of bond’s credit risk should have certain positive effect.Different from the current research, this dissertation puts forward the following points that corporate bond’s credit risk is bound to exist, but an effective legal control mechanism can prevent, reduce and ease credit risk, so as to promote the healthy development of the corporate bond market. To achieve the above perspective, this paper is divided into four chapters.Chapter One introduces the fundamental theory and social practice of corporate bond’s credit risk. By describing the concept, origin and characteristic of corporate bond’s credit risk as well as the present situation of China, this chapter explains why the law pays attention to it and provides theoretical and practical background for further analysis. And the next three chapters focus on proposing specific regulation to the corporate bond’s credit risk.Chapter Two discusses the distribution of controlling power in corporate. As this chapter proved, the effective distribution of controlling power will promote corporate’s operating performance and management achievements, improve the corporate quality at the same time improve the bond quality, and fundamentally reduce the credit risk control in corporate. In those corporates with concentration of shares, the controlling shareholders attempt to abuse their power. So it is nessecery to require the controlling shareholder bear the fiduciary duty towards the corporate. Since the establishment of the modern corporate system, management control is a direct result of the separation of the ownership and control of the corporate. The directors and the officers often seek personal profit at the price of corporate’s interests. In order to prevent moral hazard, the management is obligated to assume ficiary duty. The bondholders can exercise controlling power in case that the enterprise is in a state of bankruptcy, through the mechanism of reconciliation, restructuring and liquidation.Chapter Three deals with legal protection to corporate bondholders. The traditional legal rules have obvious flaws in terms of control of credit risk. Limited liability of shareholders is likely to increase credit risk. Therefore, under specific conditions, the bondholders can lift the corporate’s veil and request the shareholders to undertake the responsibilities. In order to balance different interests in the corporate, strengthen the director’s responsibility becomes a trend of the development of modern corporate law. Mandatory security will bring far more harms to the bond market than benefits. The development of modern law is to abolish the compulsive security set on bonds, and at the same time give the security more flexibility. The bondholders may feel helpless under the narrow protection of contract law. For this reason, it is necessary to create an legal system for collective action. The emphasis on the protection under the indenture calls for an active involvement of the Court during the interpretation of the indenture.Chapter Four analyzes the legal system of risk supervision. How to prevent credit risks and at the same time optimize the efficiency and distribution of resources? This is the same problem that regulatory agencies of many countries are facing with the acceleration of liberalization of bond market and the increase of risk. On one hand, the government should relax regulation of bond issuance. On the other hand, the government must strengthen the disclosure of information and guarantee the independence and impartiality of credit rating.

  • 【分类号】D922.287
  • 【被引频次】8
  • 【下载频次】749
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