论控制股东滥用控制权行为的法律规制

【作者】 范世乾；

【导师】 徐晓松；

【作者基本信息】 中国政法大学 ， 经济法， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 本文的基本命题是:控制股东滥用控制权行为的法律规制的基本框架应该是原则性规定与具体规范相结合。首先,控制股东行为的原则性规定应该适用诚实信用原则,而不能是信义义务原则;其次,应该围绕诚实信用原则,结合中国的实际情况对控制股东侵害少数股东利益行为的典型形式规定具体化的规则。在规制之中,我们应该考虑中国国有控制股东的特殊之处,并且研究控制股东义务的权利主体对诉讼形式的选择以及权利主体的模糊与权利形式的融合问题,同时明确对控制股东滥用控制权的救济方式。首先,为了建立完善的控制股东滥用控制权行为的法律规制体系,应该明确规定控制股东对非控制股东承担义务的原则——诚实信用原则。当前中国学者基本上认为有关控制股东义务制度方面,中国应该引入信义义务原则,尤其认为这是解决中国上市公司中控制股东滥用控制权侵害上市公司和少数股东的良方,甚至有学者对中国证券法的修订中没有明确规定控制股东应该承担信义义务而感到遗憾。但笔者认为这一观点值得商榷。有关控制股东义务的原则性规定,在世界范围内主要有以下几种立法模式:美国普通法上的信义义务原则、美国成文法上的股东压迫原则、英国成文法上的不公平侵害原则、因公平和正义而解散公司原则、Foss规则的例外、德国的诚实信用原则等。因此,中国未来立法应该从更广阔的世界范围的角度来分析和探讨自身应该借鉴的规则。在美国,对控制股东滥用控制权行为的限制最早是采用从英国移植过来的股东压迫规则。而信义义务原则是不存在股东压迫规则的州的美国法官为了救济受到侵害的少数股东而创造的规则,它产生的背景是信义义务适用范围飞速扩展的时期,而且更多是为了救济而引发的。从本质上来看,信义义务并不适合股东之间的关系,早期法院在创造该项规则时所阐述的封闭式公司与合伙之间的相似性是封闭式公司股东承担信义义务的理由也并不准确,实际上合伙与公司之间还是区别大于类似之处的。控制股东信义义务规则的发展也印证了笔者的观点。在现代,美国法官在使用信义义务原则时将其等同于股东压迫,因此实际上信义义务规则已经完全“变质”,空有外壳而毫无实际内容。美国法官之所以仍然使用这一表述,更多是因为路径依赖和表述上的习惯。而美国成文法上的股东压迫原则、英国成文法上的不公平侵害原则、因公平和正义而解散公司原则、Foss规则的例外、德国的诚实信用原则等,都是成文法上的原则,实际上都可以作为中国立法所借鉴的目标。但是,由于英美法系不注重法律体系的完备,因此美国成文法上的股东压迫原则、英国成文法上的不公平侵害原则、因公平和正义而解散公司原则、Foss规则的例外等是一些竞合性的原则。而唯独诚实信用原则是一项单一的原则,再加上中国立法一直采用大陆法系传统,诚实信用原则也早就在《民法通则》中做出过规定。因此,从使用上来看,这一原则更为司法界所熟悉。而如果使用股东压迫、不公平侵害等术语,则必须对这些术语进行解释,而且也不容易融入到现有的法律体系之中。综上,笔者建议未来中国立法采用诚实信用原则。其次,在具体规则的设计上,为了加强法律的可操作性,应该尽量针对常见的控制股东侵害少数股东的行为做出具体规定,防止法官在处理案件时自由裁量权过大,保证法律的严肃性和连贯性。笔者认为,控制股东侵害少数股东的典型行为包括解除少数股东雇佣、关联交易、控制权转让、挤出合并、表决权的变化、拒绝宣告盈余、破产、自愿解散等。再次,在规制之中,我们应该考虑中国国有控制股东的特殊之处。中国是国有经济占主导地位的社会主义国家,论述控制股东义务这一话题就不得不研究国有控制股东。在本文中,笔者将分析国有控制股东与私人控制股东和法人控制股东的义务是否存在区别。笔者认为,在企业集团中,承认企业集团的整体利益可以更好的实现集约化经营,符合经济发展的规律,因此可以承认法人控制股东为了企业集团的整体利益,在一定程度上做出损害子公司利益的行为的合理性,因此,我们应该承认法人控制股东与自然人控制股东义务是不同的。至于国有控制股东,可以允许其在一定条件下追求社会公共利益,同时,在关联交易的认定上也应该适用特殊的规则,即国有公司之间进行的交易不一定是关联交易,而国家控股的企业之间不能仅因为同受国家控股而具有关联关系。最后,我们应该明确控制股东义务的不同权利主体和与之相对应的诉讼形式,以及权利主体的模糊与诉讼形式的融合问题,并明确对控制股东滥用控制权的救济方式。如果控制股东主要侵害的是公司的利益,其他股东只是间接地受到了侵害,则公司应该作为诉讼的原告,其他股东只能通过派生诉讼来寻求救济。而如果控制股东主要侵害的是其他股东,则其他股东可以作为原告向法院提起直接诉讼。在封闭式公司中,如果不存在多重诉讼的风险,也不存在侵害公司债权人利益的可能,并且不会影响其他股东寻求救济的份额,则法院为了方便诉讼,可以允许将只能通过派生诉讼提起的案件通过直接诉讼的方式来进行审理,这就是与控制股东义务的权利主体的模糊相对应的诉讼形式的融合问题。对于控制股东侵害少数股东利益的行为,法官可以授予其认为合适的一切救济形式,包括但不限于解散公司;开除;买出;履行、禁止、改变或取消公司的行为或者其股东、董事、管理者的行为或任何行动中的当事人的行为;取消或改变公司章程大纲或章程细则中的任何条款;免除董事或管理者职务;任命董事或管理者;对争议的事项进行账目清理;任命管理人(custodian)来管理经营和公司事务;任命临时董事(享有正当选举的董事所具有的权利、权力和职责,期限和条件由法院来规定):分配盈余;授予损害赔偿。围绕上述主题,笔者对文章的结构做出如下安排:本文除绪论和结论以外,包括五章。第一章介绍了中国控制股东滥用控制权行为的法律规制的基本框架。这是文章的总论部分,提出了本章的基本主题。在本部分中,笔者首先介绍了中国控制股东滥用控制权的现状,并进而分析了现行法律对控制股东行为的规范及其存在的问题。随后,笔者论证了控制股东滥用控制权行为的法律规制的移植中需要考虑的因素。最后,基于上述的分析笔者得出中国对于控制股东行为的法律规范体系应该采用何种框架的结论。从第二章开始,笔者具体论证控制股东行为的法律规范体系的基本框架。第二章和第三章论述法律规范体系中的基本原则,第四章论述法律规范体系中的具体规定,而第五章则分析控制股东违反义务行为的诉讼和救济方式,这些内容构成完整的控制股东滥用控制权行为的法律规制的框架。更多还原

【Abstract】 The dissertation is based on such a fundamental proposition that the legal regimes regarding controlling shareholders’ liability should include principle rules and concrete norms.Firstly,the principle of good faith rather than fiduciary duty should be adopted as the general principle relevant to controlling shareholders’ liabilities.Secondly,specific rules should be established according to China’s current situation in order to restrict controlling shareholders’ behavior which is unfavorable to minority shareholders.The special characters of controlling shareholders in China should be considered,and the research concerning to whom controlling shareholder’s duty is owned as well as the amalgamation of direct action and derivative action should be carried on.Furthermore, relieves for minority shareholders against breach of majority shareholder’s liabilities should be stipulated.In the first place,to establish an advanced legal regime regarding controlling shareholders’ obligations,State must demonstrably enact the principle of good faith.Currently,most Chinese scholars insist that the principle of controlling shareholders’fiduciary duty should be adopted to regulate controlling shareholders’liabilities,and emphasize that this principle is particularly an effective prescription for resolving the issue of behavior of abuse by controlling shareholders of listed corporations,some scholars even claim that it is regretful that there is no rule of controlling shareholders’ fiduciary duty under the Securities Act of 2005.However,I opposes to this opinion.Generally,there are all together six legislative models in the world concerning principle of controlling shareholders’ liability,namely the following ones——the principle of fiduciary duty under common law in the US,the principle of shareholder oppression under statute law in the US,the principle of unfair prejudice under statute law of the United Kingdom,rule of just and equitable winding up under statute law of the United Kingdom,the exceptions to the rule set up in Foss v.Harbottle under statute law of the United Kingdom,and the principle of good faith under statute law in Germany.China should choose among all these principles the best suitable one to transplant after considering the circumstances.In the United States,the regulations of shareholder oppression for restricting controlling shareholder’s behavior was transplanted from the Great Kingdom.Fiduciary duty was introduced by judges of the states which did not have the rule of shareholder oppression to relieve those minority shareholders having been infringed by controlling shareholders’ behavior,thus was relief-oriented when then fiduciary duty was spreading fast and becoming a fashionable vocabulary. In essence,fiduciary duty does not suit the relationship of shareholders, so the opinion that the relationship of shareholders in a close corporation is similar to that of a partnership is not accurate.In fact,there are more differences than similarities between these two kinds of enterprises, which demonstrated by the development of rule of controlling shareholder’s fiduciary duty.Nowadays,the US judges equate the principle of controlling shareholder’s fiduciary duty to that of shareholder oppression when applying it,thus the principle of controlling shareholder’s fiduciary duty has been exuviated to be a mere shell without any practical contents.The reason why the US judges stick to this term is mostly because of path dependence and custom in expression. Except fiduciary duty,other rules,such as rule of shareholder oppression in the US,rule of unfair prejudice in the United Kingdom,rule of just and equitable winding up in the United Kingdom,rule of exceptions to the rule in Foss v.Harbottle in the United Kingdom,rule of good faith in Germany are all statutory rules,and can be the object for China to transplant from.But,due to less attention to consistency of legal system, rule of shareholder oppression in the US,rule of unfair prejudice in the United Kingdom,rule of just and equitable winding up in the United Kingdom,rule of exceptions to the rule in Foss v.Harbottle in the United Kingdom are competing principles except the principle of good faith which is an solo one.Moreover,China has been adhering to the statutory law system,and principle of good faith has already been adopted under General Principles of Civil Law.Therefore,this term is both familiar to jurists and convenient to apply.To sum up,I firmly proposes that the principle of good faith should be adopted under The Corporation Law.In the second place,during the process of putting paper rules into action,the state should do its best to embody rules as specific as possible on controlling shareholder’s acts,so as to improve the application of legal rules and to restrict the discretion of judges in verdicting actions about controlling shareholder’s abusing of rights.In my opinion,the aforementioned typical types of controlling shareholder’s infringing minority shareholder include dismissing minority shareholder from being director or officer,related transaction,combination to squeeze out(or freeze out)minority shareholder,diversification of voting rights,rejecting to declare surplus,pushing corporation into the situation of bankruptcy, voluntary dissolution and so on.In the third place,the special characters of controlling shareholders in China should be considered.China is a socialist country with national economy occupying dominant status,thus the issue of the duties of controlling shareholders of state-owned companies should be taken into consideration.In this dissertation,I want to analyze whether there are any differences between the duties of controlling shareholder of sate-owned corporations and those of private-owned corporations.I endeavor to say that in corporate groups,we should accept the group’s separate interests from its members corporations to improve the whole group’s economic profit.Thus,to some extent,it can be considered as reasonable if the controlling shareholder’ behavior,which damages the interests of the subsidiary companies,is to seek the whole group’s interest.As far as concerning controlling shareholder of state-owned corporations,they can be exempted from duties if their behavior is for pursuing profit maximization and seeking maximization of the public interest.They can also be exempted from duties in certain circumstances in related transactions.Finally,the state must definitely constitute rules about forms of action, namely direct action or derivative action,and regulate the amalgamation of action forms as well as relief ways.Generally,where the controlling shareholder damages the interest of the corporation directly,the corporation is the appropriate plaintiff,while where the controlling shareholder damages the minority shareholder directly,the minority shareholder is the appropriate plaintiff.However,in the case of a closely held corporation,the court in its discretion may consider an action raising derivative claims as a direct action,exempt it from those restrictions and defenses applicable only to derivative actions,and order an individual recovery,if it finds that to do so will not(ⅰ) unfairly expose the corporation or the defendants to a multiplicity of actions(multiple actions),(ⅱ) materially prejudice the interests of creditors of the corporation,or(ⅲ) interfere with a fair distribution of the recovery among all interested persons.As for the behavior of controlling shareholder’s abusing of rights,the court can grant any relief that it thinks fit,including but not being limited to dissolution of corporations, expulsion,buy-out,to appoint a custodian,to appoint a provisional director,or to order a sale of one shareholder’s stock to the other shareholders to declare dividend and grant compensation.As far as all above concerned,the article is arranged as followings:This dissertation is composed of five chapters besides the prolegomenon and the conclusion.The first chapter is mainly about the legal regime regarding controlling shareholder’s liability in China.In this chapter,I firstly introduce the current situation of the behavior of abuse by controlling shareholders and analyze current rules concerning controlling sharehoders’behavior.Then,I conclude which frame China should establish in legal system of controlling shareholders’ liability on the basis of above analysis.From the second chapter on,I recommend specifically the particular issues of legal system about controlling shareholders’ liability.The general principle is discussed in the second and the third chapter,and the specific rules is discussed in the forth chapter.In the fifth chapter,the method of actions and relief modes will be discussed.All these five chapters constitute the complete legal structure of controlling shareholders’ behavior.更多还原