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德沃金与法律的解释理论

Dworkin and the Interpretive Theory of Law

【作者】 马得华

【导师】 徐显明;

【作者基本信息】 中国政法大学 , 法学理论, 2008, 博士

【摘要】 如何理解法律、如何理解法律理论,是法律理论的元问题。论文选择德沃金的法律解释理论作为切入点,检讨了20世纪后半期影响英美法理学发展的哈特-德沃金论战,断定这一论战的核心问题就是如何理解法律、如何理解法律理论的问题,并评价了他们针对这些问题的回答。哈特、德沃金有关法律是什么的理论,可以转化为有关法律命题的根据或者法律命题的真值条件是什么的问题。以哈特为代表的法律实证主义将这一根据视为简明的事实问题——法律命题的根据取决于某个历史事实,从而只存在关于某个法律命题是否符合法律根据的经验争论。除非律师和法官共享某个历史事实作为法律根据,否则他们不可能展开有意义的争论。这一理论的缺点在于不能说明法律实践中普遍存在的针对法律命题之根据的理论争论。实证主义之所以接受简明事实观点的深层原因,在于假定法律是一个标准性概念,即:在使用任何概念的时候,我们都遵循共享的规则,这些规则设定了正确使用概念的标准。由于标准性概念不能说明人们针对某一概念之适用标准的争论,因此,我们需要在标准性概念之外,寻找解决方案。为此,本文分别探讨了自然种类概念和解释性概念。本文主张,法律是一个解释性概念,它容许人们争论概念的适用标准。解释性概念体现了分歧之上的共识。法律作为解释性概念,要求法官和公民个人在确定法律是什么的时候,采用建构性解释的方法。这个方法要求寻找到适合过去所有案例的、并且能够提供最好的道德理由的原则,然后根据那些原则确定法律命题的真值条件。恰当的法律理论也应当采用这一建构解释的方法。为此,法律理论家应当采取参与者观点争论法律命题的意义,而不是居于法律实践之外描述法律实践是什么。哈特主张法律理论是价值中立的描述性理论,德沃金则主张法律理论是规范性理论,不存在描述性理论。本文认为,法律是一个解释性概念,只有首先确定法律存在的价值才能理解法律的概念。为此,法律理论家必须参与道德论证确定这一价值是什么。从而,法律理论不是描述性理论,而是一种规范性理论。通过梳理和评价哈特、德沃金有关法律是什么这一法律理论的元问题所展开的讨论,我们认为这一问题的核心是法律与道德的关系问题,同时也涉及到法律理论与道德的关系问题。法律是个解释性概念,容许法律实践者争论法律的价值,从而展现法律实践者的信念;法学家要真正理解法律的解释性,也必须争论法律的价值,他们提出的法律理论是一种规范性的理论。

【Abstract】 Any general legal theory must answer the important questions of what law is and what a theory of law should be. These crucial questions are firmly related. It is remarkable that the methodology of legal theory has not come to the forefront of legal theory until the Hart/Dworkin debate. This article seeks to address that topic by laying bare the basic structure of the debate.The question of what law is can be changed into the question of what the grounds of the propositions of law are. Both Hart and Dworkin explore this question. Legal positivist say that theoretical disagreement is an illusion, that layers and judges all agree about the grounds of law. They think the concept of law is a criteria concept and suppose that we can argue sensibly with another if we all accept and follow the same factual criteria.The criteria concept of law cannot account for the theoretical disagreement. So we must reject it .We believe that law is an interpretive concept instead of a criteria concept.Since law is an interpretive concept. Lawyers try to show practice in its best light, to achieve equilibrium between legal practices as they find it and the beset justification of the practice. Then they frame truth condition for propositions of law. A successful legal theory should take the constructive interpretation. The legal theorists should take up the internal, participants’ point of view instead of external point of view.Hart argued for a descriptive jurisprudence. Dworkin rejects the possibility of a descriptive jurisprudence. We believe that legal theorists should assign value and purpose to the legal practice. So, jurisprudence is not descriptive but normativeWe attempt to set out the basic subject matter of the debate. The debate is organized around two most profound issues, namely, the relation between legality and morality and the relation between legal theory and morality. Theorists must take the participants’ point of view and give a constructive account of creative interpretation. Jurisprudence must be normative in character.

  • 【分类号】D90
  • 【被引频次】6
  • 【下载频次】832
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