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法律、语言与法律的不确定性

Law, Language and Legal Indeterminacy

【作者】 邱昭继

【导师】 廖美珍;

【作者基本信息】 中国政法大学 , 法学理论, 2008, 博士

【摘要】 法律的不确定性是20世纪法律理论中的一个重要问题。法律的不确定性是指法律不能为法律纠纷提供一个正确答案。具体而言,法律的不确定性是指法律渊源、法律解释和法律推理的不确定性。法律现实主义、法律实证主义、自然法学、批评法律研究、女权主义法学、种族批判理论和法律论证理论纷纷提出了各自的不确定性(或确定性)主张。法律的不确定性理论大体上可以分为描述性理论、分析(或概念性)理论和规范性(或批评性)理论三种。描述的不确定性理论探讨司法实践中法律无法决定案件结果的实际情况。法律现实主义者的不确定性主张关注的是美国法官运用非法律因素裁决案件的实情。他们的不确定性主张是描述性主张。规范的不确定性理论不关注法律无法决定案件结果的实际情况,而是致力于改变司法审判的现状。批判法律研究、批判种族理论、女权主义法律理论和解构主义法学的不确定性主张都属于批判的不确定性主张。分析的不确定性理论从语言的性质或法律的性质出发探讨法律是否必然是确定的(或不确定的)。法律实证主义者、法律解释主义者和自然法学家的不确定性主张都是概念性主张。现代分析法学奉行的概念分析方法是探讨概念性不确定性主张的最佳方法。概念分析不仅可以指出法律实践的重要方面,还可以用来评价各种概念性理论的优劣。法律不确定性问题通常以语言的基本性质为主要议题。语言是法律发挥作用的媒介,只有理解了语言,才有可能理解法律。语言具有不确定性,而法律是用语言表达的,所以法律在特定案件中的要求经常是不确定的。语义怀疑论、概念的可辩驳性、模糊性、歧义、家族相似性、争议性、不完全性、不可通约性和翻译的不确定性是语言不确定性的渊源。但是,语言的不确定性是相对的,彻底的语言不确定性主张根本无法成立。法律的不确定性也是相对的。哈特派法律实证主义和德沃金派法律解释主义提出了法律理论中两种最主要的概念性不确定性主张。哈特从语言的开放结构着手探讨了法律的不确定问题。哈特认为,由于法律存在“开放结构”,所以法官在判决“疑难案件”时拥有自由裁量权。哈特对疑难案件的处理过于简单。法官在开放结构之处的确可以行使自由裁量权,但应当发展出一套法律论证理论来约束法官的自由裁量权。德沃金在批评哈特的裁量理论基础上提出了正确答案论题。正确答案论题宣称,所有(或者几乎所有)法律问题都有一个唯一正确的答案。德沃金认为,由于语言引起的不确定性是可以消除的。不过,德沃金正确答案论题赖以存在的解释方法没有普适性。他的解释方法没有揭示法律实践的重要特征。解释方法忽视了权威和共识在法律实践中的重要性。此外,法律的不确定性并不必然构成法治的缺陷。只要不确定的司法判决具有正确性、客观性和可预测性,不确定性就不会对自由主义法治理想构成威胁。法律的不确定性意味着法官在疑难案件中需要行使自由裁量权并创制新的法律。自由裁量权和法官造法权要求法律理论发展出一套复杂而精致的裁判理论。因此,法律不确定性问题的研究最终导向法学方法论。

【Abstract】 Legal indeterminacy is an important issue of legal theory in 20 century. Legal indeterminacy means that law can not provide unique correct answers to legal questions. In short, Legal indeterminacy includes indeterminacy of legal sources, legal interpretation and legal reasoning. Legal realism, legal positivism, natural jurisprudence, critical legal studies, feminist legal theory, critical race theory and legal argumentation respectively claim legal indeterminacy (or determinacy). A claim about legal indeterminacy could be divided roughly into three broad categories: descriptive theories, analytical or conceptual theories and normative or critical theories. Descriptive indeterminacy theories purport to state the facts that law can not determinate outcome of particular cases. Legal realist’s claims of indeterminacy concerned the facts that American judges decided cases with extra legal factors. Their claims are pure descriptive claims of indeterminacy. Normative indeterminacy theories do not concern the facts that law can not determinate legal outcomes, but purport to change current situation of judicial adjudication. The indeterminacy claims of critical legal studies, critical race theory, feminist legal theory and deconstructionist legal theory belong to critical indeterminacy theories. Conceptual indeterminacy theories explore whether law is necessarily indeterminate. Legal positivists, legal interpretivists and natural legal theorists make conceptual indeterminacy claims. Modern analytical jurisprudence tends to believe that conceptual analysis is a tenable approach to research conceptual indeterminacy claims. Conceptual analysis can not only explain what is "important" about legal practice, but also evaluate that a conceptual theory is better than an alternative.The questions of legal indeterminacy often turn on claims regarding the basic nature of language. Language is the medium through which law acts. Language is commonly indeterminate and law is expressed in language, so that the requirements of the law in particular cases are frequently indeterminate. Semantic skepticism, defeasibility, vagueness, ambiguity, family resemblances, contestability, incompleteness, incommensurability and indeterminacy of translation are sources of indeterminacy. But linguistic indeterminacy is relative, the claims of radical linguistic indeterminacy is untenable. Therefore, legal indeterminacy is relative. Haitian legal positivism and Dworkinian legal interpretivism make two main conceptual claims about indeterminacy. Hart’s claim about indeterminacy was based on a theory of the open texture of language. Hart argued that judges deciding hard cases must exercise judicial discretion because legal rules have open texture in hard cases. Hart’s discussion of hard cases was too simple. Judges deciding cases which are ’open textured’ can exercise judicial discretion. But they should develop a kind of legal argumentation to constrain judicial discretion. Dworkin rejects Hart’s argument about the need for judicial discretion in hard cases and makes right answer thesis. According to the thesis, all (or nearly all) legal questions have a unique right answer. Dworkin believed that any problems created by language could be circumvented. However, the interpretative approach of Dworkin on which right answer thesis was based could not be generally applied to other legal systems. The interpretative approach fails to discover the significance of legal practice. This approach neglects the importance of authority and the importance of consensus in legal practice. Furthermore, Legal indeterminacy is not necessarily a deficit in the rule of law. If indeterminate judicial decision is correct, objective and predictable, indeterminacy don’t threaten the ideal of liberal rule of law. Legal indeterminacy means that judges deciding hard cases must exercise judicial discretion and make fresh law. Judicial discretion and judicial legislation require legal theory to develop a kind of complicate and delicate theories of adjudication. Therefore, the research of legal indeterminacy leads to legal methodology.

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