【作者】 陈晓媛；

【导师】 蔡春；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 会计学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 审计质量一直以来都是审计领域研究的热点问题。高质量审计服务对于保证上市公司信息披露质量、提高资本市场配置效率的作用显而易见。但是,由于审计行业自身的特点,现实中审计质量低下、审计师和上市公司“共谋”的现象却屡见不鲜。例如,在震惊全球的“安然事件”中,安达信会计师事务所长期为其隐瞒亏损的事实,并在安然事件东窗事发前大量销毁相关审计资料。此后,“世界通讯”、“环球电讯”、“施乐”等愈演愈烈的财务丑闻也将当时的“五大”会计师事务所全部牵涉其中。在国内,从著名的“老三案(深圳原野、海南中水国际、长城机电)”、“新三案(琼民源、红光实业、东方锅炉)”,到“蓝田股份”、“亿安科技”、“秦丰农业”、“科龙电器”,上市公司财务丑闻陆续被曝光的同时,幕后总有一个“合谋者”的影子:大大小小的会计师事务所。类似浮出水面的财务丑闻,上市公司造假案例也清晰地呈现出“十假九同谋”的特点,屡屡上演“警察”与“大盗”沆瀣一气的丑剧。这一系列涉及审计师的财务丑闻的相继出现,使得审计质量问题变得更加引人注目。然而,国内外系列财务丑闻的出现并非偶然,暴露的问题相当多,但审计行业监管不力却是众多问题中最为突出的。如何加强对审计行业的政府监管以提高审计质量因此成为理论界和实务界共同关注的一个焦点问题。本文正是从这一角度来研究审计质量问题的,研究思路如下:首先,在分析审计市场失灵的基础上,结合管制经济学、政府规制等相关理论,系统分析了政府监管对审计质量改进的作用机制;其次,分析目前国际上典型的三类审计监管模式及其适用条件,得出我国的监管模式应是“政府监管为主、行业自律为辅”的结论,并对我国目前审计监管体系存在的不足进行了深入剖析;再次,以我国证监会对审计师出具的处罚公告为样本,从政府监管的视角考察审计质量的影响因素,并从政府规则与政府惩戒两个角度考察了我国政府监管对审计质量改进的效果;最后,基于本文研究的结果,提出了相应的对策建议。本文共分八章,各章的主要内容如下:第1章导论,引出研究问题,对审计质量与政府监管的有关概念重新进行了界定,并提出本文的研究路径和框架。本章将审计质量的影响因素分为直接影响因素和间接影响因素两个层次,政府监管作为间接影响因素,通过对审计师自身因素或公司治理的影响实现对审计质量的改进;而对于审计质量的直接影响因素,除了传统的专业技能和独立性以外,提出审计师职业谨慎态度是影响审计质量的第三个直接因素。第2章文献综述。在对现有研究领域中关于审计质量的实证研究成果进行系统回顾的基础上,笔者将现有研究文献中关于政府监管和审计质量的研究分为两大类:(1)以监管结果作为审计质量的衡量标准,(2)政府监管对审计质量的影响效果分析。前者主要是以审计师遭受的法律诉讼或处罚结果作为审计质量低下的替代指标,研究审计质量的影响因素;后者主要是关于我国证券市场某些监管政策的效力检验与处罚公告的分析性统计研究。第3章政府监管与审计质量改进的理论分析。本章目的主要是为本文的研究主题提供理论框架,首先运用受托经济责任理论揭示审计的本质在于“控制”,并从价值增值角度认为审计增值功能的实现需要高质量审计服务的保证;紧接着,分析了现有审计委托模式对审计质量的影响,认为其造成了我国审计市场的失灵——高质量需求不足与低质量审计服务的供给;然后,结合管制经济学理论,在对三大管制理论进行分析评价后,认为公共利益理论能更好地为我国审计市场监管提供理论依据;最后,从理论上详细分析了我国审计市场的政府监管措施对审计质量改进的作用机制。第4章我国审计质量监管模式与监管现状。本章在对三种审计质量监管模式分析评价之后,指出我国目前的审计质量监管模式;然后,针对我国各监管主体的监管实践,指出当前监管体系中存在的问题,为实证分析埋下伏笔。第5章政府监管视角的审计质量影响因素分析。本章以证监会2002-2006再次,以我国证监会对审计师出具的处罚公告为样本,从政府监管的视角考察审计质量的影响因素,并从政府规则与政府惩戒两个角度考察了我国政府监管对审计质量改进的效果;最后,基于本文研究的结果,提出了相应的对策建议。本文共分八章,各章的主要内容如下:第1章导论,引出研究问题,对审计质量与政府监管的有关概念重新进行了界定,并提出本文的研究路径和框架。本章将审计质量的影响因素分为直接影响因素和间接影响因素两个层次,政府监管作为间接影响因素,通过对审计师自身因素或公司治理的影响实现对审计质量的改进;而对于审计质量的直接影响因素,除了传统的专业技能和独立性以外,提出审计师职业谨慎态度是影响审计质量的第三个直接因素。第2章文献综述。在对现有研究领域中关于审计质量的实证研究成果进行系统回顾的基础上,笔者将现有研究文献中关于政府监管和审计质量的研究分为两大类:(1)以监管结果作为审计质量的衡量标准,(2)政府监管对审计质量的影响效果分析。前者主要是以审计师遭受的法律诉讼或处罚结果作为审计质量低下的替代指标,研究审计质量的影响因素;后者主要是关于我国证券市场某些监管政策的效力检验与处罚公告的分析性统计研究。第3章政府监管与审计质量改进的理论分析。本章目的主要是为本文的研究主题提供理论框架,首先运用受托经济责任理论揭示审计的本质在于“控制”,并从价值增值角度认为审计增值功能的实现需要高质量审计服务的保证;紧接着,分析了现有审计委托模式对审计质量的影响,认为其造成了我国审计市场的失灵——高质量需求不足与低质量审计服务的供给;然后,结合管制经济学理论,在对三大管制理论进行分析评价后,认为公共利益理论能更好地为我国审计市场监管提供理论依据;最后,从理论上详细分析了我国审计市场的政府监管措施对审计质量改进的作用机制。第4章我国审计质量监管模式与监管现状。本章在对三种审计质量监管模式分析评价之后,指出我国目前的审计质量监管模式;然后,针对我国各监管主体的监管实践,指出当前监管体系中存在的问题,为实证分析埋下伏笔。第5章政府监管视角的审计质量影响因素分析。本章以证监会2002-2006接因素进而实现对审计质量的影响。第三,本文修正创新了审计质量衡量指标与有关模型。在检验审计质量影响因素时,以证监会对审计师的行政处罚作为审计质量替代变量,较好地将政府监管与审计质量联系起来;并且,通过引入“审计师强制轮换”变量创新了Lennox审计意见估计模型,以检验强制轮换制对审计质量改进的效果。更多还原

【Abstract】 Audit quality is always a hot problem in the auditing field. A high-quality audit has an obvious effect on ensuring information disclosure quality of listed companies and improving the allocation efficiency of the capital market. But due to the characteristics of auditing industry, the phenomenon of low-quality auditing and the“conspiracy”between auditors and listed companies frequently arise in practice. For example, in Enron event which shaking the whole world, Andersen CPA firm in a long time had concealed the deficit fact for Enron and destroyed an amount of relevant auditing materials when the truth was revealed. Henceforth, the World Com Group, global dispatch and Xerox etc.,“Big Five”CPA firms also had been involved in more and more financial scandals. In homeland, from the“old three fraud cases”, the“new three fraud cases”to Lantian, Yi-an, Qinfeng agriculture and KeLon etc., the financial scandals of listed companies have been exposed. At the same time we always could find a conspirator, CPA firm, under the shadow. Similar to scandals floating out, fraud cases in the listed companies also show the conspiracy between regulating institutions and companies. These financial scandals in which auditors had been involved appeared one after another, making audit quality problems become more noticeable.It is not accidental that a series of financial scandals happened in domestic and abroad, and the problems bringing out are quite more, of which the most serious problem is the inefficient regulation on auditing industry. So it becomes an issue both in theory and in practice that how to reinforce the government regulation in auditing industry to improve the audit quality. This dissertation studies audit quality just from this viewpoint, and the research approach is as follows: Firstly, based on analyzing the failure of auditing market, the author systematically analyzes the function mechanism of government regulation to improve audit quality in theory using regulation economics and government regulation theory and so on. Secondly, after analyzing three kinds of auditing regulation patterns and their suitable conditions, the author concludes that the regulation pattern in our country should "mainly focus on government regulation with supplementary of industry discipline", and deeply analyses the defects existing in our regulation system. Thirdly, taking the penalty notices announced by China Securities Regulatory Commission to auditors as samples, the author investigates the factors influencing audit quality from the government regulation, and examines the effects of government regulation to improve audit quality from governmental rules and punishment. Finally, in view of the results, the author proposes some strategic suggestions.This dissertation is composed of eight chapters, and the main contents of each chapter are as the following.Chapter one is an introduction, leading out the research subject, re-defining the concepts of audit quality and government regulation, and indicating the research approach and structure. In this chapter, the author divides influencing factors of audit quality into direct and indirect factors at two levels. As an indirect factor, government regulation improves audit quality through affecting auditors or corporate governance factors. However, in the direct factors, in addition to professional competence and independence, the author adds due care as the third factor which directly affects the audit quality.Chapter two is literature review. In this chapter, the author systematically reviews the empirical documents on audit quality, and classifies the existing literatures on the government regulation and audit quality into two categories: one is about taking the regulation results as a measure of audit quality, the other is about analyzing the effect of government regulation on audit quality. The former mainly examines the factors affecting audit quality just by taking lawsuit or punishment as a result of poor audit, and the latter mainly tests the effectiveness of regulatory policies in China’s securities market and statistically analyzes the penalty notices.Chapter three is the theoretical analysis on government regulation and audit quality improvement. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical framework for the theme of this study. First of all, the author reveals the nature of auditing is“control”by applying the theory of accountability, and concludes that high audit quality plays a necessary guarantee for achieving the audit function of value-added. Then, the author analyzes the influence of the current engage model on audit quality and concludes the factors resulting in the failure of audit market: insufficient demand for high-quality and low-quality audit services. After that, associating with the regulation economics and evaluating them, the author concludes that the public interest theory could preferably provide a theoretical basis for China’s regulation in audit market. At last, the author analyses the function mechanism of government regulation to improve the audit quality in details.Chapter four is a discussion of China’s auditing regulation pattern and current situation. In this chapter, after analyzing and evaluating the current three auditing regulation patterns, the author points out China’s current auditing regulation pattern. Then, in accordance with the regulation practice of main bodies in China, the author indicates the problems existing in the current regulation system which lays hints for the following empirical studies.Chapter five is an empirical analysis on factors affecting the audit quality from the government regulatory perspective. This chapter takes the penalty notices announced by China Securities Regulatory Commission from 2002 to 2006 as the research samples to examine whether the primary factor which affects the China’s audit quality is professional competence or independence. The result shows that independence is the chief reason for low quality audit.Chapter six mentions the establishment of government rules and audit quality improvement with the mandatory rotation of auditors as an example. According to the conclusion of chapter 5, the author selects the mandatory rotation of auditors as an example to test the government rules’effect on improving audit quality from the pre-regulatory perspective. The results indicate that the rule of CPA mandatory rotation does not reach the expected purpose. In mandatory rotation, the firms change plays a better role on the improvement of audit quality than the rotation of CPA does. However in voluntary changes, when audit opinion in last year was qualified, the rotation of CPA plays a better role on the improvement of audit quality than the firms change does, but the conclusion is contrary when audit opinion in last year was unqualified.Chapter seven is an empirical discussion of the government punishment and audit quality improvement. Following chapter 6, this chapter from the post-regulatory perspective to test the government punishment’effect on improving audit quality. The results indicate that China’s government regulation can identify the poor audit quality in a certain extent. But due to the constraints of regulatory power and force, it diminishes the efficiency of government regulation to improve the audit quality. Specifically, auditors only in negative earnings management group improve audit quality by reducing the surplus space after being punished.Chapter eight gives policy recommendations on strengthening government regulation and improving the audit quality. On the basis of summarizing the main conclusions of this paper, the author proposes some corresponding policy recommendations from strengthening regulation for improving audit quality, and points out the limitations of this study and the directions of future research.There are several innovations in this dissertation.Firstly, the anthor comprehensively and systematically studies the relationship between government regulation and audit quality improvement from the government regulatory perspective in this dissertation. She not only clarifies the function mechanism of government regulation to improve the audit quality in theory and establishes the important status of government regulation in policy arrangement of independent auditing, but also obtains some valuable empirical evidences by using the method of empirical research to test the effect of government regulation on improving audit quality.Secondly, this dissertation develops the analysis approach on the factors affecting audit quality, and divides them into direct and indirect factors at two levels. In direct influencing factors, in DeAngelo’s view on audit quality that professional competence and independence are two influencing factors of audit quality, the author adds due care as the third factor according to analysis of penalty notices announced by China Securities Regulatory Commission. In indirect factors, such as company, government regulation and other factors, the author considers government regulation is one of the most important factors which will influence audit quality through direct or indirect factors.Thirdly, this dissertation amends and innovates the indicators of audit quality and the model. On testing what influence audit quality, the author uses the punishments of China Securities Regulatory Commission made to auditors as the indicator for audit quality, which better associates the government regulation with the audit quality. Furthermore, this dissertation innovates the Lennox model by introducing the“mandatory rotation”variable to test the effect of mandatory rotation of auditors in improving audit quality.更多还原