【作者】 李俊丽；

【导师】 杨继瑞；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 政治经济学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 我国城市土地使用制度改革20年来,政府与土地市场的关系已发生了很大变化,然而目前城市土地市场中出现的一些问题,都与地方政府行为失范有很大关系。转型期的地方政府是从财政分权过程中逐渐分化出来的一个相对独立的利益主体,具备了凭借其掌控的资源去推动现有制度框架可容纳的地方经济增长以获取最大化垄断租金的能力。我国特殊的农村土地集体所有和城市土地国有的二元产权制度使地方政府掌握了对城市土地产权的“实际剩余控制权”,强化了地方政府介入经济的能力,土地资源因此成为实现地方政府效用目标函数最大化的最有力资源,从而形成了土地与地方财政、投资、招商引资、金融信贷和房地产市场发展等环环相扣的复杂格局,巨大的利益博弈也由此而生,造成了土地市场秩序的混乱。目前这种混乱集中体现在城市土地一级市场上,地方政府在城市土地一级市场上既是裁判员又是运动员,既是管理主体又是出让主体,土地的供给数量、方式和价格在很大程度上都要受到地方政府的影响,地方政府经济行为对城市土地配置效率和土地市场秩序构建至关重要。论文将研究视角锁定为地方政府经济行为,无疑将对中国城市土地市场化改革的走向产生一定的理论价值和现实意义。本研究的目标是为城市土地出让中地方政府经济行为规范化提供合理的理论解释和政策指导。论文研究的切入点是界定城市土地出让中地方政府行为的相关基本概念及范畴,将地方政府定性为城市土地市场化进程中一个特殊的行为主体,以此为逻辑前提,分析了城市土地出让中地方政府经济行为的表现、特征,力图把握各种行为之间的内在联系,然后依据一定的效应评价准则,全面客观地评价了城市土地出让中地方政府行为的双重效应,并进一步通过一个理论分析框架来寻找城市土地出让中地方政府经济行为的作用机理、内在逻辑和本质规律。最后在此基础上借鉴发达国家土地市场上政府行为规范的经验,探索了城市土地出让中地方政府经济行为规范化的路径与对策。全文主要由7部分组成,每部分的主要内容和观点如下:第1部分:导论。介绍了本研究的选题背景、理论价值和现实意义,并在对国内外相关研究综述进行回顾和评价的基础上给出了论文的研究方法、思路、逻辑结构等。第2部分:行为主体分析。由于城市土地一级市场由政府垄断,在现有土地制度框架下,地方政府又在实际上掌握了城市土地的最终剩余控制权,地方政府身兼产权主体、行政主体、监管主体、市场主体等多重角色,这就决定了地方政府不仅是中国经济转型期一个特殊的行为主体,更是城市土地出让中的一个特殊的行为主体,其特殊性表现在:具有“政府人”和“经济人”的双重行为特征;具有特殊的效用目标函数;是特殊的垄断供给者和需求者,特殊的价格规制者和特殊的寻租者。第3部分:经济行为束分析。现行城市土地出让制度下地方政府自身的利益在城市土地出让过程中得到了最大程度的体现,地方政府对城市土地价格具有很强的操纵能力,可以根据自身需要来对城市土地资源进行符合自身效用函数的配置,通过城市土地差别(歧视)定价等价格规制方式来谋求土地出让收入、进行基础设施投资、吸引外商直接投资和培育房地产构成了城市土地出让中地方政府发展地方经济的四大主轴。经过分析发现,地方政府的行为选择其实是对现行城市土地制度的一种理性反映,各种经济行为之间相互联系、互为因果,统一于地方政府自身利益最大化的谋取过程中。第4部分:经济行为效应分析。地方政府在城市土地市场化进程中既是中央政府的政治委托代理人,又是一个具有相对独立利益的利益主体,这种双重身份特征决定了城市土地出让中地方政府经济行为效应的双重性。从中央政府的视阈对其进行审视,其双重效应具体表现在:既从客观上起到了促进经济增长、推进土地要素市场发育、加速城市化进程、拓宽融资渠道、提供城市优质公共品等积极作用;同时其行为又是以宏观经济体非平稳运行、土地要素市场机制扭曲、土地资源不可持续利用、增加金融风险、损失社会公平、社会发展不平衡等为代价的,从而呈现出推进与破坏并存的双重效应特征。第5部分:行为机理分析。城市土地出让中地方政府的不规范经济行为有其存在的客观必然性:一是在中央政府与地方政府的政治委托代理关系中,地方政府面临的激励机制使其目标函数发生了扭曲;二是在地方政府间的竞争关系中,以政治竞争为核心的经济竞争是一种非合作博弈;三是在地方政府与其他微观主体的关系中,土地模糊产权为其提供了制度上的便利和利益上的刺激。在城市土地出让中,中央政府与地方政府间委托代理关系下的代理人问题、地方政府与地方政府间的政治晋升竞争以及模糊产权下地方政府对土地实际最终控制权的掌握是对地方政府不规范行为的重要理论解释。总的来说城市土地出让中地方政府的不规范行为不仅仅是地方政府自身的问题,而且涉及到地方政府与城市土地市场中其他行为主体的关系问题,来自中央政府自上而下和辖区居民自下而上的纵向约束以及来自地方政府间横向约束不足是城市土地出让中地方政府行为不规范的深层原因。第6部分:经验借鉴与启示。本章选取了与我国大陆一样实行土地批租制的香港地区、与我国一样存在土地资源稀缺国情的日本和土地市场机制发育较为完善的美国作为参照对象,对三者的土地市场特点及政府干预进行了考察,结果发现在发达市场经济国家和地区,政府干预土地市场的目的主要被确定为矫正市场失灵,政府在城市土地市场上的角色被定位为城市土地的管理者,政府角色的正确定位保证了土地利用中个人目标和社会目标的一致性,保护了土地利用中的公众利益。在此基础上总结出了土地市场化条件下规范的政府行为准则,为我国城市土地出让中地方政府行为的规范化提供了参照。第7部分:对策选择。提出了城市土地出让中地方政府经济行为规范化的有价值的思路和对策:在科学发展观的统领下,通过各相关利益主体间在土地市场上利益格局的重塑,形成中央与地方政府间正和互动、地方政府间进取型竞争以及地方政府与微观主体从控制到服务关系的利益平衡架构。作为一个拥有独立利益取向和自主意志的行为主体,地方政府的行为选择是对特定制度约束条件和激励结构的理性反应,因此要通过改变地方政府所面临的具体制度安排,通过建立有效的激励约束机制来强化对地方政府行为的规范,使地方政府的行为在新的利益格局下逐步趋向公共服务型政府的要求。论文的创新性思考可能在于:1,研究视角。我国历次城市土地供给制度改革皆围绕着中央与地方关系、土地管理权的上收与下放进行,其中虽触动了政府与市场的关系,但这种制度安排仅重视了市场化本身的要素设计,而未考虑地方政府行为对城市土地市场干预的严重性,没有触及城市土地制度的核心问题。当前的认识误区和实践偏差是将城市土地市场化等同于城市土地出让方式的改变(即变划拨、协议出让为招、拍、挂出让),实质上只要不改变政府在土地市场的垄断地位,不规范地方政府在城市土地市场上的经济行为,就无法从根本上改变土地资源的低效配置状态,无法建立起真正意义上的城市土地要素市场。本文在选题上将研究视角锁定为地方政府经济行为,以其行为的规范作为合理界定政府与土地市场边界和推进中国城市土地市场化进程的一个切入点和落脚点,显然有利于提高理论对现实的相符性和解释力。2,逻辑起点。以“城市土地出让中的地方政府:特殊的行为主体”作为全文的逻辑起点。地方政府不仅是中国经济转型期一个特殊的行为主体,更是城市土地出让市场中的一个特殊的行为主体:具有“政府人”和“经济人”双重行为属性和特殊的效用目标函数,是一个特殊的垄断供给者和需求者、特殊的价格规制者以及特殊的寻租者。全文以此为逻辑起点进行逻辑分析和推理,为全文研究奠定了一个独特而又坚实的理论坐标。3,论文借鉴企业理论中的“剩余控制权”思想提出了一个“土地产权实际剩余控制权”的概念。由于城市和农村土地产权事实上都处于一种模糊产权状态,在产权模糊的情况下,出现多个产权主体,多头管理,产权只有通过协商或谈判才能最终确定,这时产权落在了谈判力较强的产权主体手里。城市土地出让中地方政府成为了谈判力最强的产权主体,从而在模糊产权状态下掌握了土地产权的实际剩余控制权,成为城市和农村土地产权的实际最终控制者。4,论文在“蒂伯特选择”的理论预设下,在前人研究基础上,借助于一个土地要素模型分析了地方政府与企业之间以土地为媒介的利益关系,发现这一关系的实质是地方政府对农民土地收益向企业的变相转移支付,并进一步分析了这种实质背后的深层理论动因是地方政府间的非合作博弈,这种博弈遵从的基本逻辑是从“囚徒困境”到“寻底竞争”,从而给出了一个城市土地出让中地方政府“零地价”、“负地价”非理性招商引资的博弈论解释。5,论文通过一个“中央与地方政府间政治委托代理关系”、“地方政府间政治晋升博弈关系”和“地方政府与微观主体间模糊产权关系”的三维分析框架,对城市土地出让中地方政府行为及其双重效应背后的深层动因、作用机理和本质规律作出了合理的解释,并依此提出重塑城市土地市场上利益相关者的利益格局,即中央与地方政府间的正和互动、地方政府间的进取型竞争、地方政府与微观主体的从控制到服务的关系。基于城市土地出让中地方政府经济行为的选择是对特定制度约束条件和激励结构的理性反映,逻辑分析的结论就是通过制度供给和有效的激励约束机制来强化对地方政府行为的规范。更多还原

【Abstract】 The relation between the government and land market had been changed much from the reform of city land use system in China. However, many questions in the city land market at present, have tight relation with the local government’s unnormal behavior.The local government in the transition period is a relatively independent benefit body which splits up gradually from the financial decentralization process, it have the motive to impel the local economy and hold the maximized monopoly rent with the resources under it’s control. And the surplus domination to land property rights strengthened its ability to involve economy. Therefore the land resource becomes the most powerful resources to maximize the objective function of the local government. The linked pattern formed by land and the local finance, the investment, the attract bid, the financial credit ,the real estate market bring huge benefit gambling and confused the land market system. The local government in the city land market great influenced the land supply quantity and land supply way, land supply price because it has the dual role of referee and athlete, not only a administer but also a seller. The local government economic behavior is important to the city land disposition efficiency and the land market order, thus this thesis study from the view of the local government economic behavior . It will have certain theory value and the practical significance for the Chinese urban land’s market reform trend.The aim of this thesis is to provide reasonable explanation and policy instruction for the local government economic behaviors of selling the urban land.And the thesis includes six chapters,the main points of each chapter as follows:Chapter one is the introduction. it explained the theoretical and realistic value of this research.and it introduces the author’s approach, the innovation and deficiencyand so on based on summarize studies carried out by domestic and international scholars. Chapter two defined the local government . The local government is a peculiar subject not only in transition period but also in the land transfer market.The particularities are: it has double behavioural characteristic of“the government”and“the economic human”;it has the peculiar efficacy target function; it is a peculiar monopolistic supplier and needer;it is a peculiar price ruler and a peculiar rent seeker.Chapter three analysed economic behaviours of the local government. Local government’s benefit have got maximal degree embodiment in the course of selling city land under the current city land selling system. For running after political achievements and short-term budgetary income, most local government choosed the real estate exploiture, construction of urban infrastructure and attracting investments as its development route. On selling primary market in city land, the local government has very strong ability to controll city land price.So it can seek income of selling land, carry on the infrastructural investment, attract foreign direct investment cultivate real estate through price discrimination and regulations,and those four behaviors became the main measures to develop the local economy.Chapter four analysed the effects of those economic behaviours. The local government is both a political agent of the central governmen and a relatively independent benefit subject, the double figures decided its behaviours have dual effects.Scanning the effects from the visual threshold of central government,the concrete positive manifestation of dual effects are such as: hastening economic growth, pushing forward the land market, accelerating the course of urbanization , broadening a financing channel , providing the common city high grade product and so on.At the same time,the behaviors brang the macro-economy body’s unstable operation,the land market mechanism’s warping, land resources’unsustainable use and it increased financial risks , losed the social equity, incured society disparate development.So the effect displays two sides of positive and negative.Chapter five analysed the reasons of those behaviors. The local government non-rational economic behaviors have existence objective necessity. The thesis draws lessons from Principal-Agent Theory, inter-governmental competition theory and property right theory to analyze dual effects of local government’s behaviors. First Centralgovernment-Local government:the local government’s target function warped because between central government and local government the commission agent mainly related with the contracting in politics;And the second Local government-Local government:in local government’s competition relation, economic competition centering on politics competition is that one kind of non-cooperation gambling;The Third, Local government-Micro subject: fuzzy property right of land provided facilitating and the stimulation to its behavior.In general the reason of the non-rational economic behaviors is not only in virtue of local government self’s problem,but also dealing with relationship between local government and other subject in land market.The insufficient longitudinal restraint from the the central government and residenter, and insufficient restraint from other local government caused those behaviors together.Chapter six explained experiences from other areas.we inspected the government behavior in land market of Hong Kong, Japan and USA, and found that in the developed market economics country and region ,the purpose of government intervention to land market had been ascertained for correcting dysfunction of market. The role of government in city land market is ascertained director.The right role choice ensured compatibility between the individual target and society target of land utilization. These conclusions have provided experiences for our country.Chapter seven is the countermeasure. This chapter proposed valuable countermeasure to Standard the local government’s behavior in land market. Local government’s behavior choice is responded to the specific system constraints and the drive structure rationality, therefore we can change the concrete institutional arrangements which the Local authority faces, and strengthen effective incentive and restraint mechanism to cause local authority’s behavior to the collective services government’s request gradually under the new benefit pattern.The innovations of this paper possibly include the following aspects:First,the study have a new visual angle.This paper chose the local government economic behaviors as visual angle,and want to take the reasonable boundary between government and the land market and advance the Chinese city land market by its behavior’s standard. The second,the study has a new logical beginning.It takes“the local government in land market:a peculiar behavior subject”as the logic starting point of the whole paper,the characteristic of subject decided the particularity of its behavior.The third, The paper proposed a new concept :“the surplus domination of the land property right”. Because urban and countryside land property rights are at a fuzzy condition in fact,so the local government with strong negotiations strength became the final master.The fourth, under the theory supposition of“Tiebout Model”,the paper analyzed the interest relations between the local government and the enterprise which takes the land as medium ,and find the essence of the relations is intergovernmental non-cooperation gambling.The fifth, through analysing relations between local government and other subjects, the paper proposed remoulding benefit pattern as countermeasure: establish cooperation between Centralgovernment-Local government; establish enterprising competition between Local government-Local government; establish service relations between Local government–microscopic subjects.更多还原