【作者】 胡雯；

【导师】 李萍；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 政治经济学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 中国是以农立国的大国。由于独特的自然气候和地理条件,以及巨大人口压力引致的粮食安全问题,使中国的农业生产对于灌溉具有一种特殊依存性,由此形成的灌溉农业可谓国之根基。灌溉离不开水资源,而治水则离不开大规模的水利灌溉系统。作为一种回应,中国自古以来即将治水作为极其重要的公共事务,灌溉系统治理的演进则是内生于中国治水模式的演进之中。古代中国因治水而形成的权力单中心的高度中央集权体制,以及内生于其中的社会、文化和经济形态,具有自我实施和自我强化的惯性,被学者谓之为“治水社会”,及至当代,仍带有这一制度的深刻印痕。但当前中国正在经历从经济体制到社会以及政治体制的全面转型,灌溉系统治理的目标和命题、技术条件、制度环境、意识形态等均发生了翻天覆地的变化,适用于农业社会的传统单中心治理模式已越发显得无力和失效,新的有效治理模式尚在孕育成长之中,中国的灌溉系统治理结构正处于一个新旧模式更替的转型期。转型背景下的中国农业灌溉面临着“两难困境”,一方面面临水资源短缺的危机,而另一方面则存在灌溉水资源浪费严重和用水效率低下的难题。这种“两难困境”看似是水资源供给短缺和灌溉工程建设与维护投入不足的危机,其实质是一种治理危机,即灌溉系统治理机制长期落后于灌溉系统的治理需求,不能适应变化的社会经济条件和日益复杂的治理环境的累积结果,从而灌溉系统与环境(包括自然、经济和社会环境)、灌溉系统的利益相关者之间的经济利益关系不相协调。笔者认为,陷于治理“困境”的中国灌溉系统面临严重的“不可持续性”。要解决当前中国灌溉系统不可持续性的问题,关键在于制度性因素,其核心在于激励,其根本性出路在于寻求适应中国经济社会全面转型条件下的新型灌溉治理模式,改变灌溉治理中利益相关者的不良激励,从而提高灌溉绩效和实现灌溉系统的可持续发展。本文正是循着这样的思路展开研究,着重运用现代制度分析的工具和方法,通过构建一个基于灌溉系统属性和利益相关者行为激励分析的制度“需求—供给”理论解释框架,剖析转型期中国农业灌溉系统不可持续治理的深层次制度根源,探寻现行治理结构中涉及灌溉系统供给和生产各环节的不良激励因素及其相关性,为理解转型期中国灌溉系统治理转型中的大量经济现象提供一个新的视角;同时,在此基础上设计改善激励的更优替代制度,并从中折射出公共领域具有普遍借鉴意义的制度分析方法和应用价值,以期对中国转型经济理论发展和经济社会转型实践做出有益贡献。本文贯彻了“提出理论假说—经验性应用和检验—导出政策含义”的思路。全文共分为7章。第1章是导论。第2—4章是理论研究部分。第2章从灌溉系统的资源属性入手,对转型期中国灌溉系统的属性进行尝试性的重新审视。总体上看,灌溉系统具有典型的公共池塘资源特征,但在转型期中国的特殊背景下,各种外部约束条件的改变已经使灌溉系统的内部属性发生了裂变。通过重新审视,笔者发现灌溉系统的经济属性具有谱系特征,从类公共物品到类私人物品,介于两者之间又具有多个层次,形成一种渐变的谱系。相应的,灌溉系统的产权具有了嵌套分层的特征。这必然要求与之相适应的治理结构也要分层分类,发生不同性质的治理裂变,并不是单纯的集权或单纯的市场能一以概之。第3章对转型期中国灌溉系统治理的利益相关者进行了识别和界定,并区分了灌溉系统供给和生产的各环节,以及与之相关的利益相关者面临的主要激励和互动博弈。治理结构的变迁实质上是对责任和权利的重新分配,这必然涉及人与人之间的利益关系的重新博弈及其均衡。灌溉系统的治理是一个复杂的过程,涉及诸多处于不同层次的利益相关决策主体,只有尽可能减少其“摩擦”、和谐其相互关系,才可能在最节约交易成本的情况下实现较好的制度绩效。转型期中国灌溉系统的治理决策体系中,用水农户和中央政府作为体系的两极,中间涉及农民用水者组织、供水机构、灌溉专业管理组织、地方各级政府及其水行政主管部门,以及私营企业、国际援助机构等多个层次的决策主体,每个主体对灌溉系统拥有不同的控制权和影响力,在长期而复杂的相互依赖和博弈中追求不同目标、获取不同利益。灌溉系统利益相关者的互动博弈主要涉及:用水农户之间在自然状态下的合作困境与自主谈判的可能;农户—农民用水户协会(WUA)—政府及其代理机构之间对WUA的一种双重委托—代理关系;政府及其代理机构之间在科层治理结构中的“剩余控制权”之争;政府与企业之间在产权软约束条件下的“寻租”关系;政府与国际援助组织之间相似激励的相互强化。不同利益相关者介入灌溉系统治理具有丰富和多样化的选择可能,参与供给的主体不一定参与生产,相应的,供给和生产的各个环节可能适宜于不同的制度安排,以最大限度地遏制利益相关者的不良激励。第4章是全文的核心部分和主要创新部分。从灌溉系统的供给和生产两个方面着手,建立了一个基于交易成本的制度绩效评价概念性框架,并利用这一评价框架对集权治理、市场治理与社群自主治理三种基本的治理结构绩效进行了比较分析,发现采用任何一种制度安排以解决灌溉系统的可持续治理难题都必须支付显著的成本,没有任何一种制度安排是万灵的、唯一的解,不同的制度之间存在分工合作、相互互补和相互竞争的关系,是紧密互动的有机整体。因此,基于前面全部章节的构想和推导,本文提出了转型期中国灌溉系统可持续治理的更优替代制度设计——嵌套分层的多中心治理结构。这种治理结构实质上是一种公民社会和市场成长为与国家力量相互制衡的治理模式,其行动规则与经济组织具有嵌套分层的特性。在这个体系中,具有一个事实上的成文宪法,为不同的利益相关主体的权利和义务提供了一个最高约束力的法律框架,在这一框架下,又分层分类地具有具体的集体选择规则或操作规则,下一层的规则受制于上一层的规则,即规则相互嵌套形成完整的规则体系,规范和约束相关利益主体的行为,维持治理结构的有序性。在这一规则体系的约束下,各利益相关主体间实现制度化的集权和分权,根据在多大的边界范围内能将灌溉系统的外部效应成功地“内部化”的标准,为灌溉系统的供给和生产选择不同规模的主体或划定不同规模的“管区”。这其中,灌溉系统的供给主体不一定必然是生产主体,供给主体可能选择自己生产,也可能以市场契约的形式选择其他主体提供生产,或与其他主体共同生产。这些供给和生产的主体或“管区”也是嵌套分层的,但这种组织的嵌套分层不具有传统意义上的行政式隶属关系,而是基于不同的规模经济的范围。不同的“管区”之间是权力相对分立的即权力是多中心的,相互之间的关系主要基于法律和规范提供的行动规则与契约关系,从而使灌溉系统的供给和生产具有了灌溉服务产业的特征,不同类型和规模的主体之间形成互补、竞争和制约的关系,最大程度地遏制不良激励,实现灌溉系统的可持续。第5—6章是实证研究部分。第5章对中国灌溉系统治理结构的变迁进行了历史回顾和梳理,并利用本文所提供的研究思路和研究框架,对中国灌溉系统治理结构的演进逻辑进行了理论解释。中国灌溉系统治理结构的演进是对环境约束条件变化的响应,从古至今均是在权力单中心的科层体系框架下演进,相关事务的决策权通过等级制的命令链条组织起来,中央政府是终极权力中心;其演变的核心是灌溉系统产权制度的演进,即灌溉工程和灌溉水资源的产权不断界定的过程,其中,灌溉水资源的产权制度演进又是导致灌溉工程产权制度演进最重要的诱因;这一演进过程中,国家有逐渐放弃微观层面治理转而向宏观层面收缩的倾向,科层结构中逐渐引入市场,出现由权力单中心向权力多中心转变的趋势;重视制度激励对灌溉系统“良治”自我实施能力的强化作用成为当前乃至今后很长时期内灌溉系统治理改革的重心。中国灌溉系统治理结构的演进具有典型的政府主导的强制性制度变迁的特征。在当前急速转型的社会中,民间团体发育不足、公共参与能力不强,纯粹的诱致性制度变迁并不容易发生,政府行政力量并不适宜过早过快地退出,强制性的制度变迁仍然占据主导地位。第6章通过对转型期中国灌溉系统的典型案例:位于经济发达地区、水资源较为丰沛的全国特大型灌区——都江堰灌区和位于边远贫困山区、水资源匮乏、以中小型灌溉系统为主的巴中市的灌溉系统治理进行制度比较分析,进一步对我国当前灌溉系统治理改革中的现实问题进行了深入剖析,对不同区域的不同变革路径选择进行了理论解释,更加明晰了转型期中国灌溉系统可持续治理的未来改革取向。第7章是结语及政策意蕴。在归纳总结全文的基础上,展望转型期中国农业灌溉系统可持续治理结构改革的未来取向,认为更加扁平化的嵌套分层的多中心治理结构将是变革的必然趋势,并导出具有一般借鉴意义的政策意蕴,以期为转型期中国灌溉系统可持续治理改革实践提供有益参考。中国灌溉系统的可持续治理转型是一项复杂、艰苦而长期的事业。改革的最终目的,是要将现在自上而下的以国家力量为单一权力中心的相关利益主体的科层治理关系,转变为公民社会和市场力量与国家力量相互制衡的新型网络合作伙伴关系,这可能需要一两代人甚至几代人与制度和文明惯性的博弈。新的文明模式和治理模式能否顺利成长或能在多长时间内成长起来还未有定论,但对改革的最终成功我们拭目以待。更多还原

【Abstract】 China is a great country setting up on the basis of agriculture. China’s agricultural production have a special dependency on irrigation because of the unique natural climate and the geographical conditions, as well as food safety problem which caused by the huge population pressure, so irrigation agriculture is the foundation of our country. Irrigation can not be achieved without water resources, and water-control is closely related to the large-scale water conservancy irrigation system. As a response to those, China has been taking water governance as extremely important public affairs since the ancient times, and the evolution of irrigation system governance is endogenous of the evolution of water governance pattern. In the ancient, the authority single center had a highly authority centralization system which formed on the basis of water-control, as well as the society, the culture and the economic form which was endogenous of that. They had the inertia of self-implementation and self-strengthened, called“irrigation society”by scholars. In the present age, there is still having this system’s profound mark. However,at present, China are experiencing an overall transition from the economic system to the social political system, the goal and the proposition, the technical conditions, the institutional environment, the ideology and so on of the irrigation system governance all have changed greatly. Although the traditional single-central governance pattern has already became more and more ineffective which is suitable to agricultural society, the new effective governance pattern was still in the process of inoculation, so China’s irrigation system governance structure is being in a transition period from the old pattern to the new one. During the transformed period, China’s agriculture irrigation is facing a“dual dilemma”. On the one hand, it is facing a crisis of shortage of water resources. On the other hand, it has a problem that the irrigation water resources have been wasted seriously and the efficiency of using water are very weak. It is seemly that the dilemma is a crisis that shortage supplies of water resources and the irrigation project construction and the investment in maintenance are insufficient, but its essence is a crisis of governance, namely the governance mechanism of irrigation system has fallen behind the governance demand of irrigation system for a long time, and it is also the accumulated consequences of the mechanism which cannot adapt to the changed social economic conditions and the increasingly complicated governance environment, thus economic-interest relationships are not coordinate among the irrigation system and the environment (including nature, economy and social environment) and the stakeholders of irrigation system. In writer’s opinion, China’s irrigation system which sinks into the governance“difficult position”is facing“non-continuation”seriously. If we want to solve the non-continuation problem of China’s irrigation system, the key point lies in the institutional factors. Its core lies in encouragement, its fundamental outlet lies in seeking a new irrigation governance pattern under China’s overall transition, and changing stakeholders’bad encouragement in the process of irrigation governance so as to enhance irrigation performance and realize sustainable development of irrigation system.This dissertation just proceeds its research based on this thought, emphatically using the modern institutional analysis tool and method , through constructing a theory explanation frame of institution“demand - supply”based on the irrigation system attribute and encouragement analysis of stakeholders behavior , then analysis the deep level institutional root why China’s agriculture irrigation system can not be governed sustainable in this transition period, inquiring about the bad incentive factors and their relevance about the supply of irrigation system and each link in the whole production involved in the present governance structure, so as to provide a new angle of view for understanding the massive economic phenomenon appeared in the governance transition of irrigation system of China in the transformation period. At the same time, in order to make beneficial contribution for the development of economic transition theory and the transition practice of economic society, the author designed a better substitution system in order to improve encouragement based on that, and reflect the institutional analysis method and the application value which have universal referential significance in the public domain. This dissertation carried out the research thought that“put forward the theory hypothesis - empirical application and tests - derived the policy implications”. There are seven chapters altogether. The first chapter is introduction.The chapters from two to four are the fundamental research part. The 2nd chapter attempts to make a new viewpoint on the attribute of China’s irrigation system in the transformation period. Generally speaking, irrigation system has the typical characteristic of common-pool resources, but each change of external restrictions have already caused fission of irrigation system internal attribute under the special background of China in the transition period. Author discovered that the economical attribute of irrigation system has clan feature through a new consideration. There are many levels between public-like goods and private-like goods formed a gradually changed pedigree. Correspondingly, property right of irrigation system has nesting layered characteristic. This inevitably requests the governance structure which adapts to it also to have hierarchical classification and occur heterogeneous governance fission, which are not to be done by the pure centralization and the pure market.The 3rd chapter aims at making a definition and definition of the stakeholders of irrigation system governance in transformation period of China, and differentiates the various links of supply and production of irrigation system, as well as main motivation and interactive game which the stakeholders are facing. The change of governance structure is essentially the reallocation of responsibility and right which is inevitably involves gambles and its balance of the interest relations among individuals. The governance of irrigation system is a complex process, its supply and production include numerous links of the decision-making, the plan, the financing, the construction, the maintenance, the management, the movement and so on, and it also involves many relevant decision-making subjects who are in different levels. In order to realize better institutional performance under the condition of saving transaction cost as much as possible, we must reduce“the friction”as far as possible and make their relationship harmonious. In the decision-making systems of the governance of China’s irrigation system in this transition period, the water used peasant household and the central government are two poles of this system, and the intermediate zone involves many levels of decision-making subjects, including the Water User Associations of Farmers (WUA), the water supply organizations, the specialized management organizations of irrigation, all levels of local governments and their water administration department responsible for the work, as well as the private enterprises, the international assistance organizations and so on. Every main body has different domination and influence to the irrigation system, pursuing different goal and gain divergent interest in the complex long-term interdependence and gambling. The stakeholders’interactive gambling of irrigation system mainly involves the possibility of cooperative dilemma and independent negotiations among peasant household under the natural conditions; the double principal-agent relationships among the peasant household,WUA and the government with their agent organizations; the struggles for the“residual rights of control”between governments and their agent organizations in the departments’governance structure; the relations of“rent-seeking”under the condition of property right soft constraints between governments and enterprises; the mutual strengthening of similar stimulation between governments and international assistance organizations. It is possible that the different stakeholders who involve in the governance of irrigation system have rich and diverse choices, and the main body who participate in supplies does not necessarily participate in production. Correspondingly, may be each link of supplies and production suitable to different institutional arrangements so as to contain improper stimulation to stakeholders as much as possible. In chapter 2, we have discussed the economic attribute of irrigation system and the fission of property right structure, which are suitable to the nesting layered governance structure .Now we make a logic consistency to that.The 4th chapter is the core and main innovation part of this full paper. Starting with the two aspects of supplies and production of irrigation system, this chapter establishes a conceptive frame about the appraisal institution and performance based on transaction cost, then using this appraisal framework to compare and analyze the performance of these three basic governance structure: the centralized governance, the market governance and the social group self-governance .At last, we discover that we must pay remarkable cost for solving the problem of sustainable governance of irrigation system whatever anyone of the institutional arrangements, and anyone of the institutional arrangements is not all-powerful unique solution. It has relations of division and cooperation, mutually supplementary and mutual competition among the different institutions, but they constitute a close interactive organic whole. Therefore, based on the conception and derivation of above chapters, this paper has designed a better substitution system about the sustainable governance of China’s irrigation system in the transition period - nesting layered polycentric governance structure. This governance structure is essentially a mutual restriction governance model between the civil society and market and the national power, its regulations and economic organizations have the characteristic of nesting layered. In this system, it has a written constitution in fact, and it provides a legal framework has the highest binding force for the different interest-related subjects’rights and obligation, under which it also has classified and categorized collective-choice rules or operation rules, and the latter rules are restrained by the previous rules, namely the rules nest each other and form a complete regular system so as to standard and restrain stakeholders’behavior and maintain the orderliness of governance structure. Under the constraint of this regular system, stakeholders realize their institutional centralization and decentralization, and choose different scale subjects or determine different“district”for irrigation system’s supplies and production according to the standard that in what scale of the boundary range does the external effect of irrigation system can be integrate into“internalization”successfully. Main providers of irrigation system do not necessarily the main body of production. It is possibly that main providers choose to produce themselves or choose other main bodies to provide products in the form of using market contracts or producing with other main bodies. Although these main bodies of supplies and production or the“district”are also nesting layered, these organizations’nesting layered does not have the traditional significance administrative membership, but rather based on different scopes of scale economy. The authority is separated relatively in different“districts”. In other words, the authority is polycentric, and the relations are mainly on the basis of motion rules and contractual relationships which provided law and standard, thus make irrigation system’s supplies and production have the characteristic of irrigation service industry, and then the subjects of different types and scales can form a supplementary, competitive and restrictive relations so as to contain the bad stimulation as much as possible and realize the sustainability of irrigation system.The 5-6th chapters are the parts of demonstration research. In chapter 5, it gives a historical retrospection and carding about the changes of governance structure of China’s irrigation system, and then uses research thoughts and framework provided by this dissertation to explain the logic of evolution of China’s irrigation system governance structure theoretically. The evolution of China’s irrigation system governance structure is the response of environmental constraints’changes. It has been evolving under the framework of authority single-central bureaucracy from ancient to now: the decision-making power of related transaction is organized by hierarchical orders, and central government is the ultimate authority center. The core is the evolution of irrigation system property rights, namely a process of defining property right of irrigation project and irrigation water resources unceasingly. Among them, evolution of the property right of irrigation water resources is also the most important inducement which causes the evolution of property rights of irrigation project. In the process of this evolution, government has the tendency of giving up the governance in microcosmic aspect gradually and turning to shrinkage of macroscopic aspect. And then it will introduce market in bureaucracy structure gradually, appearing a transition from the authority single center to the authority multi-centers. Pay more attention to the strengthening effect of institutional incentive to self-enforcing capability of irrigation system“good governance”, which is the focus of governance reform of irrigation system from now to the future. The evolution of China’s irrigation system governance structure has the typical characteristic of institutional innovations by the government. In the current rapid transformation of our society, due to the insufficient nurturing of civil organizations and the weak ability of public participation, pure induced institutional change is not to be occurred easily, so the government administrative strength is not suitable to withdraw too early and too quickly. Because of these reasons, the induced institutional changes still need to occupy the dominant position.Chapter 6 takes researches on typical cases of China’s irrigation system in the transition period - irrigation district of Dujingyan and Bazhong’s irrigation system, and holds comparative institutional analysis on them. Thus, it makes a further analysis to the realistic problems of China’s governance reform of current irrigation system, and interpretes theoretically different transformation paths in different zones. Then the future reform orientation of sustainable governance of China irrigation system in the transition period is to be clearer.Chapter 7 is the conclusion and policy implication. On the basis of summarizing the full text, it forecast future orientation of the reform that sustainable governance structure of China agriculture irrigation system in the transition period, think that the flatter nesting layered polycentric governance structure will be the inevitable trend of transformation, and derive policy implication which has the general referential significance. In a word, the aim is to provide useful references to the reform practice of sustainable governance of China irrigation system in the transition period更多还原