【作者】 何凡；

【导师】 张炜；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 区域经济学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 在市场经济条件下,地区竞争就是以地方政府竞争为主导的行政区间在经济发展上的竞争,它是区域竞争的特殊形态。相对于一般意义上的区域竞争而言,地区竞争既包括地区间产业或企业基于产品市场拓展的竞争,也包括地方政府间为提升本地产业或企业竞争力而展开的竞争,而且,地区政府的竞争效应要通过本地区产业或产业组织的竞争力来体现。因此,地区间产业或企业的市场竞争与地方政府间为培育产业或企业发展环境的竞争均构成地区竞争不可或缺的内容。由于发展环境对于提升地区产业或企业竞争力的极端重要性,所以,地方政府竞争在地区竞争关系尤其是我国的地区竞争关系中就显得尤为重要。虽然在处于市场经济的联邦制国家和实行财政分权的单一制国家,地区竞争的存在是一个客观的经济和社会现象,而非中国分权式改革进程中的特有现象。但对于正处于制度转型和经济快速发展的中国来说,地区竞争尤其是地方政府竞争是理解具有中国特色的制度变迁模式和经济发展模式的一个非常重要的视角:通过它既可以理解我国制度变迁的动力机制和特殊路径;也可以部分地解释地区间发展水平收敛趋势的产生机理,进而可以深入地分析国家产业结构升级的利益机制和产业空间结构形成与演变的动力机制。事实上,国内学术界在讨论地区“产业结构趋同化”问题时,基本上都是从这一视角出发的。地区之间产业竞争是本文展开国家产业空间结构形成的动力机制分析的独特视角。地区产业结构演进与全国产业空间结构变化是一个问题的两个方面,只不过前者是从地区而言的,而后者则基于全国范围。由此可以认为,地区产业结构的升级过程也就是全国产业空间结构的形成与演进过程,地区间的产业竞争既是地区产业结构升级和优化的推动力量,也应是国家产业空间结构调整和优化的动力机制受学术界在地方保护、市场分割等地区竞争的特殊方式与地区间产业结构的趋同趋势之间建立起因果联系的分析路径的启迪,本文试图在地区专业化体系的形成与发展这一国内外产业结构空间演进的良性趋势中找寻地区竞争的积极影响和作用,进而用地区竞争及其发展来解释国家产业空间结构的演进趋势。基于此,本文将围绕地区竞争对国家产业空间结构演进的影响这一主题,运用区域经济学的基本理论和方法,借鉴中外学术界的相关研究新成果,对地区竞争的动因,制度环境,内容、方式及变化趋势,地区竞争对国家产业空间结构形成与演进的影响机制等进行较为系统的理论分析;将美国内部地区竞争与产业空间结构演进的良性互动关系当作典型案例进行解析;最后,对中国地区竞争方式及其演变趋势、地区专业化的发展状况、地区竞争与产业空间结构变化之间的关系进行了较为详细的实证检验,并支持了前文的理论结论。全文由九章组成,除绪论与结论外,正文分成两部分:第一部分由五章构成,主要介绍地区竞争产生的动因,制度条件,竞争的方式及其变化趋势,地区竞争对一国产业空间结构演进的影响机制等。第2章对地区竞争及其对国家产业空间结构演进的影响涉及到的理论基础做一个概要的介绍;第3章主要分析说明地区竞争形成的基本动因——地区利益及其最大化;第4章说明地区竞争的制度环境;第5章介绍地区竞争的基本内容、竞争方式、竞争手段以及竞争机制;第6章主要讨论地区间产业竞争对全国产业空间结构的形成和发展的影响机制与形式,从而说明地区间产业竞争行为是解释一国产业空间结构演进的重要变量。第二部分由两章构成,主要用经验事实和数据对前文的若干理论结论进行验证。选择对象为市场经济制度完善、经济发达的美国和正处于从计划经济体制向市场经济制度转轨过程之中、尚处于发展中的中国这两个具有典型的制度差异和不同发展阶段的大国。第7章说明美国内部地区竞争对国家产业空间结构演进的影响及其机制;第8章对正处于制度转型过程中的中国内部地区竞争与国家产业空间结构演进的相关性进行实证研究。第9章归纳总结全文的主要结论,并在此基础上简单讨论了中国的地区间竞争存在的问题以及规范地区竞争的若干对策,对本文的后续研究进行了展望。本文理论部分的主要结论是:(1)地区利益的最大化是地区间展开竞争的基本动因。然而,学者们在谈到地区利益时,习惯于将重复建设、假冒伪劣泛滥、地方保护等不合意的地方政府行为归为地方利益作祟的结果,但这种理解是不全面的。地区利益对于上述现象是有影响的,但这种影响并不一定导致上述现象的必然出现。(2)地区间竞争受一国宏观法律制度和国家行政管理体制的约束,同时,也受到中央政府的严格监管以及辖区民众的有效监督。因此,在不同的制度环境中,地区竞争的方式、手段与策略及其效果是有差异的,不能做一概而论。(3)地区间竞争是一个长期的重复博弈过程,回馈机制和学习效应的不断累积将使博弈结果达成合意性;地方保护与市场分割仅是特定发展阶段、特定制度条件下地方政府(尤其是欠发达地区政府)的理性选择,而不是地区竞争的主要方面。(4)地区竞争的实质是产业竞争,地区产业结构升级和产业(企业)竞争力的提升是竞争的根本目标;随着地区竞争的展开和各地产业结构的自主升级以及优势产业或特色产业的确立,会使国家的宏观产业空间结构实现合理化演进。可见,规范适度的地区竞争是地区专业化生产体系形成和发展的基本动因。所以,规范和治理地区竞争是实现国家产业空间结构优化,建立和完善地区间专业化分工协作体系的有效途径。本文经验和实证部分的主要结论是:(1)美国的地区竞争性关系非但没有造成地区间的地方保护和市场分割现象的普遍存在,反而造就了一个国家产业空间结构合理化演进趋势的出现。究其缘由,主要在于美国地区政府间竞争是建立在市场经济的基本架构之上,服务于市场经济的运作的。政府的基本作用是如何更好地让市场机制发挥作用,以弥补“市场失灵”,它倡导的是保护竞争机制,而不是保护竞争者。而良好法律制度环境,有效的政府行政管理体制,政府与市场、政府与企业活动边界的合理界定、政府职能的明确等是导致美国地区竞争适度、有序的制度环境。它为中国治理和引导地区竞争,以使其发挥积极效应提供了经验。(2)对中国的实证分析的结论:首先,随着改革的不断深入和市场化程度的发展,地方政府竞争已逐步摆脱“掠夺型地方政府”的特征,转变为“进取型地方政府”。也就是说,大部分地方政府,包括相对不发达地区的地方政府,不再仅仅通过各种行政性收费、竖立贸易壁垒和分割市场来掠夺当地企业和居民的剩余,逐渐脱离了过去政府行政主导经济发展的模式,而更多地通过公共品供给、制度和政策创新来提高竞争力。这是一种良性的竞争趋势;其次,地区竞争极大地改善了地区投资环境,促进了经济要素的流动和产业的地区转移。经济要素的流动和产业的地区转移使得资源的空间配置更有效:促进了区域产业整合,强化了产业集聚效应,产业互补效应也开始显现。总之,本文在已有相关研究成果的基础上,从地区竞争视角入手,对地区竞争与宏观产业空间结构演进的相关性进行了较为深入的研究,从而在理论构建和应用分析两方面对区际关系理论做出了一定贡献:(1)提供了一个分析研究国家产业结构升级和产业空间结构演进的动力机制的新视角。因为选择地区竞争的视角就能够整合区域竞争、企业的区位选择和地方政府竞争等多种因素,有利于建立一个更加有效的产业空间结构形成机制的解释框架。(2)在此基础上,以地区竞争方式作为解释变量,构建了一个较新的产业空间结构形成、变化的理论解释框架。首先是对地区竞争的不同方式进行了重复博弈分析,证明了地区竞争的“合意性”发展方向;然后,以此为基点,说明“合意性”地区竞争对国家产业空间结构演进的积极影响,即地区竞争—→企业的区位选择—→产业的地区间转移和地区聚集-→地区专业化和区际分工关系的形成--→全国经济空间网络的形成与发展。更多还原

【Abstract】 Under the market economy condition, the administrative-region competition is a kind of competition between administrative sectors in the aspect of economic development taking competition between local governments as the leading form, which is a particular form of regional competition. The administrative-region competition not only includes inter-regional industries’or enterprises’competition based on the expansion of commodity market, but also includes the competition between local governments in order to enhance the competitiveness of local industries or enterprises. The competitive effect of the local government is embodied by local industries’or industry structures’competitiveness. Therefore, both the marketplace competition between inter-regional industries or enterprises and the competition between local governments so as to develop an excellent environment for the development of local industries or enterprises comprise the indispensable content of administrative-region competition. Since developing an environment is extremely significant to the enhancement of local industries’or enterprises’competitiveness, the competition between local governments appears particularly important in the relationship of administrative-region competition, especially in China.In the federal countries being in the market economy and the unitary countries putting financial decentralization into practice, administrative-region competition is an objective economic and social phenomenon, which is not China-solely-owning phenomenon in the process of Chinese decentralization reform. However, as for China, which is being in the stage of institutional transition and of which economy is quickly developing, administrative-region competition, especially the competition between local governments, is a fairly important perspective for us to understand the pattern of institutional change and economic development with Chinese characteristics. By administrative-region competition, we can understand the dynamic mechanism and the particular path of China’s institutional change and can also explain the generating mechanism of convergence trend of inter-regional development level. Besides, we can take advantage of administrative-region competition to analyze the interest-mechanism of upgrading national industrial structure and the dynamic mechanism of national industrial spatial structure forming and changing. In fact, academics in China are mainly to set off from this perspective, when discussing the assimilation of inter-regional industrial structure.Inter-regional industrial competition is a unique perspective of this thesis to analyze the dynamic mechanism of national industrial spatial structure forming. Administrative-region industrial structure evolution and changes of national industrial spatial structure are the two aspects of one problem, of which the former is based on local range and the latter is based on national range. Therefore, the upgrading process of administrative-region industrial structure is also the formation and evolution process of national industrial spatial structure, and inter-regional industrial competition is not only the driving force of industrial structure upgrading and optimizing, but also the dynamic mechanism of national industrial spatial structure adjusting and optimizing.Enlightened by the analyzing approach used by academics to establish the causal relation between some peculiar ways of administrative-region competition (such as local protectionism, market segmentation and so on) and the assimilation trend of inter-regional industrial structure, this thesis attempts to find the active impact and function of administrative-region competition in the course of regional specialization system forming and developing, which is a benign trend of industry’s spatial structure evolution. Furthermore, it uses administrative-region competition and its development to explain the evolution trend of national industrial spatial structure.Based on this, this thesis focuses on the topic of administrative-region competition’s impact on the evolution of national industrial spatial structure, wields fundamental theories and methods of regional economics, consults new achievements of domestic and foreign academic circles’studies, carries out comparatively detailed theoretical analysis of the causes, institutional environment, contents, means, changing trend of administrative-region competition and the mechanism of administrative-region competition affecting the formation and evolution of national industrial spatial structure; this thesis takes the benign interactive relationship between America’s inter-regional competition and its evolution of spatial structure as a classic case to explain; at last, this thesis makes a detailed empirical research on the relationship among the evolution trend of China’s administrative-region competition, the development level of China’s regional specialization, China’s administrative-region competition and its industrial spatial structure changes, and supports the theoretical conclusions of previous article.The thesis is composed of nine chapters, which is divided into two parts as a whole besides the introduction and the conclusion: Part I is composed of five chapters, mainly introducing the causes, institutional conditions, modes, changing trend of administrative-region competition and the mechanism of administrative-region competition affecting the evolution of national industrial spatial structure. The second chapter briefly introduces the relevant theories of administrative-region competition and its impact on the evolution of national industrial spatial structure. The third chapter mainly analyses the basic cause that forms the administrative-region competition, i.e. administrative-region benefit and its maximization. The fourth chapter explains the intuitional environment of administrative-region competition. The fifth chapter introduces the fundamental content, method and the developing trend of administrative-region competition. The sixth chapter mainly discusses the inter-regional industrial competition and the mechanism of its impact on the formation and development of national industrial spatial structure, so as to demonstrate inter-regional industrial competition is a significant variable for us to explain the evolution of industrial spatial structure of a country. Part II is composed of two chapters, which carries out verification on several theoretical conclusions of previous article chiefly using experiential facts and data. This thesis chooses the USA and China as the two target countries which have typical intuitional differences and are in the different developing stages. The former has a perfect system of market economy and highly developed economy and the latter is in the process of transition from planned economy system to market economy system and is still in its developing phrase. The seventh chapter explains the mechanism of America’s inter-regional competition affecting national industrial spatial structure. The eighth chapter makes an empirical research on the pertinence of China’s inter-regional competition to its evolution of national industrial spatial structure. The 9th chapter summarizes the main conclusions of the full text, discusses the problems of China’s inter-regional competition and some countermeasures to rectify nonstandard administrative-region competition, and looks forward to the following research of this thesis.The main theoretical conclusions of this thesis are as follows:(1) The maximization of administrative-region benefit is the basic cause of competition between different administrative region. When talking about administrative-region benefit, scholars are accustomed to ascribe repetitious construction, a great deal of counterfeit, and local protectionism to the result of local benefit acting like an evil spirit, however, this understanding is not all-round. Administrative-region benefit influences the above-mentioned phenomena to some extent, but its impacts do not necessarily cause the definite appearance of above-mentioned phenomena.(2) Administrative-region competition is constrained by macroscopic legal regime and administrative system of one country. Simultaneously, it is also supervised strictly and effectively by the central government and the public in this precinct. In different intuitional environment, the modes, means, strategies and effects of administrative-region competition are different, so they cannot be considered and analyzed in the same way.(3) Administrative-region competition is a long-term repeated game process, so that constant accumulation from feedback mechanism and learning effect are to satisfy the game; regional protectionism and market segmentation is only the rational choice of local government (especially the government in underdeveloped region) at the special development stage and under the particular institutional conditions, but not the normality for administrative-region competition.(4) The essence of administrative-region competition is industrial competition and the basic goal of this competition is the upgrading of regional industrial structure and the enhancement of industries’or enterprises’competitiveness. Along with the expansion of administrative-region competition, the automatic upgrading of industrial structure in each region and the establishment of superior industry or characteristic industry, a county’s macroscopic industrial spatial structure will realize rational evolution. Obviously, the standard and moderate administrative-region competition is the fundamental cause of the formation and development of local specialized production system. Therefore, to rectify and govern the local competition is an effective way to realize the optimization of national industrial spatial structure and establish and consummate inter-regional specialized division of labor cooperating system.The main experiential and empirical conclusions of this thesis are as follows:(1) America’s administrative-region competition does not cause the phenomena of local protectionism and market division between administrative regions, instead it creates the appearance of the evolution tendency of national industrial spatial structure. The main reason mainly lies in the fact that intergovernmental competition in America is established on market economy and serves for the operation of market economy. The basic function of a government, which advocates protecting the competitive system not the competitor, is how to make the market mechanism function better to make up“market failure”. But the fine legal regime environment, the effective government administration system, the government and the market, the reasonable defining of the government’s and the enterprise’s activities boundary, the definitude of the governmental function and so on are the intuitional environments which cause a moderate and orderly administrative-region competition. It provides useful experiences for China to govern and guide the administrative-region competition so as to bring positive effects into play.(2) The conclusions of empirical research on China: Firstly, along with the unceasing deepening of reform and the developing of marketability degree, the local government competition has already got rid of“the plundering local authority”and is gradually transforming to“the enterprising local authority”. In other words, the majority of local authorities, including the local authorities in relatively underdeveloped region, have no longer plundered the local enterprises’and the inhabitants’surplus only through all kinds of administrative charges, erecting trade barrier and dividing the market, and have gradually been separated from the past government -leading economy-development-pattern, instead, local authorities start to attract resources inflow more through the supply of public goods and the innovation of institutions and policies. This is one kind of benign competition tendency. Next, the administrative-region competition enormously improves the local investment environment and promotes the flowing of economic factors and the regional shifting of industries. Finally, the flowing of production elements and the regional shifting of industries make the resource allocation more effective, promote the integration of regional industries and simultaneously strengthen the industrial accumulative effect. Besides, the industrial supplementary effect also starts to appear.更多还原