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航空联盟形成机理及协调管理中若干问题研究

Research on Some Issues of the Formation Mechanism and Coordination Management about Airline Alliance

【作者】 文军

【导师】 杜文;

【作者基本信息】 西南交通大学 , 交通运输规划与管理, 2008, 博士

【摘要】 航空公司战略联盟是关系到多家航空公司经营活动的一种运作模式。其中各家航空公司的活动不是一种简单的线性叠加过程,而是动态的、复杂的、非线性的集成过程。这种特点决定了航空公司战略联盟运营组织和管理的复杂性和多变性。航空联盟理论研究和管理实践表明,在航空联盟成功构建和运转中,存在着伙伴选择、收益分配、风险控制、激励契约等问题。因此,对航空公司战略联盟进行系统和深入的研究,具有重要的理论和现实意义。本论文以现代管理学理论、系统工程理论、委托代理理论等原理为基础,运用博弈论、模糊数学、灰色评价、熵权法等方法,结合航空公司战略联盟的特点进行了研究。论文的研究内容主要包括以下几个方面:1.航空公司战略联盟的形成动因在对战略联盟的基本概念和形式进行回顾的基础上,对航空公司战略联盟的基本概念进行了界定,介绍了航空联盟的形式,并与一般联盟的形式做了对比分析,探讨了航空公司战略联盟的五个大特征,通过分析航空公司所处的环境变化因素和自身变化因素,将航空公司战略联盟形成的动因分为外部驱动因素和内部驱动因素。2.全球航空公司战略联盟的博弈分析建立了航空公司合作竞争行为的支付矩阵博弈模型,对航空公司的合作竞争行为进行了分析。通过对全球航空运输业进入、退出壁垒、成本结构及固定资产专用性的分析,认为全球航空运输业存在规模经济、具有寡头垄断的特征,并在此基础上运用多寡头市场的古诺模型、斯塔克博格模型对全球航空联盟进行了分析,得出了全球航空运输业战略联盟的发展趋势是全球航空公司企业追求利润最大化的必然结果,并预期这种趋势将持续下去。3.航空公司战略联盟合作伙伴选择研究航空公司战略联盟成功的关键是能否选择出理想的合作伙伴,这是一个复杂的决策问题。为此结合航空联盟合作伙伴选择的特点,讨论了航空联盟合作伙伴选择评价指标体系建立的原则,建立了航空联盟合作伙伴选择的三阶段选择模型,给出了航空联盟合作伙伴选择的评价指标体系,提出了一个比较新颖的算法,首先根据AHP方法确定模糊评价矩阵和权重向量,并针对航空联盟的敏捷性要求和特定的市场需求,提出了评价指标两两间的比较标度的修正方法,然后通过模糊运算对目标函数进行排序,实现对合作伙伴的最优选择。最后以实例表明本算法能有效的支持伙伴选择。4.航空公司战略联盟收益分配机制研究收益分配是战略联盟中关键而又矛盾最突出的一个问题,它对合作关系的持续稳定发展起决定作用。首先讨论了航空联盟收益分配机制的分配原则,在此基础上,运用合作博弈理论,建立了可转移支付的航空联盟合作博弈模型,并应用合作博弈中关于核心和核非空性等概念,研究了设计航空联盟收益分配机制的条件和约束,并重点讨论了其中的Shapely值法、Nash谈判模型法、核心法和MCRS法。最后,针对不同分配方法得到的结果不一致的情况,首次将熵权法的思想引入航空联盟收益分配协商问题中,利用熵权法求得各种分配方法的权重,再对各种分配方法得到的结果进行加权平均,即可将不同分配方法得到的结果折衷为相对合理的收益分配方案,解决了不同分配方法结果不一致的问题。5.航空公司战略联盟激励契约机制研究航空联盟的激励契约机制设计是航空联盟协调管理的重要手段,针对不同的环境,设计合适的激励契约将极大地提高航空联盟的协作水平。在总结了委托代理理论的基本分析框架基础上,建立了基于代码共享的航空联盟委托代理模型,然后针对信息对称和信息不对称情况下,分析了这两种激励方式对盟员航空公司协作行为的影响,进而通过引入内部监控信号和外部观测变量,达到了激励机制与监控机制相结合的方式来解决信息不对称所出现的道德风险问题。为航空联盟组织提高联盟合作效率,制定激励契约机制提供了一种参考方法。6.航空公司战略联盟的风险管理针对航空联盟组建、运营管理过程中的风险问题,论述了风险分析和风险管理的基本步骤以及各个阶段应用的主要方法;然后分析了航空联盟风险的含义和特性,并对航空联盟风险产生的诱因进行了识别和分类研究;其次考虑航空联盟风险因素和评价专家的灰色性影响,建立了航空联盟风险评价的指标体系,提出了基于多层次灰色的航空联盟风险评价方法,利用AHP建立评价指标的权重,借鉴多个专家的知识,计算出评价指标的灰色评价权系数矩阵,最终得到综合评价结果,通过实例验证,该方法切实可行。最后分析了航空联盟风险管理的目标,建立了航空联盟风险预警系统,以及风险规避与化解的对策。

【Abstract】 The airline strategy alliance is a kind of operation pattern being related to many airlines. In airline alliance, the airlines activity is not that one kind of simple linearity overlays process, but is dynamic, complex, the non-linear integrated process. This kind of characteristic has decided that the operation organization and management of airline strategy alliance is complexity and polytropy. The theory research and managing practice of airline alliance are indicated that the problems such as partner selection, profit distributing, risk control, incentive contract is exist during the constructing and operation managing of airline alliance. Therefore a system and further research on airline alliance is of great importance theoretically and realistically.In this dissertation, on the basis of some theory such as modern management thory, systems engineering theory, principal-agent theory, thinking of the characteristic of airline strategy alliance,we make research on the the method of game theory, fuzzy mathematics, gray appraisal method, entropy weight. The research is made as following:1. Research on the formation motive of the airline allianceOn the basis of the retrospection of the fundamental concept and form, the basic concept is put forward and the form of the airline alliance is introduced. Then the contrast analysis with the general alliance form has made. The five characteristics of airline alliance are discussed. On the grounds of analyzing the environmental variation factor about the airline self and outer, the formation motive of the airline alliance is divided into the external drive factor and internal actuation factor.2. Game Analysis of global airline strategy allianceThe game model of payment matrix about the behavior of cooperation and competition of the airline alliance is set up. The behavior cooperation and competition behavior of the airline alliance is analyzed. The global airline industry has the characteristics of scale economy and oligopoly based on the analyzing entering and withdrawing barriers and cost structure and fixed assets specificity. The Cournot model and Stackelberg model of duopoly market of the global airline industry are set up. This result is that the global airlines through strategic alliance seek for the maximum profit, and this tendency will continue.3. Study on selection of cooperation partners in the airline alliancesPartner selection is the key to successful airline strategic alliances, and is animportant and complex decision problem. In this paper, a new algorithm is put forward. First, the fuzzy comparison matrix and the criteria weight vector are given in the light of analytic hierarchy process(AHP). And the modifying method of the pairwise comparison gauge was presented according to the agility of airline alliances and the specific market demand. Then the optimal solution is acquired in terms of the sequence result of objective function. Finally, an example demonstrates the validity of the algorithm.4. Research on profit allocation of airline allianceThe profit allocation is an important and contradictory problem in the airline alliance. It plays a determinable role to the continuous and stable development of the cooperation. Firstly the four principles of profit distribution are put forward,then a kind of transferable payment cooperative game model, by using the concept of core and core non-vacant etc. the terms and subject to the payment mechanism of airline alliance’s profits are given. On the basis of these, some kinds of methods to fix on the reference value of payment vector are introduced, in which the Nash negotiation model and the Shapely method and Core method and minimum costs-remaining savings(MRCS) are taken emphases on. Because different profit allocation methods get different results, a new profit allocation method is used to resolve this variance. It uses entropy weight method to get the relative weight of each allocation methods, and then it compromises the different results into a relative reasonable profit allocation scheme through weighted average method.5. Reasearch on incentive contract mechanism of airline alliance Designing the incentive contract mechanism of airline accliance is the impormence means of coordination management. The appropriate incentive contract mechanism will enhance the level of coordination. On the basis of the basic analysis frame of principal-agent theory, principal-agent model of airline alliance based on code-sharing is set up. In symmetric information and asymmetric information, the influence on the incentive behavior of airline alliance is analyzed. And under introduced to the inside supervising signal and the outside observation variable, the moral hazard in asymmetric information are solved. This result is provided a reference method for improving the cooperation efficiency of airline alliance.6. Research on risk management of airlin allianceFirstly the basic step of risk analysis and management and the main using method in each phase are stated. Then the conception and characteristic of airline alliance is analyzed. The risk inducement of airline alliance is identified and studied according of different species. The evaluation index system of risk of airline alliance is set up. The evaluation method based on the hierarchy grey evaluation is put forth. The weighted value is constructed by AHP. The grey evaluation weighte coefficient matrix is calculated and the synthesis evaluation result is gained. An example demonstrates the validity of the algorithm. Finally, the aim of risk management of airline alliance is analyzed, and the early-warning system of risk of airline alliance is constructed, and the measure of avoiding and disassembling risk is bringed forward.

  • 【分类号】F224;F560
  • 【被引频次】11
  • 【下载频次】1186
  • 攻读期成果
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