【作者】 王星；

【导师】 田毅鹏；

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 社会学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 本篇博士论文探讨三个问题:一是对比转型过程中单位政治的变化图示,将单位政治纳入时间序列中进行考察;二是解释单位政治不同类型的制度成因;三是意图通过制度匹配概念,思考结构是如何决定行动主体行为方式选择这一社会学的基本问题。本文归纳了分配政治和生产政治两种单位政治类型,在解释路径上坚持理性行为的立场,但是认为理性行为本身的选择偏好来自制度,规定行为主体行动取向的利益是现实具体的,即理性是社会建构的。笔者抛弃了理性选择理论“动机还原”的解释路径,而是从制度层面推导出个体的利益政治行动,认为单位工厂内的政治行为虽然是行为个体基于自身利益诉求而衍生的,但是这种利益诉求是在具体的制度环境中展开的并由制度所规定。基于此理论假设,本文依据单位政治行为和单位组织治理机制相匹配原理建构了整个解释框架。同时以东北一家国有企业中的师徒间的劳动政治转型变化事实验证了解释框架的有效性,并延伸探讨了非市场治理机制对和谐社会建设的重要意义。更多还原

【Abstract】 The basic characteristic of China transformation is regarded as“the state evacuated from the economic area and release the market power”. The state’s evacuation means two points: firstly, the control way of state has been changed and the interest distribution way is also different with the old one; secondly, for the social member, the protection of state is disappearing. This not only means the central government’s plan control way has a big change, but also means the ideas and the other institution arrangement of the state’s protection are absent. In the process of transformation, the market power’s release will set the logic of“competition and substitute”, what is embedded in the market power, free. This will re-construct the social interest distribution way and lead to many kinds of conflict and contend around the marketization. I chose the Danwei politics as the research topic because the reform of the SOEs in China follow the rule of transformation, the relationship between the state, the Danwei and the social individual will be very complex and interesting.The forepassed research about this topic has the deficiency, which is as follows: firstly, among the production, the historical comparative research is seldom. The productions focus on the macro-institution, namely the whole regime of Danwei. They were seldom focus on the process of the political conflict behind the Danwei organization’s marketing transformation. And secondly, they often emphasize the face of Danwei’s political and social characteristic, but ignore the face of Danwei’s product function. I think that the Danwei is consisting of three closely related kind of face, namely the political, social and economic characteristic. These tree kinds of characteristic are triunity. Many of the Danwei’s action are as the part of the national stratagem. The historical evidence tell us that the way of“Danwei Ban Shehui”was to keep the factory’s product order and to satisfy the need of industrialization. So our study on the Danwei politics should not ignore the production politics. Thirdly, much of the research work are mainly to conclude the type of Danwei politics, they are seldom to look for the cause of Danwei politics and the change of their type. Even some of the research touched upon the mechanism of causation, but because of the limitation of the interpretation, which was mainly based on the rational choice theory, many of the conclusions were wrong.The marketization of Danwei organization is a course that means the state reduces the direct intervention in the labor process. The action of Danwei is getting more and more rationalization. This has two handles: firstly, in the age of the plan economy, the Danwei organization used as a tool to realize the industrialized strategy by the state. Most of the Danwei’s actions was organized around the law of“anti-interest”. The labor management belonged to the paternalistic regime. The agreement that the workers signed with the Danwei was a kind of social contract. Secondly, in the reform era, the labor relation between state and workers transited from social contract to market contract. The labor management follows the law of market and quest for the interest. This is the background in which Danwei politics was produced and changed. Danwei politics includes two types, one is called“distribution politics”, which is around the resource and interest distribution. The other one is defined as product politics, which is happened in the labor process and around the relation in the production. This dissertation addresses three question as follows: firstly, I draw upon historical comparative studies on Danwei politics. Secondly, find the institution factors which cause the different Danwei politics types. Thirdly, based on the conception—institution complementarity, this dissertation want to address a classic sociological topic, which is“how the structure shape the agent’s choice?”The reform leads to the change of the regime of Danwei governance. There are three kinds of governance institution systems, namely liberal market economies, coordinated market economies and plan economies. The competitive relationship between the Danwei(corporate) organizations and the labor management institution in different market arrangement context are also different. The system of corporate governance is a complex configuration, which is made of varied institutions. These institutions build up a field. The outcome of institution complementarity is reached by the institutional interaction. If one of the institutions was altered, the other institutions, especially the adjacent institution arrangements will also be affected. A new situation of institutional interaction is created, which leads to the institution change and conflict. The interest politics is the main expressional form.We can’t regard China economy as liberal market economies, but the reform rule obviously inclined to the law of liberal market. The reform of Danwei is aim to marketed the organization and workers. The marketed institutions include, for example, the laid-off institution, labor contract system and construction of the labor market. The inter-institutional conflicts lead to the Danwei politics transition from distribution politics to production politics. As the case story shown, the model of the optimal efficiency is only theoretic. The interest politics that are produced around the mentoring relationship in SOEs show us that the agent political action usually includes three levels of means: firstly, the interactive relationship between the various institutions. Secondly, the interactive relationship between the institution and agent. Thirdly, the interaction between different agent. This is a kind of structuring process, which belongs to the political economy process and can’t be explained by the abstract rational incentive principle.Obviously, all of the political actions are the outcome of the agent’s choice. But the biggest difference between the historical institutionalism of economic sociology and the rational choice theory is that the former one focuses more on the formation of the preference than the later one. The historical institutionalism of economic sociology thinks that the rationality is constructed by the social institution: Firstly, their definitions of institution are different. The former regards institution as a action context, but the later regard the institution as a tool of tactic. Secondly, the historical institutionalism emphasizes the contextual constraint and regards institution as a determinant of choices and preferences. Thirdly, the rational choice theory emphasizes the agent’s calculating, but the historical institutionalism of economic sociology thinks that the study should combine the agent action with the culture context. In belief, the historical institutionalism is opposed to the transcendental rational belief. So the historical institutionalism insists that we should use the dynamic way to study the institutional change, the processing method is very useful. Based on the interactive relationship between the structure and the agent, the scholars of historical institutionalism are to study the institutional change’s whole process and outcome. The action logic of agent belongs to the appropriate reaction, it is not the maximize process. Historical institutionalism insists on the semi-determinism. They think that the institution has the dual nature: when the institution is stable, they are independent variable, which shapes the politics and policy. When the institution come to change, they are dependent variable, which will be shaped by the politics and policy. This is the theoretic meaning.This dissertation’s reality meaning is to show us the non-market governance mechanism’s important feature to the economic order and industry relationship in factory. The capitalism political economy thinks that the non-market governance mechanism is aim to protect the society. In general, when the liberal market mechanism doesn’t work, the non-market mechanism will work as the supplement. Karl Polanyi called them double movement, namely the movement between the self-regulating market and the social protection. But how the double movement is going on?What’s the interactive form between the market and the non-market mechanism? There are many different ideas about these questions. The economic neo-liberalism claims that the non-market mechanism is de-commercialize, it can strengthen the workers’power,but weaken the capital’s power. This situation will lead to the politics against markets, which blight the market institution’s performance. However, many domestic scholars overly emphasize the social protection as an opposed action against markets. My study in this dissertation provides a new approach that the market mechanism and the non-market mechanism can be close match and the arrangement also has a good performance. I believe that this conclusion is of an significance to the construction of the innovative state and the harmonious society.更多还原