【作者】 吴庆；

【导师】 但斌；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 随着企业业务的全球化和竞争的加剧,以及环境的不断变化,物流外包已经成为许多企业成功的重要战略工具。将物流业务外包给第三方物流服务提供商(Third Party Logistics Service Providers,TPLSP)主要可以获得两个方面的优势:降低、节约物流成本;提高物流服务水平。从这两个维度出发,本文主要研究了如何设计有效的合同协调TPLSP和客户企业之间的利益冲突问题。首先,在考虑客户企业的产品价格与需求之间存在线性关系的条件下,设计了一种共享节约合同协调TPLSP和客户企业共同努力节约物流成本的利益冲突问题。运用动态博弈模型论证了共享节约合同可以形成一种有效的内在激励机制,可以激励双方共同努力节约物流成本,并且这一合同优于常见的物流外包合同。最后,运用算例证实了共享节约合同具有良好的性质和效率。其次,在前面研究的基础上,考虑到除了价格因素外,产品的市场需求还会受到顾客的可支配收入、消费偏好、以及季节变化等因素的影响,为了更好的模拟、解释现实情况,进一步假设客户企业产品的市场需求是随机的。在这一假设条件下,研究了共享节约合同如何协调TPLSP与客户企业共同努力节约物流成本的问题。运用动态博弈模型论证了共享节约合同能有效的协调双方共同努力节约物流成本的利益冲突,实现双方的共赢、系统利润的更优。然而,在共享节约合同下,双方的努力程度、客户企业的存货决策量和系统的利润都不能达到集中式决策模式下的最优水平,即共享节约合同不能实现系统的完美协调。最后,给出了相应的算例。最后,研究了物流服务水平影响市场需求变化的第三方物流协调合同设计问题。当TPLSP提供的物流服务水平不影响客户企业的产品市场需求时,在常见的物流外包合同下双方的博弈会导致客户企业的存货决策量低于其在集中式决策下的情况,即存货扭曲的问题。为了解决这一问题,设计了一种收入共享合同。当合同参数满足一定条件时,收入共享合同不仅可以协调存货扭曲的问题,而且可以实现系统利润的最优、双方的共赢。当TPLSP提供的物流服务水平影响客户企业的产品市场需求时,在常见的物流外包合同下双方的博弈会导致TPLSP提供的物流服务水平、客户企业的存货决策量都低于其在集中式决策下的情况,即物流服务水平扭曲和存货扭曲的问题。为了解决这一问题,设计了一种收入共享与服务成本共担的组合式合同。运用动态博弈模型论证了在一定条件下,这一组合式合同既可以协调TPLSP的物流服务水平的决策,又能协调客户企业的存货决策,并且能实现系统利润的最优、双方的共赢。最后,运用算例进一步证实了上述两种协调合同的良好性质和效率。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the globalization of businesses, the consequent competitive pressures and the constantly changing environment, many organizations have progressively sought to outsource their logistics functions as successful strategic tools. Outsourcing their logistics functions to third party logistics service providers (TPLSP), these organizations mainly gain two advantages, including reducing or saving logistics cost and improving logistics service levels. From the two perspectives, this thesis studies how to design effective contracts to coordinate the benefit conflicts between a TPLSP and a client enterprise.Firstly, under the assumption that there is a linear relative between the product price and the market demand for the client enterprise’s product, a shared-savings contract is designed to coordinate the benefit conflicts in that the TPLSP and the client enterprise exert joint efforts to save logistics costs. And a dynamic game model is developed to demonstrate that the shared-savings contract makes an effective intrinsic incentive mechanism which drives both sides to exert joint efforts to save the logistics costs, and the shared-savings contract is better than a usual logistics outsource contract. In addition, a corresponding example is presented to illustrate that the shared-savings contract has good properties and high efficiency.Secondly, on the base of the former study, considering that the market demand for the client enterprise’s product is influenced not only by the product price but also by the factors, such as the dominative revenue and consumption priorities of consumers and season change, the assumption that the market demand is stochastic is provided to better simulate and explain actual things. Under the assumption, the problem that how a shared-savings contract coordinates the benefit conflicts in that the TPLSP and the client enterprise exert joint efforts to save logistics costs is studied. And a dynamic game model is developed to demonstrate that the shared-savings contract can effectively coordinate the benefit conflicts, achieve a win-win outcome and improve the profit of the system. However, the effort levels of both sides, the order inventory of the client enterprise and the optimal profit of the system under the shared-savings contract cannot achieve the optimal levels under centralized making decision mode, i.e., the shared-savings contract cannot achieve full coordination. Moreover, a corresponding example is presented to illustrate the conclusions. Finally, this thesis studies the coordinating contract design problem for the TPLSP and the client enterprise with logistics service levels dependent market demand. When the market demand for the client enterprise’s product is not influenced by logistics service levels that the TPLSP provides, the games between both sides lead to that the order inventory of the client enterprise under the usual logistics outsource contract is less than that under centralized making decision mode, i.e., inventory distortion problem. To resolve the problem, a properly designed revenue-sharing contract is designed. When contract parameters satisfy some conditions, the revenue-sharing contract can not only coordinate inventory distortion but also achieve full channel coordination and a win-win outcome. When the market demand is influenced by logistics service levels, the games between both sides bring that logistics service levels that the TPLSP provides and the order inventory of the client enterprise are less than those under centralized making decision mode, i.e., the distortions of inventory and logistics service levels. To resolve the problem, a properly designed combination contract with revenue-sharing and service-cost-sharing is designed. And a dynamic game model is developed to demonstrate that the combination contract can achieve full channel coordination and a win-win outcome as well as coordinate the distortions of inventory and logistics service levels. Further more, a corresponding example is presented to illustrate the good properties and high efficiency of the above coordinating contracts.更多还原