【作者】 赵莹；

【导师】 杨玉生；

【作者基本信息】 辽宁大学 ， 经济思想史， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 国有企业是国民经济的支柱,国有经济占主导地位是社会主义市场经济的重要特征之一。国有企业改革是经济体制改革的中心环节,是整个改革取得成功的关键。因此,国有企业的生机与活力、改革与发展关系到社会主义事业的长治久安,关系到社会稳定和经济发展全局。经过近30年改革,国有企业发生了巨大的变化,取得了巨大的成就,但是我们也要看到,同发达市场经济国家的现代企业相比较,我国的国有企业仍存在一定的差距。比如说,一些大型国有企业仍背负着沉重的历史包袱,还没有摆脱企业办社会的状况;一些国有企业中仍然存在大量冗员;一些国有企业缺乏自主创新能力,核心技术完全依赖外国;还有一些国有企业严重依赖银行贷款存活,企业资产负债率居高不下等等。从整体上看,国有企业的效率低于其他所有制企业。国有企业所表现出来的所有这些问题,都与一个深层次的问题—软预算约束分不开。所以,要想解决国有企业存在的这些问题,从根本上说,就是要解决国有企业面对的软预算约束。软预算约束是匈牙利学者科尔奈首先提出的一个概念。经过30余年的发展,软预算约束理论已经成为现代经济学的前沿理论之一,它与企业资本结构、所有权边界、经济增长等经济学基本理论结合在一起,用于分析各种社会经济现象。软预算约束理论研究方向之一就是分析不同社会制度背景下的企业行为,因此,本文应用软预算约束理论对我国国有企业展开分析,期望通过对软预算约束问题的探讨,探寻硬化预算约束的治理方式,为我国国有企业改革方式方法的选择提供借鉴。文章主要内容如下:第一,文章对软预算约束理论的基本内容进行了分析,主要包括软预算约束概念,软预算约束的形成机制,软预算约束产生的影响,软预算约束理论的发展及应用情况,最后分析了软预算约束理论中对国有企业问题的研究。第二,文章对国有企业软预算约束的形成机制进行了分析。首先,本文按照DM模型动态承诺不一致的分析思路,构建了国有企业软预算约束的基本模型;其次,本文介绍了软预算约束的各种存在形式;最后,论述了导致国有企业软预算约束问题的各种原因。软预算约束反映了国家与国有企业之间的关系。社会主义国家政府的父爱主义使国家可以不求回报地为国有企业提供援助,而重工业优先发展战略的实施,使国有企业缺乏自生能力。在企业承担政策性负担导致政策性亏损的情况下,国家对企业亏损负有责任,救助不可避免。政府对国有企业的管制使政府官员在企业决策中拥有了很大的权利,而这种官员管理制度的存在,使企业的软预算约束成为可能。这三个方面都是从政府、政治家、政治利益角度探讨软预算约束的成因,除了这些政治上的原因之外,还可以从经济体系内部探讨软预算约束。此时,缺乏动态承诺一致性是造成软预算约束问题的重要原因。在这种分析思路中,强调“集中”这一特性是一种主要的分析观点,所以,本文探讨了不同的集中(或集权)方式在软预算约束问题上的作用,这其中即包括银行信贷体系上的集中,也包括国家财政上的集权性,还包括由生产集中导致的软预算约束。此外,内部人控制也会导致软预算约束,由于掌握企业控制权会给经理带来极大的个人利益,当企业遇到困难时经理有激励寻求外部救助,维持企业的生存,进而维持自己的控制地位。于是,软预算约束就产生了。第三,本文论述了国有企业软预算约束的表现形式,也就是软预算约束对国有企业产生的影响,从对国有企业产生的各种影响角度来看,软预算约束对国有企业的作用是消极的。软预算约束对国有企业效率的负作用表现在企业的生产经营管理和投入产出各个方面。最重要的是,它改变了企业经营者对未来的预期,引发“道德风险”和“逆向选择”问题,这种救助的预期一旦形成,则直接影响到企业行为。这种影响不仅体现为对企业效率的负作用,还表现在其他一些方面。如对企业融资结构产生的影响,对企业产品供给产生的影响,及对企业自主创新能力产生的影响。无论是哪一方面的影响,都使国有企业存在的问题暴露得更为明显,使国有企业的一些缺点表现得更为突出,软预算约束的存在使国有企业无法显示出其优势,且存在很多问题。因此,在国有企业改革中,解决软预算约束问题就成为一项重要的任务。第四,本文讨论了国有企业软预算约束的治理问题。分别从支持体、预算约束体、市场体系的完善角度进行了讨论。从支持体的角度看,如何作出令人置信的承诺,改变预算约束体对未来救助的预期,是硬化预算约束的关键。既然集中制是导致软预算约束的原因之一,那么进行分散化改革则有助于解决这一问题,如财政分权、信贷分散化等等。从预算约束体的角度看,由于所有制形式并非软预算约束的决定因素,所以硬化预算约束并不意味着一定要改变公有制。只有当满足一定条件时,私有化才能起到硬化预算约束的作用。其实,无论是公有制企业还是私有制企业,只要存在所有权和经营权的分离,就会存在委托代理问题,存在道德风险和逆向选择问题,也会存在软预算约束问题。私有化本身并不可能解决软预算约束问题。同私有化比起来,重组可能是硬化预算约束更好的方式。此外,既然“内部人控制”是造成软预算约束的原因之一,那么,解决内部人控制问题,就起到了硬化预算约束的作用。本文认为,强化对企业经营者的激励约束机制,可以减少经营者的道德风险行为。与国有企业的多重目标相对应,解决国有企业办社会问题,减轻企业负担,就要促进市场体系的建立与完善。一方面,要完善市场竞争体系,有效解决投资人与企业之间的信息不对称问题,另一方面,要加强社会保障体系的建设,由社会而不是由企业负责职工的养老、医疗、失业保障等问题。这样,从多方面入手,才能有效解决软预算约束问题,使国有企业改革取得成功,而不是单纯依赖产权改革。更多还原

【Abstract】 State-Owned enterprises are the pillar of the national economy and are one of the main characters of the socialist market economy. The reform of the state-owned enterprises is the core of economic system reform which is significant to the success of the whole reform. So the vigor and enterprising of state-owned firms are related to the development and stability of socialist society. After 30 years reform, State-owned enterprises in China have changed dramatically and made a rapid progress. However, it should be noticed that there is a large gap between State-Owned enterprises in China and ones in the developed market economy countries. For example, some large State-Owned enterprises in China are burdened by the problem of enterprise-run society. Some of them are trouble in the superfluous staffs and lack of independent innovation ability to acquire the core technology which comes from foreign countries. Some of them rely seriously on the loan from banks and keep high asset-debt ratio. In a whole, the efficiency of State-Owned enterprises is lower than those under other ownership. The problems in State-Owned enterprises are involved with the deep-seated reason of Soft Budget Constraint.The conception of Soft Budget Constraint is initially introduced by the Hungarian scholar Kornai. With 30 years development, the theory of Soft Budget Constraint has been one of the frontier modern economic theories. It is used to analyze different social economic problems, combined with economic fundamental theories such as enterprise capital construction, property frontier and economic development. One of the research fields of Soft Budget Constraint theory is to analyze the enterprise activity under different social system. The article applies the theory of Soft Budget Constraint to analyze State-Owned enterprises in China in order to seek efficient governance pattern to tighten budge constraint and propose reference for the selection of reform mode and method of State-owned enterprise. The article is arranged as following:First, the article analyzes the main contents of Soft Budget Constraint theory. The contents include the conception of the Soft Budget Constraint, formation mechanism of the Soft Budget Constraint, development of the Soft Budget Constraint theory and its application. Finally the researches on State-Owned enterprises among the Soft Budget Constraint theory are discussed.Second, the article analyzes the formation mechanism of State-Owned enterprise. First, the article constructs the basic model of Soft Budget Constraint of State-Owned enterprises according to the analytical thinking of dynamic promise inconsistent of DM model. Second, the existing forms of Soft Budget Constraint are given. Finally, the reasons for the Soft Budget Constraint are discussed. The Soft Budget Constraint reflects the relationship between nations and State-Owned enterprise. The Patemalism leaves the governments of socialist countries to provide aid regardless of pay. Moreover, the prior development strategy of heavy industries makes the State-Owned enterprises lose the spontaneity ability. Policy burden of State-Owned enterprises leads to policy depletion. As a result it is inevitably that government compensates on the loss of enterprises. The regulation of government to State-Owned enterprises gives it large right to charge enterprises and existence of official management institution makes Soft Budget Constraint of State-Owned enterprises possible. All reasons mentioned above analyze the problem of Soft Budget Constraint from the aspect of government, political man and political interests. Except that, the problem of Soft Budget Constraint can be analyzed from the internal economical system. At this time, time inconsistent problem is the main reason for Soft Budget Constraint. Under this way, the character of centralization is emphasized as a main analytic point of view. So the article examines the effects of different centralization patterns on Soft Budget Constraint, such as centralization of the bank credit system, centralization of government finance right and centralization of production. Furthermore, insider control can lead to Soft Budget Constraint. Because the enterprise control power can bring managers great individual benefits. When enterprises are in trouble, managers are stimulated to seek external assistance to keep the survival of enterprises and control position of him. So the problem of Soft Budget Constraint takes place.Third, the article discusses the existence patterns of Soft Budget Constraint of State-Owned enterprises, in other words, the effects of Soft Budget Constraint on the State-Owned enterprises. From aspect of the influence of Soft Budget Constraint on State-Owned enterprises, the role is negative and can been seen from enterprise management and input-output conditions. It is the most important that it converts the anticipation of the manager and causes the problem of moral hazard and adverse selection. Once the anticipation of aid comes into being, enterprise activity will be influenced instantly. The influence not only includes the negative effect on enterprise efficiency but also includes other aspects such as finance structure, product supply and independent innovation ability. No matter which influence happened the existing problems and disadvantages of the State-Owned enterprises can be manifested. The existing problem of Soft Budget Constraint limits advantages of State-Owned enterprises and leads to many problems. So it is an important task to solve the problem of Soft Budget Constraint for the reform of State-Owned enterprises.Finally, the article studies the governing problems of Soft Budget Constraint of State-Owned enterprises from aspects of supporting substance, budget constraint substance and perfect degree of market system. As for supporting substance, it is key to tighten budget constraint how believable commitment are made to convert the anticipation of budget constraint substance to future aid. Now that centralized system is one of the reasons for the Soft Budget Constraint, decentralization reforms such as fiscal decentralization and credit decentralization can be carried out to solve the problem. As for budget constraint substance, ownership is not the determinant of Soft Budget Constraint, so it doesn’t mean to tighten budget constraint by the conversion of the public ownership. Only if some conditions are satisfied, privatization can tighten budget constraint. Actually, if there is the separation of ownership and managerial authority, the problem of principal-agent, moral hazard and adverse selection and Soft Budget Constraint appear. Privatization itself can’t solve the problem of Soft Budget Constraint. Compare with privatization, reorganization may be a better method to tighten budget constraint. Moreover, now that insider control is one of reasons for Soft Budget Constraint, it can tighten budget constraint to solve the problem of insider control. The article concludes that it can reduce the moral hazard behaviors of managers to tighten the incentive and constraint mechanism of the managers of enterprises. Relative to the multiple targets of State-Owned enterprises, it can solve the problem of enterprise-run society and reduce the burden of enterprises to establish and improve market system. In one side, market system needs to be improved to efficiently solve the information asymmetry. In the other side, social security system should be strengthened and the problems such as pension security, medical security and unemployment security should be charged by the government not by the enterprises. Rather than simply relying on proper right reform, only in this way the problem of Soft Budget Constraint can be solved to make the reform of State-Owned enterprises success.更多还原