【作者】 王鹏；

【导师】 张桂文；

【作者基本信息】 辽宁大学 ， 政治经济学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 关于专利保护的正当性,存在支持和反对两个派别,两派别争议的实质是专利制度利弊之间的矛盾问题。为解决这一问题,经济学家从专利的保护范围、期限两个方面,对最优专利机制进行了设计,以在专利垄断带来的社会福利损失和激励创新之间寻求平衡。1960年,美国著名经济学家罗纳德·科斯出版了他的关于社会成本问题的论文,成为法经济学的奠基之作。此后,交易费用分析、产权分析等理论被应用到侵权法的经济分析研究中,开启了侵权法经济分析研究的新浪潮。但是,关于专利侵权法律制度的探讨并不多见,我国几位青年学者虽然从不同角度对此进行了有益的尝试,可总体上仍显得相对滞后:一是没有进行完整的系统研究,二是缺少最优制度设计,三是对有关专利侵权法律制度的基本理论理解不够充分。专利侵权法律制度是随着商品经济的发展和技术的进步,尤其是随着技术的商品化而产生发展起来的。从经济学的角度看,主要包括四个方面的内容:一是专利权二次界定制度,二是落入专利权保护范围判定制度,三是专利实施权安排制度,四是外部性解决制度。专利侵权法律制度具有两大特点:一个是将权利行使制度与救济制度相互融合起来,形成禁止性规范;另一个是相对其他权利来讲,对产权更为严格的限制。与法学上的专利权范畴相比,经济学上的专利权关注的重点是效率。专利权具有排他性、分解性、可让渡性和界定高成本性的经济特征。由于专利权的初始界定大多不够清晰,为了实现产权的功能,专利侵权法律制度首先要解决的问题是明晰产权,即对专利权进行第二次界定。在专利权明晰后,通过劳动价值分析、成本收益比较等方法,构建经济模型,对何种产品或方法落入专利权保护范围进行判断。关于专利实施权安排问题,一般情况下,实施权属于专利权人,专利权人可以与他人通过谈判对专利实施权自愿交易,这是有效率的。但是,在某些情况下,由于交易费用过高,抑制了实施权交易,为使专利技术得到有效利用,应将实施权安排给对实施权净值评价最高的一方。专利侵权产生了外部性。传统上通过政府干预方式解决外部性存在明显不足,应当综合运用财产规则和责任规则解决外部性问题。在确定侵权责任的承担时,要结合不同情况适用不同的责任规则,激励侵权人施加社会最优注意水平和行为水平:对侵权产品的销售者、使用者适用过错责任规则,对其他实施者适用无过错责任规则。同时,法院判决不同的赔偿数额对激励侵权人选择最优行为也有不同的作用,一般情况下,按照实际损失全面赔偿,是有效率的选择。但是,法院在难以确定专利侵权损失的情况下,对损失加权平均值的计算相对正确,也能够激励侵权人采取最优行为方式。总体上看,我国专利侵权法律制度符合我国经济发展阶段和效率的要求,但是还存一些问题,需要进一步完善专利产权界定制度和实施权安排制度,健全诉讼成本分担规则,改革专利案件审理体制,设立统一的专利高级法院。更多还原

【Abstract】 As to the justness of patent protection, there exist different opinions from two groups. The essence of the dispute lies in contradiction of patent system between the pros and cons. Faced with this problem, economists have designed an optimum patent mechanism from three aspects: the length, width and height of patent protection, in order to seek the equilibrium between loss of social welfare and encouraging innovation brought by patent monopolization. In 1960, Ronald, famous economist of U.S.A., published his thesis about the problem of social cost, thereby laying a foundation to law economics. Hereafter, theories about trade expense analysis and property rights analysis etc., have been applied to the study of economic analysis of infringement law, which surged a new tide of the study. However, the discussion about the legal system of patent infringement was actually rare. Though several young scholars in our country have carried on beneficial attempt to this from different angles, the study still seems relatively backward in the following ways: First, the study was not intact and systematical enough; Second, the study lacked optimum system design; Third, the basic theories about legal system of patent infringement were not fully understood.The legal system of patent infringement came into being with the development of commodity economy and progress of the technology, especially with commoditization of technology. From the viewpoint of economics, the system of patent infringement has four major parts: The first is its second-defining system; The second is the judging system to fall into the patent protective range; The third is the arranging system of executing patent rights; The fourth is the solving system of externality. Moreover, the legal system of patent infringement has two major characteristics: One is to form a prohibitive norm by merging the exercising system of rights with the relieving system; The other is to exert a relatively stricter limit to rights compared with others.Compared with the category of patent rights in law science, the focal point of the patent right in economics is the efficiency. The patent right has such economic characteristics as exclusiveness, decomposing nature, being amortized and high cost of defining. Since the initial defining of the patent right is mostly unclear enough, in order to realize the function of the property right, the initial problem that the legal system of patent infringement should solve is to define a distinct property right, i.e. to define the patent right for the second time. After the patent right is defined, through analyzing labor value and comparing cost and income, an economic pattern needs to be constructed to make judgment about which kind of products and methods fall into the domain of patent right protection. Generally, as to the arrangement of implementing right, it belongs to the patentee, and it is efficient that the patentee should trade the right voluntarily through negotiations with others. However, in some cases, the high cost of trade can actually inhibit the trade of implementing right. In order to utilize the patent technology effectively, the implementing right should be granted to the party which appraises supreme the net value of implementing right.Patent infringement produces externality. It is obviously insufficient to solve the problem of externality through the traditional way of government interference. Instead, both property rule and liability rule should be used synthetically to solve the problem. When confirming liability for tort, different liability rules should be applied in different situations, encouraging infringers to exert the social optimum attention level and behavioral level: To the seller and the user of the infringed products, liability rule of the fault should be applied. Whereas to other implementers, the liability rule of non-fault should be applied. Meanwhile, the variety in the amount of compensation by the court’s judgment plays a different role in encouraging infringers to choose the optimum behavior too. Generally speaking, to fully compensate real losses is an efficient choice. But in confirming patent infringement under the lost situation, it is a relatively correct calculation to add an average to the loss, which can also encourage infringers to take the optimum behavior.On the whole, the legal system of patent infringement of our country accords with the demands of economic development stage of our country and of efficiency. However, some problems still exist, which calls for the need to further improve both defining system of patent property and arrangement system of implementing right; to perfect sharing rule of the cost of lawsuit; to reform the trial system of patent cases patent case and to set up a unified patent higher court.更多还原