【作者】 安玉兴；

【导师】 唐晓华；

【作者基本信息】 辽宁大学 ， 产业经济学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 随着技术和需求的变化,电信市场的垄断结构已经不再是最优的产业组织结构。放松规制、引入竞争已经成为了促进电信市场竞争的有效的、通用的方法和手段,而根据网络效应理论,实现电信网络的有效竞争,就必须实现不同电信网络之间的互联互通。不同电信网络之间的互联互通,就涉及到了接入价格的确定的问题。接入价格的确定方法(政府强制或谈判协商、互惠接入定价或非互惠接入定价等)以及接入价格的高低都将影响电信运营商的接入激励和市场的竞争效果。因此从电信网络之间的接入为切入点,分析接入方式、接入定价等对电信网络之间的竞争的影响,结合中国电信市场的实际,提出提高中国电信市场有效竞争的政策建议。这篇论文基于传统的SCP框架,在此框架基础上分析电信网络结构、运营商行为以及市场的竞争绩效。电信网络之间的结构主要是从以下两个方面展开的:一是电信网络横向结构,包括基于覆盖率的网络结构、基于成本异质的网络结构、基于网络差异化的网络结构以及基于异质网络的网络结构等;二是电信网络的纵向结构,包括纵向一体化的网络结构和纵向分离的网络结构等。运用经典的LRT模型,本文分析了本地电信市场的网络竞争、长途电信市场的网络竞争,并结合中国的实际,对原有的LRT模型进行了必要的扩展,以适合对中国电信市场的分析。模型的扩展主要是基于以下几个方面:进入决策对市场结构的影响、移动网络之间的竞争、移动与固定网络之间的竞争、全业务电信运营商之间的网络竞争。本文将使用规范分析方法对电信竞争中接入问题进行了分析,使用比较分析方法对不同市场结构下的接入定价行为及其产生的竞争绩效进行比较分析。本文使用实证分析方法分析中国电信业的竞争及接入问题,对中国电信业有一个总体的把握和判断,以了解和掌握中国电信业的市场结构、接入价格的构成和规制制度以及零售市场价格竞争状况。在对不同市场结构下的网络间竞争的分析中,使用博弈分析方法确定接入价格等决策变量。通过理论模型的分析和实践的检验,本论文认为:电信市场的有效竞争,市场结构以及网络之间的互联互通进而接入价格的水平起到了关键的作用。中国电信市场的结构、接入(结算)体系在促进电信市场竞争的过程中作用微弱,甚至起阻碍作用,因此中国电信市场没有实现有效的竞争。电信市场的放松规制、引入竞争仍将继续。无论是基于覆盖率、成本还是基于网络之间的差异性,网络的对称性决定了网络的竞争均衡的对称性,但是接入价格是否互惠性、零售价格是否线性、零售价格是否歧视性等价格行为将影响市场的最终绩效。如果竞争性的网络是没有价格歧视的话,那么在线性定价下,接入价格成为合谋的工具,而在两部收费下,接入价格不会成为默许合谋的工具。如果网络之间有价格歧视的话,那么两部收费仍然会成为合谋的工具,竞争性网络会采取互免结算的方法来弱化网络之间的竞争。当网络基于覆盖率、成本还是网络之间的差异而存在不对称的时候,竞争均衡将不具有对称性。长途电信市场的竞争均衡取决于网络的结构(一体化或分离)、成本结构(独立的长途部门与一体化的长途部门的成本差异)、单向和双向接入价格的制定方式和水平以及本地电信市场的竞争状况。本地电信市场的竞争越是激烈,那么长途电信市场的零售价格越低。但是中国长途电信市场的激烈竞争不是由于本地电信市场的激烈竞争,而是由于接入价格的结算体制导致长途电信市场的激烈竞争。如果规制者完全规制零售价格和接入价格而对进入不加规制的话,潜在进入者的进入可能导致市场的过度进入或进入不足。到底是过度进入还是进入不足,取决于规制者对潜在进入者的成本信息的掌握程度。规制者对潜在进入者的成本信息掌握得越是充分,那么市场的结构就越能够达到福利最大化的水平。市场结构的内生性、成本信息的不对称性导致均衡的不确定性。两部收费以及非歧视性定价下,如果零售价格是不受规制的,那么双向收费是严格优于单向收费的。给定零售价格不受规制,当双向收费改为单向收费的时候,零售价格是提高的,厂商的利润是减少的,消费者剩余和社会总福利都是减少的。而目前对双改单改革的一个一般化的观点就是,双向收费改为单向收费是以不改变零售价格为前提的。然而,当运营商具有定价自主权的时候,双改单一定会导致零售价格的提高。两部收费及非歧视性定价下,移动运营商的市场份额的增加,将会导致移动零售价格的下降。固定运营商提高接入价格,会导致移动运营商零售价格的增加和市场份额的降低。而固定网络的零售价格与接入价格和市场份额无关。从当前的趋势来看,移动对固定的替代越来越大,实现电信运营商的全业务经营是电信改革的必然选择。在全业务运营下,FMC将是全业务下的核心特征。3G标准的实施,将会为全业务经营提供广泛的应用空间。模型的扩展为中国电信市场的有效竞争提供了改革的理论基础,通过理论和中国电信市场的现状及问题的分析,本论文给出了中国电信市场基于接入的促进有效竞争的对策建议,主要包括:全业务运营商、号码可携带、虚拟运营商、产业规制体系以及网间结算体制等方面。要想实现中国电信市场的有效竞争,全业务运营、虚拟运营商的进入、号码可携带、网间结算体制的完善将是促进中国电信市场有效竞争的有力保障。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the change of technology and demand, the monopoly market structure intelecommunication industry is no more the first best structure of industrial organization.Deregulation and competition have been the effective and common methods for thedevelopment of telecommunication industry. According to the theory of network effects,different telecommunication network must be interconnected with each other in order toachieve effective competition. The interconnection between different telecommunicationnetworksmeans that they must agree on the determination of access price. Both the waythat access price is decided (compulsive or negotiational, reciprocal or nonreciprocalaccess pricing e.t.) and the level of access price will affect the access incentive oftelecommunication operators and the performance of market competition. So this articlestarting from the access among telecommunication networks, analyzing the effects ofaccess pricing on the competition of telecommunication networks. This article alsoanalyzes the telecommunication market in China, and provides some suggests andpolicesforimprovingcompetitioninthisindustry.This article based on the classic SCPframework.Depending on this frameworkthisarticle analyzes the network structure of telecommunication, the behavior of operatorsand performance of market competition. The structure of telecommunication networks isdescribed as follow, horizontal network structure and vertical network structure. Theformer includes the structures based on cover rate, heterogeneous costs and networkdifference(location). Thelaterincludesverticalintegrationnetworkstructureandverticalseparationnetworkstructure.Using the classic LRT model, this article analyzes the network competition of localtelecommunication market and long-distance telecommunication market.Then accordingto the practice of telecommunication market in China, this article expanding the LRTmodel in order to taking China telecommunication market into account. The expandinclude: the effect of enter determination ofmarket structure, competition among mobilenetworks, competition among fixed and mobile networks, and competition amongfull-businessoperators.In this article, using normative analysis method to analyze competition and access issues in telecommunication industry, and using comparative analysis to compare accesspricingbehavior andthe resultingcompetitionperformanceindifferent market structures.This article also uses empirical analysis to analyze the problems of competition andaccess of telecommunication industry in China. Through the empirical analysis, someassessments are obtained, these assessments include market structure, access priceconfiguration, regulation institution, and price competition in retail market. During theprocessofanalyzingfordifferentstructure,gametheoryisintroduced.Wegetthefollowingopinionsthroughnormative analysisand empiricalanalysis:(1) Market structure, interconnection and then access price is the key factor forimproving effective competition in telecommunication industry. As to China, thestructure, access system cannot provide a perfect competition framework. Deregulationandintroducingcompetitionshouldgoon.(2) The cover rate, the network difference, and cost determinate the finalequilibrium. In equilibrium, access price and retail price would affect the finalperformance. In the case of linear pricing, access price becomes tacit collusioninstrument, but in the case of tow-part pricing, access price doesn’t become tacitcollusioninstrument.(3) The more intense competition in the local telecommunication market, the lowerprice would be in long-distance sector. As to China, the intense competition inlong-distance sector is not the result of the competition in local sector. The reason isaccessschemeinChina.(4) We analyzed a telecommunication market, in which there is an incumbenttelecommunicationfirm who owns alocal networkandfaces potential competitioninthedownstream market (long-distance telecommunication network). Under asymmetric costinformation, the enter decision of the potential competitor will affect the structure ofdownstream market. In other words, the market structure of downstream market is notexogenous. The retail price and access charge are regulated by the welfare-maximizedregulator. If the welfare -maximized regulator want to obtain efficient competitionstructureindownstreammarket,he/shemustmodifythetraditionalRamseypricingrule.(5) In the case of two-part tariff and nondiscriminated pricing, if the retail price isunregulated,thenthe two-wayretail priceis betterthan one-wayretail pricestrictlyfrom the aspects of operator’s profit, consumer’s surplus, and total social welfare. But,currently, a common viewpoint in the reform is that, we should cancel the two-wayretailpricing.Thisreformtrendwas wrongiftheretailpricewouldbeunregulated.(6) In the case of two-part tariff and nondiscriminated pricing, the increase ofmarket share in mobile sector would decrease the retail price of this sector. If the fixedoperators increase access charge, the retail price would be increase and themarket sharewould be decrease for mobile sector.The retail price and access price for fixed networkshave no relationship with market share. From the current trend, FMS is more and moresignificant,sofull-businessoperatoristhefirstbestchoiceforregulators.Theexpands for the LRTmodel aremainlyused fortheChinese telecommunicationmarket, using these expands I got the following policy implications for accomplishingeffectivecompetitioninChina: full-business operators, numberportable,virtual operator,regulationschemeinthisindustry,andtheframeworkofaccessprice.更多还原