【作者】 沈伟；

【导师】 王韬；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 发展中国家广泛的财政分权实践和相应快速的经济增长使人们开始关注财政分权的经济增长效应。但是目前理论与实证研究得到的结论充满了不确定性和矛盾。本文分析了其中存在问题的原因,并在此基础上实证研究了中印财政分权的经济增长效应,为发展中国家的财政分权实践提出了相关建议。首先,将财政分权与经济增长的作用机制归纳为财政支出分权的资源配置效应和财政收入分权的制度环境效应。其中,前者是指将政府作为社会生产的重要部门,由于中央和地方在提供不同公共服务时的财政支出效率存在差异,将资源在中央和地方之间进行重新配置会影响到经济增长。后者是指由于财政收入分权形成的政府间税收竞争改变了政府部门的行为,从而影响到私人部门的产出以及经济增长。接着以此为基础建立了可以反映财政分权与经济增长作用机制的二维实证研究基础模型。其次,分析认为实证研究文献结论差异的主要原因在于样本选择的不同。通过引入最优财政分权度,认为财政分权的经济增长效应取决于实际财政分权度与最优财政分权度的比较关系。同时,研究认为最优财政分权度还具有变动性。这样,当样本期间内最优财政分权度发生变化,就会使实证研究结果产生严重偏差。因此,本文提出了一些实证研究样本选择的限制性条件和检验最优财政分权度是否发生严重变化的方法,并指出实证研究结果仅能说明样本期内财政分权对经济增长的暂时性影响。然后,本文研究了中印财政分权制度、经济发展模式等方面的差异,这些差异分别影响到财政分权指标的设定和实证研究控制变量的选择。中国的财政分权存在于各级政府,需要考虑中央和省、以及省级以下政府的财政分权,而印度的财政分权存在于中央和邦之间,仅需考虑中央和邦之间的财政分权。中国的经济主要靠制造业及对外留易推动,而印度基础设施建设落后,主要依赖服务业和高新技术产业的发展,因此,本文选择进出口贸易、中等职业教育以及高等教育的发展水平来反映两国经济发展模式的差异。最后,实证研究了中印财政分权的经济增长效应。使用中国各省1995～2006年以及印度20个样本邦1996～2004年的面板数据进行回归分析。结果显示,中国的财政支出分权促进了经济增长而财政收入分权阻碍了经济增长,印度的财政支出分权和财政收入分权都促进了经济增长。中印财政支出分权经济增长效应的相似性在很大程度上表明发展中国家财政支出分权对经济增长促进作用的普遍性,同时,财政收入分权经济增长效应的差异表明财政收入分权与经济增长的关系容易受民主、法治基础以及市场经济条件的制约。并据此指出了中印两国财政分权改革的方向,提出了其他发展中国家进行财政分权改革时应该注意的问题。更多还原

【Abstract】 Recently, policy makers and scholars begin to focus on economic growth effects of fiscal decentralization with widely fiscal decentralization practice and corresponding rapid economic growth in developing countries. Theoretical and empirical literatures have gained some conclusions, but these are full of uncertainty and contradiction. This dissertation analyses the reasons of the problems, and based on which analyses the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth for China and India by empirical approach. The conclusions provide experience to developing countries.First, theoretical and empirical literatures don’t clearly know the mechanism between fiscal decentralization and economic growth. The dissertation summarizes it to the allocation effect of fiscal expenditure decentralization and the institute environment effect of fiscal revenue decentralization. The allocation effect is direct approach for fiscal decentralization affecting economic growth. Since the central government and the local government have different fiscal expenditure efficiency when providing different public services, allocating the public resources between the central government and the local government by fiscal expenditure decentralization will affect economic growth. The institute environment effect is indirect approach for fiscal decentralization affecting economic growth. Fiscal revenue decentralization will induce governments’ tax competition and change the governments’ behavior, which consequently affect private department’s output and economic growth. Based on above research, the dissertation establishes two dimensional empirical models to research the economic growth effects of fiscal decentralization.Second, by analyzing the reasons for the differential conclusions of empirical studies, the dissertation finds that the main reason is sample differentia. By introducing the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization, it argues that the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth depends on the comparison between the actual degree and the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization. When the former is less than the latter, fiscal decentralization will promote economic growth, and on the contrarily, it will hinder economic growth. Further research finds the optimal degree is dynamic. When the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization changes, the sample will include two kinds’ data and make the result deviate. Therefore the dissertation argues some restrict conditions for sample choice and the method to check up whether the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization seriously changes. It also makes point that the results only explain the temporality effect of fiscal decentralization to economic growth in sample period.Third, the dissertation studies fiscal decentralization system and the pattern of economic development of China and India. These differences will affect fiscal decentralization index setting and the choice of control variable. It must review the fiscal decentralization below the provincial government for China, but only studies the fiscal decentralization between federal government and state government for India. China’s economic development mainly depends on manufacturing and foreign trade, while India mainly depends on service and high-tech industry due to its behindhand infrastructure. Therefore the dissertation chooses international trade, the development of secondary vocational education and higher education to reflect the difference patterns of economic development between China and India.Finally, the dissertation studies the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth for China and India. According to two dimensional empirical models and panel data of China (1995～2006) and India’s 20 states (1996～2004), the empirical study find that, fiscal expenditure decentralization has promoted the economic growth while fiscal revenue decentralization has hindered the economic growth for China. Both fiscal expenditure decentralization and fiscal revenue decentralization have promoted the economic growth for India. The common grounds in fiscal expenditure decentralization show the promoting effect of fiscal expenditure decentralization is prevalent. The difference in fiscal revenue decentralization show the relationship between fiscal revenue decentralization and economic growth suffer democracy conditions and market economy development. Then the dissertation proposes a guideline of fiscal decentralization reformation for China and India, and some critical suggestions for other developing countries.更多还原