【作者】 邓晓卫；

【导师】 唐齐鸣；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 数量经济学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 公司控制权是公司治理的核心,控制权转移是上市公司治理机制不可或缺的组成部分。此前对于上市公司控制权转移问题的研究基本上集中在控制权转移的效率及影响效率的原因等问题上。如果说这些研究专注于控制权转移后所带来的“果”,那么关于控制权转移的“因”,即,哪些因素对控制权转移产生影响这一方面的研究则不多见,也不够完善。对该问题的研究可以进一步完善和丰富控制权理论;同时,具有如下实践意义:第一,可为机构和个人投资者在控制权市场上提供合适的投资建议,降低接管成本,提高接管成功的概率;第二,由于控制权转移过程中存在追逐控制权转移溢价,掏空目标公司的现象,因此研究控制权转移的影响因素,可为不希望被接管的上市公司设计出合理的防御体系,抵制外部接管;第三,随着股权分置改革的深入,中国上市公司股权结构将由部分流通走向全流通,对该问题的研究将有助于政府相关部门对关系国计民生的国有上市公司实施有效控制,在掌握其控制权的基础上进行资产重组和资源整合,提高国有上市公司的效率,保持国家经济安全、稳定的发展。本文将从理论和实证两个方面对控制权转移的影响因素问题进行全面研究,并从中国控制权转移市场特殊的制度背景出发进行合理解释。本文首先从界定控制权转移等相关概念着手,总结现有关于控制权转移的相关研究成果及西方国家关于控制权转移的动因理论,结合中国资本市场特殊的制度背景,分析影响中国上市公司控制权转移的因素,构建相应的检验指标。这部分内容旨在为后续实证研究中国上市公司控制权转移的影响因素做好理论铺垫。其次,用演化博弈论方法从理论上分析了控制权转移的影响因素。不同于国内外现有文献中关于控制权转移问题理论研究所采用的博弈论方法,本文以经济演化理论为出发点,将企业创新、提高管理效率、降低成本等作为上市公司发生控制权转移的内在动因,利用演化博弈论方法,通过建立数理模型证明了控制权转移市场上“接管者”与“在位者”演化博弈的结果存在演化稳定策略,即,“强”的投资者进入控制权市场获取控制权,“弱”的投资者退出控制权市场;“在位者”的选择是放弃控制权。这一结论一方面从理论上证明了企业进行技术创新、改变无效率的管理以及降低成本等是控制权发生转移的“因”,另一方面也表明,在有效的资本市场,控制权转移确实能起到改善公司治理、优化资源配置进行企业创新的作用。第三,用单因素方差分析(ANOVA)方法横向分析控制权转移的相关影响因素。本文以2002-2006年沪深A股全部上市公司为样本,将上市公司分成两类:发生控制权转移的公司与没发生转移的公司。然后从企业财务指标、股权结构及董事会特征等方面共引入48个指标,将两类公司的这些指标进行均值相等的方差检验。结果表明在全部48个指标中除了九个指标不显著外,其余39个(约占80%)指标均有显著性差异。这说明发生控制权转移的公司与没发生控制权转移的公司具有系统性差异。特别,发生控制权转移的上市公司的创新指标均值显著高于没有发生控制权转移公司的相应均值。这一结论从统计学方法上再次证实了前述理论研究中得到的企业创新是控制权转移的重要影响因素这一结果。最后,运用计量模型研究控制权转移的影响因素,是前一部分研究的深入和细化。与国内外现有文献主要采用Logit模型研究这一问题不同,本文采用面板Logit模型进行研究。首先对面板Logit模型的理论进行了梳理;然后以2002-2004年发生控制权转移的上市公司为样本对相关财务指标、股权结构及董事会特征等对控制权转移的影响进行了实证检验,得到包括主营业务利润率、主营业务收入增长率、每股净资产、总资产等共十一个财务指标以及股权集中度、重要股东持股比例集中度和独立董事比例等指标对控制权转移有显著影响。而后,以2002-2006年发生控制权转移的上市公司为样本,利用面板Logit模型进一步研究了股权分置改革对控制权转移的影响。主要结论为:股权分置改革提高了控制权市场的活跃度,增加了上市公司控制权发生转移的概率。更多还原

【Abstract】 The controlling rights are the focus of corporate governance and controlling right transferring is the indispensable component of governance mechanism of listed companies. The studies on companies’ controlling right transferring are mainly focused on the efficiencies of controlling right transfer and the reasons of influencing transferring efficiencies. That is, these studies are concentrated on the results of controlling right transferring, and what cause controlling right transferring are neglected to some extent so present literatures about the influencing factors are rare and imperfect. Research of this issue can further perfect and enrich the controlling right theories and has practical meanings of it are as follows: firstly, sound investment advice can be given to institutional investors and private investors, and the takeover cost will be reduced and the probability of successful takeover will be increased; Secondly, because controlling right premium is sought during the controlling right transferring process, and the tunneling behavior of target companies are existed, so rational defense system can be designed by studying influencing factors of controlling right to help listed companies which are in takeover risk but not willing to be purchased to resist mergers and acquisitions. Thirdly, with the development of shareholder structure reform, shareholder structures of Chinese listed companies will be changed from partial circulation to full circulation, the investigation about this topic will be helpful for government to control state-owned listed companies which are closely related to the national economy and the people’s livelihood efficiently, and assets reorganization and resource integration can be held based on this foundation, so to improve the efficiencies of state-owned listed companies and keep the development of national economics safely and stably. In this paper, the influencing factors of controlling right transferring are investigated comprehensively from theoretical and empirical point of view, and sound interpretations are given in the special system background of controlling right market in China.Above all, the concept of controlling right is defined. On the foundation of summarizing relative study results about controlling right transferring and the theory of transferring impetus of developed country, combining with the special system background of China capital market, possible influencing factors are analyzed and the corresponding test indices are established. This part is the theory introduction of successive empirical study of controlling right transferring of Chinese listed companies. Secondly, influencing factors are analyzed by using evolutionary game theory. Different from game theory adopted to study controlling right transferring in present literatures, from the evolutionary economics point of view, enterprise innovation, improving management efficiency and decreasing cost, etc, are considered as internal impetus of controlling right transferring in listed companies. Mathematical model is established adopting evolutionary game theory and it is proved that evolutionary stable strategy of evolutionary game result is existed about takeover people and dominators in the controlling right transferring market. That is, powerful investors enter takeover market and obtain the controlling right and weak investors exit the controlling right market. The choice of the dominator is to give up the controlling right. The conclusion theoretically proves that the causes of controlling right transferring are enterprise technical innovation, cost reduction, and the improvement of inefficient management. On the other hand, it also proves that controlling right transferring do improve corporation governance, optimize resource allocation ,and inspire enterprise innovation in efficient capital market.Thirdly, relative influence factors are analyzed by using single factor ANOVA method. In this thesis, annual data of all listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market from 2002 to 2004 are used as samples, which are divided into two categories: listed companies whose controlling right are transferred and listed companies whose controlling right are not. Then 48 indices of corporate financial indices, shareholder structure and directorate characteristics are introduced, and variance test of equal mean about these indices of the two type corporations are made. The test results show that 38 indices, about 80% of all indices are of significant differences and 10 indices are insignificant statistically. So listed companies whose controlling right are transferred and companies whose controlling rights are not transferred are systematically different. Especially, means of innovation indices of companies whose controlling rights transferred are significantly higher than those companies whose controlling rights are not transferred, so the result of foregoing innovation that corporations is the important influencing factor is validated statistically again.Finally, econometrical models are adopted to study the influence factors of controlling right transferring. Different from Logit model adopted in domestic and foreign literatures, panel Logit model is used to investigate this issue. At first, theories of panel Logit model are expounded and summarized, then empirical tests of relative financial indices, shareholder structure and directorate characteristics are made using listed companies whose controlling rights were transferred in 2002-2004. The empirical results show that controlling right transferring are significantly influenced by 11 financial indices, such as total assets, net assets per share, indices of ownership concentration and the proportion of independent directorates. Afterwards, the listed companies are adopted as samples whose controlling right transferred in 2002-2006, and the impact of shareholder structure reform on controlling right transferring is studied using the panel Logit model. The main conclusions are that the shareholder structure reform improve the activity of the market for corporate control and increase the probebility of controlling right transferring.更多还原