【作者】 刘春晖；

【导师】 田国强； 周少甫；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 数量经济学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 拍卖机制的应用由来已久,但作为博弈论和机制设计理论的应用,拍卖机制理论的创立和发展是近50年的事情。1961年维克里的经典文章的发表开启了拍卖机制理论研究的大门,1996年作为拍卖机制理论的开创者维克里获得了诺贝尔经济学奖,至此人们已经广泛认可了拍卖机制的伟大作用。由经济学家设计的各种拍卖机制得到了广泛的应用,世界上大多数国家都实行了政府采购制度,每年数以万亿计的成交额以拍卖(招投标)的形式完成,拍卖机制已经成为我们经济生活中主要的交易方式之一。拍卖机制设计的目的是保证物品(合约)配置的有效性,选择最有竞争力的竞标者获得胜利。由于拍卖过程中有委托代理、信息不对称等问题存在,所以拍卖过程中腐败的现象时有发生,特别是在各项制度不健全的国家和地区。研究拍卖中腐败产生的根源并提出遏制腐败的有效措施成了当务之急,本文针对目前拍卖中出现的腐败现象从理论和应用两方面进行了探讨。首先,大多数人都认为腐败将损害配置的有效性。事实上,在我们设定的经济环境中,先进行贿赂竞争然后进行投标竞争,所有竞标者在这两个阶段地位是对等的情况下,这种腐败并没有损害配置的有效性。若拍卖师在第一阶段得到的“贿赂金”作为物品所有者收入的一部分,那么就不存在腐败,而产生了一个新的拍卖机制—混合密封拍卖机制。其次,我们分析了腐败程度强弱的变化对拍卖结果产生的影响。对度量腐败程度强弱的方法进行了创新并提出了有限腐败的概念,我们以行贿者获得特权的多寡来描述腐败程度的强弱,取代了以前用腐败发生概率的大小描述腐败强弱的方法。在其他竞标者都不知道腐败存在的情况下,我们发现在第一价格拍卖机制中,由于行贿者的多个标价中的最高标价比其他竞标者的标价更强势,导致其他竞标者获胜的概率减少,行贿者获胜的概率增加。而行贿者的其他出标机会所用的出标策略比其他竞标者的出标策略要弱势,所以在保证获胜概率增加的情况下所付出的期望支付有可能比在没有腐败情形下的期望支付还要低。特别地,当行贿者获得更多的出标机会时所采用的出标策略与我们的直觉是有差异的。有限腐败对于物品所有者来说是不利的,他的期望收益随着行贿者的特权的增强而减少。当其他所有竞标者都知道腐败存在的时候,拥有有限特权的竞标者为维持其累积的竞争优势,在估价分布的右侧部分将更强势(与其他竞标者不知腐败存在的情况下相比)。然后,我们分析了采购中的腐败竞争。在一维信息情形下,我们发现在范围很广的经济环境中,采购是概率为一地以保留价成交,也即是说腐败的存在促成了竞标者之间的共谋。在多维信息情况下,腐败是由委托代理问题引起的,我们发现腐败的存在减弱了招投标配置合约的有效性,腐败所引起的无效率成本是和代理人的操控能力是一致的。这为我们在招投标中规范评标委员会成员行为的规则提供了理论支持。最后,我们就我国政府采购制度的形成、发展、现状及目前我国政府采购中存在的腐败产生的根源进行了分析。提出了从政府采购预算编制、法律体系完善、监管制度的完善、加强人才培训和逐步完善政府采购电子化等几方面采取措施以减少或预防政府采购中腐败的发生。更多还原

【Abstract】 The application of the auction mechanism has been so for quite a long time. However, as the application of game theory and the mechanism design, the auction theory was only created and has been developing over the past fifty years. The magnificent paper was published by Vickrey in 1961 and then the research about auction theory sprung up like mush-rooms. The pioneer of the auction theory, Vickrey, was honored Nobel prize in 1996, and at the same time people became to recognize that auctions play an important role in our lives. All kinds of auctions designed by the economists are widely applied. Government procurements are put to practice in many countries. Millions of dollars were transacted in the form of auction every year. Auction mechanism has become one of the main forms of deal the economy industry. The aim of the design of auction mechanism is to assure the efficiency in equipping commodities (or contracts) and to choose the most competitive winner. Because of many reasons, such as principal-agent and the asymmetry of information etc., corruptions often arise in the process of auctions, especially in countries and regions where the economic system is imperfect. Our priority is to find the root of the corruption and to propose effective measures. In this essay, the corruptions are analyzed from two aspects: theory and application.Firstly, many people believe that corruptions undermine the equipment efficiency. Practically, under the given economic environment, the stage of bidding is after the stage of bribe, so all bidders are equal in two stages. This kind of corruption does not impact the effectiveness of the mechanism. If the bribery fund the auctioneer get in the firs stage is a part of the revenue of the owner, then there is no corruption, and there exists a new auction mechanism—the fixed sealed auction.Secondly, the effect of the variation in the level of the corruption is investigated. A new concept of limited corruption is created to describe the level of the corruption, by using the special right that the briber gets to describe the level of corruption in stead of the probability that the corruption happens. In second price sealed-bid auction, we find that the corruption does not affect the bidders’ behavior and the outcome, since bidding the true valuation constitutes the weak dominant strategy. With regard to the first price sealed-bid auction, changes are distinct due to the limited corruption. In equilibrium, the highest bid of the briber will be more aggressive than the bids of any other bidders, which decreases other bidders’ winning probabilities and increases the briber’s winning probability, and the other bids of the briber will be less aggressive than the bid of any other bidders. The briber’s expected payoff rises where his expected payment might be less than the counterpart of the corresponding standard first price auction. Specifically, the briber’s bidding strategy differs from normal intuition if the briber has the right to submit more "legitimate" bids. The expected revenue apparently decreases, which harms the interest of the owner of the auctioned object. When every one knows the existence of the corruption, the bidder who has special right will be more aggressive at the right of the interval of the valuation distribution to keep his accumulative advantage.Thirdly, the competition and corruption in procurements or in auctions are discussed. Under the circumstance of one-dimensional information, we find that in wide economy environment, procurements are done at the reserved price with probability of one, that is to say corruptions help to shape collusion between bidders. Under the circumstance of multiple-dimensional information, the principal agent gives rise to corruption. It is shown that corruptions do harm the equipped efficiency; the cost of the efficient bidder to win is consistent with the manipulation power of the agent. That is why we standardize the behavior of the assessment committee.Lastly, investigation is carried out on the origination, development and current situation about the institution of government procurement, and the source of the corruptions in our government procurement. Some efficient measures are proposed to subtract or to prevent the corruptions in government procurement, for example, to perfect budget making, to improve the law system and the system of the management by supervision, to reinforce the specialist education and to computerize government procurement service.更多还原